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ABSTRACT 
THE CHALLENGE OF STICKINESS IN KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER AMONG 
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY (ICT) FIRMS IN 
MALAYSIAN TECHNOLOGY PARKS 
 
The study examines knowledge transfer between firms by using the concept of stickiness 
to conceptualise problems with knowledge transfer. The concept of stickiness is sub-
divided into “macro” and “micro” levels stickiness. As for “macro” level stickiness, the 
study uses literature in the field of innovation studies, in which governments have been 
identified as major contributors to macro level stickiness. The study uses literature in the 
economics of knowledge and evolutionary economics to develop the concept of “micro” 
level stickiness, which refers to firms‟ contributions to stickiness. Four factors are used to 
examine micro stickiness: transfer mechanisms, types of transfer, knowledge barriers, 
and transfer contexts.  
 
After explaining the concept of stickiness and providing a background to technology 
parks policy, the study examines the perceptions of a variety of informants of stickiness 
in  knowledge  transfer  among  ICT  firms  in  Malaysian  technology  parks.  The  study 
approached seven (out of eleven) Malaysian technology parks, over a period of three 
months in 2005 (May-July 2005) and a month in 2007 (August 2007). It interviewed fifty 
(50) informants, who included policy makers, government officers, and executives of ICT 
firms in Malaysian technology parks.  
 
With respect to “macro” level stickiness, policy makers and government confirmed that 
the government cannot exclude previous policy documents that contained three major 
elements:  national  unity,  foreign  direct  investment  and  sound  economic  growth  to 
formulate  policy  for  Malaysian  technology  parks,  which  does  not  solely  encourage 
knowledge transfer because the policy documents permitted short term profit taking by 
ICT firms. 
 
With respect to “micro” level stickiness, the results suggest that transfer mechanisms, 
types of transfer, knowledge barriers, and transfer contexts are costly; thus, impede ICT 
firms from participating actively in knowledge transfer between ICT firms. This study 
suggests that the government and ICT firms should work closely to facilitate knowledge 
transfer between ICT firms in Malaysian technology parks. 
         
                     iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DECLARATION ................................................................................................................ ii 
ABSTRACT  ....................................................................................................................... iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  ................................................................................................... iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................. vii 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... xiv 
LIST OF APPENDICES ................................................................................................... xv 
LIST OF ACRONYMS ................................................................................................... xvi 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Research objective .................................................................................................... 2 
1.2 Definition of “Stickiness” ......................................................................................... 3 
1.3 Stickiness understanding in theoretical terms ........................................................... 6 
1.4 Stickiness understanding in practical terms ............................................................ 10 
1.5 Research question and assumptions ........................................................................ 12 
1.6 Research methodology ............................................................................................ 13 
1.7 Organisation of chapters ......................................................................................... 15 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................... 16 
2.1 Origin of stickiness ................................................................................................. 17 
2.2 “Macro” level stickiness ......................................................................................... 25 
2.2.1 Economic policies ............................................................................................ 26 
2.2.2 Technology parks ............................................................................................. 31 
2.3 “Micro” level stickiness .......................................................................................... 33 
2.3.1 Transfer mechanisms ....................................................................................... 34 
2.3.2 Types of transfer .............................................................................................. 37 
2.3.3 Knowledge transfer barriers  ............................................................................. 39 
2.3.4 Transfer contexts  .............................................................................................. 41 
2.4 Summary ................................................................................................................. 42 
CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND TO TECHNOLOGY PARKS POLICY ....................... 45 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 46 
3.1.1 Economic approaches ...................................................................................... 47 
3.1.2 History.............................................................................................................. 49 
3.2 Five periods of Malaysian economic development ................................................ 50 
3.2.1 Agriculture export trade (1786-1949) .............................................................. 50 
3.2.2 Import substitution industrialisation (1950-1960) ........................................... 53 
3.2.3 Labour intensive industrialisation (1961-1980) ............................................... 57 
3.2.4 Capital intensive industrialisation (1981-1995) ............................................... 62 
3.2.5 Knowledge intensive industrialisation (1996-2007) ........................................ 67 
3.3 Knowledge-based economy and Technology Parks ............................................... 72 
3.3.1 Investment needs  .............................................................................................. 72 
3.3.2 Knowledge-based economy indicators ............................................................ 79 
3.3.3 Reasons for the knowledge-based economy .................................................... 89 
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY .................................................................................... 95   v 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 96 
4.2 Methods used in previous studies ........................................................................... 98 
4.3 Methods used in this study  .................................................................................... 100 
4.4 Justification for qualitative method ...................................................................... 100 
4.5 Data collection ...................................................................................................... 102 
4.5.1 Before data collection .................................................................................... 102 
4.5.2 During data collection .................................................................................... 103 
4.6 Instruments used in data collection ....................................................................... 109 
4.7 Data analysis ......................................................................................................... 111 
CHAPTER 5: MACRO LEVEL STICKINESS AND MALAYSIAN TECHNOLOGY 
PARKS  ............................................................................................................................ 114 
5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 114 
5.2 Feedback from policy makers ............................................................................... 117 
5.2.1 Policy makers response to Question 1 ........................................................... 119 
5.2.2 Policy makers response to Question 2 ........................................................... 127 
5.2.3 Policy makers response to Question 3 ........................................................... 129 
5.3 Feedback from government officers ..................................................................... 132 
5.3.1 Government officers response to Question 1 ................................................. 133 
5.3.2 Government officers response to Question 2 ................................................. 138 
5.3.3 Government officers response to Question 3 ................................................. 143 
5.4 Feedback from firms‟ representatives  ................................................................... 147 
5.4.1 Firms‟ representatives response to Question 1 .............................................. 149 
5.4.2 Firms‟ representatives response to Question 2 .............................................. 152 
5.4.3 Firms‟ representatives response to Question 3 .............................................. 153 
5.5 Summary of Findings  ............................................................................................ 156 
CHAPTER 6: MICRO LEVEL STICKINESS AND MALAYSIAN TECHNOLOGY 
PARKS  ............................................................................................................................ 160 
6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 160 
6.1.1 Background of Malaysian Technology Parks ................................................ 162 
6.1.2 Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC)  ................................................................ 163 
6.1.3 Technology Park Malaysia (TPM)................................................................. 163 
6.1.4 Cyberjaya (CB) .............................................................................................. 164 
6.1.5 Selangor Science Park (SSP) ......................................................................... 164 
6.1.6 Seri Iskandar Technology Park (SITP) .......................................................... 164 
6.1.7 Johor Technology Park (JTP) ........................................................................ 165 
6.1.8 Kulim High Technology Park (KHTP) .......................................................... 165 
6.2 Responses of ICT firms on “micro” stickiness ..................................................... 168 
6.2.1 ICT Firm 1 ..................................................................................................... 168 
6.2.2 ICT Firm 2 ..................................................................................................... 169 
6.2.3 ICT Firm 3 ..................................................................................................... 170 
6.2.4 ICT Firm 4 ..................................................................................................... 172 
6.2.5 ICT Firm 5 ..................................................................................................... 173 
6.2.6 ICT Firm 6 ..................................................................................................... 174 
6.2.7 ICT Firm 7 ..................................................................................................... 175 
6.2.8 ICT Firm 8 ..................................................................................................... 176 
6.2.9 ICT Firm 9 ..................................................................................................... 177   vi 
6.2.10 ICT Firm 10 ................................................................................................. 178 
6.2.11 ICT Firm 11 ................................................................................................. 179 
6.2.12 ICT Firm 12 ................................................................................................. 180 
6.2.13 ICT Firm 13 ................................................................................................. 181 
6.2.14 ICT Firm 14 ................................................................................................. 182 
6.2.15 ICT Firm 15 ................................................................................................. 183 
6.2.16 ICT Firm 16 ................................................................................................. 184 
6.2.17 ICT Firm 17 ................................................................................................. 185 
6.2.18 ICT Firm 18 ................................................................................................. 185 
6.2.19 ICT Firm 19 ................................................................................................. 186 
6.2.20 ICT Firm 20 ................................................................................................. 187 
6.2.21 ICT Firm 21 ................................................................................................. 188 
6.2.22 ICT Firm 22 ................................................................................................. 189 
6.2.23 ICT Firm 23 ................................................................................................. 190 
6.2.24 ICT Firm 24 ................................................................................................. 191 
6.2.25 ICT Firm 25 ................................................................................................. 192 
6.3 Cross analysis on “Micro” level stickiness ........................................................... 197 
CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION  .......................................................................................... 210 
7.1 “Macro” level stickiness ....................................................................................... 211 
7.2 “Micro” level stickiness ........................................................................................ 224 
7.3 Linkage between the results of the “macro” and “micro” levels stickiness ......... 232 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 236 
8.1 Limitations of the study ........................................................................................ 237 
8.2 Future directions of the study ............................................................................... 239 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 242 
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................ 250 
Appendix 1: Cover letter ............................................................................................. 250 
Appendix 2: Interview questions ................................................................................. 252 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   vii 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I thank and praise Allah, God the Almighty, who gave me the capability to complete my 
study.  
 
I also thank my parents, the late Tuan Mhd Sarif Darham and Puan Robeah Haji Zakaria, 
my parents-in-law, Tuan Haji Yahya Haji Jamin and Puan Aishah Hashim, my wife, Puan 
Rohaziah Haji Yahya, and all my family members for their patience and support. 
 
My heartiest gratitude to my supervisors, Associate Professor Dr. Richard Joseph, Dr. Ian 
Cook, and Mr. Yusof Ismail for their constructive comments, advice, encouragement, and 
patience throughout my doctoral candidature. 
 
I  would  like  to  thank  the  Government  of  Malaysia  and  its  agencies,  particularly  the 
Public Services Department of Malaysia, Ministry of Higher Education Malaysia and 
International Islamic University Malaysia which provided the scholarship, allowances, 
and research fund to enable the research to be conducted successfully in 48 months (4 
years).  A  big  thank  you  to  the  Ministry  of  Higher  Education  Malaysia  and  the 
International Islamic University for the privilege they gave me for the two consecutive 
extensions of study leave.  
 
I also thank staff of Murdoch University, particularly Associate Professor Beverly Thiele, 
Associate Professor Graham O‟Hara, Ms. Georgina Wright, Dr. Julia Hobson, and Mr. 
Colin  Beasley  for  providing  the  guidance  and  motivation  during  the  progress  of  my 
studies. Also, I wish to thank all staff and postgraduate students of Murdoch Business 
School of Murdoch University for their encouragement and support. 
 
I  also  wish  to  thank  my  colleagues,  friends,  individuals,  and  informants  for  their 
contribution to my research, particularly informants from the Economic Planning Unit 
(EPU), Prime Minister‟s Department of Malaysia, Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Innovation Malaysia, Ministry of International Trade and Industry Malaysia, Ministry of 
Finance, and the state governments of Kedah, Perak, Selangor, and Johor. Not to forget 
also, the informants from the Multimedia Super Corridor, Technology Park Malaysia, 
Cyberjaya, Selangor Science Park, Johor Technology Park, Kulim Hi-Tech Park, and Seri 
Iskandar Technology Park. 
 
Last but not least, I wish to thank personally all individuals and institutions (named here 
or  not)  that  have  contributed  directly  or  indirectly  to  the  completion  of  my  PhD 
dissertation.   viii 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Descriptions  Page 
 
Table 1: The Evolution of “Stickiness” Concept   
5 
 
Table 2: A Summary of “Stickiness” Concept Development 
 
34 
Table 2.1: “Macro” Level Stickiness Concept Development and the Gaps 
 
42 
Table 2.2: “Micro” Level Stickiness Concept Development 
 
43 
Table 2.3: Micro “Stickiness” Concept in Practice and the Gaps 
 
44 
Table 3.1: Transitional Indicators from the Production-based Economy to a 
Knowledge-based Economy 
 
76 
Table 3.2: Malaysia‟s Economic Capability for Knowledge  79 
 
Table 3.3: Potential Workforce from School level in Malaysia  80 
 
Table 3.4a: Potential Workforce from Undergraduate Tertiary level in 
Malaysia 
 
81 
 
Table 3.4b: Potential Workforce from Graduate Tertiary level in Malaysia  81 
 
Table 3.5: Percentage of Professional, Technical and Related Workers of Total 
Employment in 1997 
 
 
82 
Table 3.6: Access to Information and Knowledge  84 
 
Table 3.7: Knowledge-based Economy Development Index 2000-2004  85 
 
Table 3.8: Science and Technology Indicators  86 
 
Table 3.9: Private and Government Fixed Capital Formation (% Gross 
Domestic Product) (1970-2005) 
 
87 
 
Table 3.10: Private and Government Fixed Capital Formation (% of Total 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation) (1970-2005) 
 
 
88 
   ix 
Table 3.11: Total FDI Inflows by Country (1990-1997) (in US$)  90 
 
Table 3.12: Labour cost and value added per worker in manufacturing (US$ 
per year) 
 
90 
 
Table 3.13: Development Planning Documents  93 
Table 4.1: Summary of Research Question, Propositions and Unit of Analysis  97 
Table 4.2: Summary of Methods Used in Previous Studies on “Micro” 
Stickiness 
99 
Table 4.3: The Basis for the Interview Questions on “Macro” Level Stickiness  106 
Table 4.4: The Basis for the Interview Questions on “Micro” Level Stickiness  108 
Table 4.5: Informants‟ Codes and Profiles  110 
Table 4.6: Summary of Research Question, Propositions, Unit of Analysis, and 
Interview Questions 
 
112 
Table 5.1: Summary of Responses on “Macro” Stickiness Interview Questions  115 
Table 5.2: Summary of Policy Makers Responses to “Macro” Stickiness 
Interview Questions 
118 
Table 5.2a: Factors Considered in the Malaysian Economic Policies according 
to 14 Policy Makers 
120 
Table 5.2b: Reasons for National Agenda in Malaysian Economic Policies 
according to Policy Makers 
127 
Table 5.2c: The Roles of Malaysian Technology Parks assist Knowledge 
Transfer among ICT firms according to Policy Makers 
130 
Table 5.2d: The Responses of Policy Makers on Three Interview Questions of 
“Macro” Stickiness 
132 
Table 5.3: Summary of Government Officers Responses to “Macro” Stickiness 
Interview Questions 
133 
Table 5.3a: Factors Considered in the Malaysian Economic Policies by 
Government Officers 
134 
Table 5.3b: A Comparison between Responses from Policy Makers and 
Government Officers 
135 
Table  5.3c:  Reasons  for  National  Agenda  in  Malaysian  Economic  Policies 
according to  Government Officers 
139   x 
Table 5.3d: National Agenda in Malaysian Economic Policies: A Comparison 
between Responses from Policy Makers and Government Officers 
143 
Table 5.3e: The Roles of Malaysian Technology Parks that assist Knowledge 
Transfer among ICT firms according to Government Officers 
144 
Table  5.3f:  Most  Important  Roles  of  Malaysian  Technology  Parks  in 
Knowledge  Transfer  among  ICT  firms:  A  Comparison  between  Responses 
from Policy Makers and Government Officers 
 
146 
Table 5.3g: The Key Responses of Government Officers on Three Interview 
Questions of “Macro” Stickiness 
147 
Table  5.4:  Summary  of  Firms  Representatives  Responses  to  “Macro” 
Stickiness Interview Questions 
148 
Table 5.4a: Factors Considered in the Malaysian Economic Policies by Firms‟ 
Representatives 
150 
Table  5.4b:  The  Most  Important  Factors  Considered  in  the  Malaysian 
Economic Policies: A Comparison between Responses from Policy Makers, 
Government Officers and Firms‟ Representatives 
 
151 
Table  5.4c:  Reasons  for  National  Agenda  in  Malaysian  Economic  Policies 
according to Firms‟ Representatives 
152 
Table 5.4d: The Most Important Reasons for National Agenda in Malaysian 
Economic Policies: A Comparison between Responses from Policy Makers, 
Government Officers and Firms‟ Representatives 
 
153 
Table 5.4e: The Roles of Malaysian Technology Parks assisting Knowledge 
Transfer among ICT firms according to firms‟ representatives 
 
154 
Table  5.4f:  The  Key  Roles  of  Malaysian  Technology  Parks  in  Knowledge 
Transfer among ICT firms:  A Comparison between  Responses from Policy 
Makers, Government Officers and Firms‟ Representatives 
 
155 
Table 5.4g: The Key Responses of Firms Representatives on Three Interview 
Questions of “Macro” Stickiness 
156 
Table 5.5: Summary of Key Findings  156 
Table 5.5a: Research Question, Propositions and Key Findings for  “Macro” 
Stickiness on Knowledge Transfer among ICT firms 
158 
Table 6.1: Background of  Seven Malaysian Technology Parks  161   xi 
Table  6.2:  Major  Economic  Policies  that  Promoted  Malaysian  Technology 
Parks 
162 
Table 6.3a: The Background of ICT Firms‟ Representatives  167 
Table 6.3b: The Distribution of Firms‟ Representatives from Seven Malaysian 
Technology Parks 
167 
Table 6.4a: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 1  169 
Table 6.4b: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm  170 
Table 6.4c: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 3  172 
Table 6.4d: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 4  173 
Table 6.4e: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 5  174 
Table 6.4f: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 6  175 
Table 6.4g: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 7  176 
Table 6.4h: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 8  177 
Table 6.4i: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 9  178 
Table 6.4j: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 10  179 
Table 6.4k: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 11  180 
Table 6.4l: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 12  181 
Table 6.4m: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 13  182 
Table 6.4n: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 14  183   xii 
Table 6.4o: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 15  183 
Table 6.4p: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 16  184 
Table 6.4q: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 17  185 
Table 6.4r: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 18  186 
Table 6.4s: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 19  187 
Table 6.4t: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 20  188 
Table 6.4u: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 21  189 
Table 6.4v: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 22  190 
Table 6.4w: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 23  191 
Table 6.4x: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 24  192 
Table 6.4y: Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 25  192 
Table  6.5:  Summary  of  Firms  Representatives  Responses  to  “Micro” 
Stickiness Questions 
193 
Table  6.5a:  Summary  of  Firms  Representatives  Respond  to  All  Aspects  of  
“Micro” Stickiness 
194 
Table  6.6:  Cross  Analysis  on  Firms  Representatives  Responses  to  “Micro” 
Stickiness Aspects 
195 
Table 6.6a: “Micro” Stickiness Trend at Cyberjaya  197 
Table 6.6b: “Micro” Stickiness Trend at Technology Park Malaysia  198 
Table  6.6c:  Comparison  on  “Micro”  Stickiness  Trend  at  Cyberjaya  and 
Technology Park Malaysia 
198   xiii 
Table 6.6d: “Micro” Stickiness Trend at Selangor Science Park  199 
Table  6.6e:  Comparison  on  “Micro”  Stickiness  Trend  at  Cyberjaya, 
Technology Park Malaysia, and Selangor Science Park 
 
200 
Table 6.6f: “Micro” Stickiness Trend at Multimedia Super Corridor  200 
Table 6.6g: Comparison on “Micro” Stickiness Trend at Federal Government‟s 
Technology Parks 
 
201 
Table 6.6h: “Micro” Stickiness Trend at KHTP, SITP, and JTP  201 
Table  6.6i: Comparison  of  “Micro”  Stickiness  Trends  at  State  Government 
Technology Parks 
 
202 
Table  6.6j:  Comparison  on  “Micro”  Stickiness  between  Three  Federal 
Government Technology Parks and Four State Government Technology Parks 
203 
Table  6.7:  Cross  Analysis  on  Firms  Representatives  Responses  to  “Micro” 
Stickiness Aspects for the Degree of Costliness 
 
205 
Table 6.8: The Degree of Costliness of “Micro” Stickiness at Three Federal 
Government Technology Parks and Four State Government Technology Parks 
 
206 
Table  6.9:  Research  Question,  Proposition,  “Micro”  Stickiness  Aspects, 
Interview Questions and Key Findings for “Micro” Stickiness on Knowledge 
Transfer among ICT firms 
 
208 
Table 6.10: Proposition, Interview Questions and Key Findings for  “Micro” 
Stickiness on Knowledge Transfer among ICT firms 
 
209 
Table 7.1: Summary of Feedbacks from the Informants  210 
Table 7.2: Key Indicators from the Feedbacks from the Informants  212 
Table 7.3: The basis for Key Ideas  213 
Table 7.4: The Summary of the Research Findings  233   xiv 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Descriptions  Page 
 
Figure 1.1: Contents of Chapter 1 
 
1 
Figure 1.2: The Evolution of “Stickiness” Concept  5 
Figure 2.1: Contents of Chapter 2 
 
16 
Figure 2.2: Framework for Stickiness 
 
24 
Figure 2.3: Sweeney (1996) illustration of „macro‟ stickiness  
 
27 
Figure 3.1: Contents of Chapter 3 
 
45 
Figure 3.2: Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and knowledge 
 
78 
Figure 3.3: The Flow of Policy Making in Malaysia 
 
83 
Figure 4.1: Contents of Chapter 4  95   xv 
LIST OF APPENDICES 
Descriptions  Page 
 
Appendix 1: Cover letter  250 
 
Appendix 2: Mail survey questionnaire  251 
 
Appendix 3: Interview questions  252 
 
                 
             
                 xvi 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
EPU  Economic Planning Unit 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
FTZ  Free Trade Zone 
GDP  Gross Domestic Products 
ICT  Information and Communication Technology 
IMP  Industrial Master Plan 
JTP  Johor Technology Park 
KDI  Knowledge-based Economy Index 
KHTP  Kulim Hi-Tech Park 
MP  Malaysia Plan 
MSC  Multimedia Super Corridor 
MTDC  Malaysia Technology Development Corporation 
MTR  Mid Term Review 
NEP  New Economic Policy 
NKDC  National Knowledge-based Economy Development Council 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OPP  Outline Perspective Plan 
PIKOM  Persatuan  Industri  Komputer  Malaysia  (Computer  Industry 
Association of Malaysia) 
TFP  Total Factor Productivity 
TPM  Technology Park Malaysia 
PIA  Promotion Investment Act 
SITP  Seri Iskandar Technology Park 
SMIDEC  Small and Medium Industries Development Corporation 
SSP  Selangor Science Park 
   1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
An overview of the study is presented in seven parts: (a) the research objective, (b) a 
definition of „stickiness,‟ understanding of stickiness in (c) theoretical and (d) practical 
terms,  (e)  research  question  and  assumptions,  (f)  research  methodology,  and  (g)  the 
organisation of chapters of the study. Figure 1 illustrates the discussion of Chapter 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Research 
objectives 
1.2 Definition of 
stickiness 
1.3 Stickiness understanding 
in theoretical terms 
1.4 Stickiness 
understanding in 
practical terms 
1.5 Research question 
and assumptions 
1.6 Research 
methodology 
1.7 Organisation 
of chapters 
* To develop and use 
stickiness to conceptualise 
knowledge transfer 
difficulties between firms 
* Specific to “learning,” 
“doing,” and “remembering” 
* Lead authors: Arrow 
(1962), Teece (1977), Nelson 
& Winter (1982), Von Hippel 
(1994), and Szulanski (1996) 
* Arrow (1962, p.155) “learning by 
doing” 
* Teece (1977, pp.245-246) “cost of 
transfer” 
* Nelson & Winter (1982, pp.99-101) 
“remembering” and “doing” 
* Von Hippel (1994, p.430) “sticky 
information” 
* Szulanski (1996, p.32) “stickiness” 
knowledge 
* Policy makers 
* Government officers 
* ICT Firms 
* Research question: Why is knowledge 
transfer difficult between ICT firms? 
* Assumptions: 
1. Economic policies & „macro‟ stickiness 
2. Technology parks & „macro‟ stickiness 
3. Transfer mechanism & „micro‟ 
stickiness 
4. Types of transfer & „micro‟ stickiness 
5. Knowledge barrier & „micro‟ stickiness 
6. Transfer contexts & „micro‟ stickiness 
* Qualitative method; personal 
interview technique 
* Informants: policy makers, 
government officers, and firms 
* Note taking approach 
* Content analysis 
 
1. Introduction 
2. Literature review 
3. Background to technology parks policy 
4. Research methodology 
5. „Macro‟ level stickiness and Malaysian technology parks 
6. „Micro‟ level stickiness and Malaysian technology parks 
7. Discussion 
8. Conclusion 
Figure 1.1. Contents of Chapter 1 
   2 
The purpose of the research is to examine the phenomenon of „stickiness‟ in knowledge 
transfer among ICT firms in Malaysian technology parks. „Stickiness‟ is explained in 
theoretical and practical terms as it permeates the entire study. The research question and 
the  contribution  to  the  present  research  to  the  literature  on  knowledge  transfer  are 
addressed in a separate section. To develop the research question, the author reviewed 
previous  studies  that  have  contributed  to  the  body  of  knowledge  transfer.  The 
assumptions extracted from the literature provide only tentative answers to the research 
question. These assumptions will be confirmed empirically. The research methodology 
explains how the answers to the research question can be obtained from the informants 
involved in the study. 
 
1.1 Research objective 
The study aims to make an original contribution to the literature concerning knowledge 
transfer by examining difficulties with knowledge transfer within and among firms in 
Malaysian  technology  parks.  In  doing  so,  the  study  uses  a  specific  concept  called 
“stickiness” to address the problems with knowledge transfer between information and 
communication  technology  (ICT)  firms  in  selected  Malaysian  technology  parks.  The 
study deals with „the challenge of stickiness in knowledge transfer between ICT firms in 
selected Malaysian technology parks.‟ “Stickiness” represents one of the ways to explain 
knowledge transfer difficulties between ICT firms. The study chooses ICT firms because 
these firms are knowledge intensive and need to be proactive in knowledge transfer to be 
successful.  However,  the  study  chooses  ICT  firms  in  Malaysian  technology  parks   3 
because policy makers expect technology parks to play a role in encouraging knowledge 
transfer.  
  
1.2 Definition of “Stickiness” 
There  are  several  definitions  of  „stickiness‟  from  the  literature.  Firstly,  an  article  by 
Gabriel Szulanski entitled “Exploring internal stickiness:  Impediments to the transfer of 
best  practice  within  the  firm”,  published  in  the  Strategic  Management  Journal 
(Szulanski,  1996,  p.  27),  discussed  in  detail  the  role  of  “stickiness”  that  impedes 
knowledge  transfer  within  firms.  Secondly,  an  article  by  Eric  von  Hippel,  entitled  “ 
„Sticky information‟ and the locus of problem solving: Implications for innovation” and 
published in Management Science, (Von Hippel, 1994, p. 430), discussed the increase of 
cost  of  transfer  when  knowledge  is  transferred  from  one  firm  to  another  firm. 
Additionally, some articles discussed “stickiness” in relations to “price” (Fougere, Le 
Bihan, & Sevestre, 2007, p. 247) and “rental rates” (Lai, Wang, & Yang, 2007, p. 159). 
While the term has been employed with some divergent meanings, this study refers to 
“stickiness” specifically to explain knowledge transfer difficulties between ICT firms in 
Malaysian technology parks.   
 
From a more in-depth examination of uses for the literature review, the author observed 
that  the  term  “stickiness”  was  not  first  used  in  this  way  by  the  lead  authors  in  the 
literature of knowledge transfer. The term “stickiness” originated from Arrow (1962, p. 
155)  who  used  the  term    “learning  by  doing”  to  reflect  organisational  investment  in 
knowledge in terms of hiring people and purchasing of resources. The difficulties of 
“learning by doing” in organisations have been illustrated by Arrow (1969, p. 33) when   4 
he used the communication process metaphor to explain the technical knowledge transfer 
process.  Later, Teece (1977, p. 245) used Arrow‟s (1962, p. 155) “learning by doing” to 
look at costs associated with manufacturing technology transfer. 
 
Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 99) argued that organisations perform at least two activities, 
namely “remembering” and “doing”, to achieve organisational goals, with both done at 
the  organisation‟s expense. Subsequently, Szulanski (1995, pp. 437-438) introduced the 
term  “stickiness”  when  discussing  the  costs  associated  with    maximising  knowledge 
transfer between firms. As such, Szulanski identified two aspects of knowledge that need 
attention: “knowledge characteristics” and “situation characteristics” (Szulanski, 1995, p. 
437).  Szulanski‟s  (1995,  p.  437)  proposition  was  based  on  Arrow‟s  (1969,  p.  33) 
contention that knowledge transfer can be understood as a communication process. Based 
on the above analyses of “stickiness,” this study adopts the meaning of “stickiness” to 
refer to costs that firms incur in implementing knowledge transfer between firms.  
 
In short, the concept of “stickiness” in the literature evolved from Arrow‟s (1962, p.155) 
“learning  by  doing”  in  very  general  form  to  Szulanski‟s  (1995,  p.437).  Table  1 
summarizes the evolution.   5 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
The Evolution of “Stickiness” Concept  
Authors  Concept  Items  “Stickiness” 
Arrow (1962, p.155)  “learning by doing”  people and 
resources 
investment on people and 
resources 
Arrow (1969, p.33)  “learning by doing”  technical 
knowledge and 
people 
communicating technical 
knowledge to other people 
Teece (1977, p.245)  “learning by doing”  technical 
knowledge and 
people 
transfer of manufacturing 
technology 
Nelson and Winter 
(1982, p.99) 
“remembering” and “doing”  people, knowledge 
and context 
people, resource and 
organization interact to 
achieve organizational 
goals 
Von Hippel (1994, 
p.430) 
“sticky” information  cost related to 
workers, resources 
cost increase when transfer 
in other contexts 
Szulanski (1995, p.437)  “stickiness”  people and context  knowledge with people and 
situation 
 
The evolution of the concept of “stickiness” as presented in Table 1 can be illustrated in 
Figure 1.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  Figure 1.2. The Evolution of “Stickiness” Concept 
 
“learning by doing” by people and resources 
“learning by doing” in technical knowledge transfer 
“learning by doing” in manufacturing knowledge 
transfer 
“remembering” and “doing” by people 
“sticky” information 
“stickiness” 
Arrow (1962, p.155) 
Arrow (1969, p.33) 
Teece (1977, p.245) 
Nelson and Winter (1982, p.99) 
Von Hippel (1994, p.430) 
Szulanski (1995, p.437)   6 
The study sub-divided the discussion of “stickiness” into “macro” and “micro” levels of 
stickiness to explain the influence of external and internal factors on knowledge transfer 
between ICT firms. The author argues that “macro” level stickiness is created by the 
government,  through  economic  policies  that  do  not  support  meaningful  knowledge 
transfer between firms due to a national agenda.  As for “micro” level stickiness, the 
author  argues  that  “micro”  level  stickiness  is  contributed  by  ICT  firms  because  the 
owners of ICT firms perceived that knowledge transfer means that they have to incur 
additional costs. Therefore, firms have the tendency to avoid costly knowledge transfer to 
maximize profits.  
 
1.3 Stickiness understanding in theoretical terms 
This part provides an explanation of the concept of stickiness as it emerges from the 
literature on knowledge transfer. This concept is important to ICT firms because it affects 
their decision to  participate  in  knowledge  transfer.  The importance of a  concept  like 
stickiness  in  theoretical  terms  has  been  demonstrated  by  Arrow  (1962,  p.  155)  who 
identified costs associated with the learning that occurred within organisations. Arrow 
(1962, p. 155) used the term “learning by doing” to refer to organisational investment in 
learning in terms of hiring people and purchasing resources. The logic for investment in 
for-profit organisations is to produce reasonable returns on investments. In this context, 
Arrow (1969, p. 32) identified costs associated with learning in organisations that were 
part of organisational investment. Arrow (1969, p. 32) argued that the cost of transfer was 
a factor that influenced organisations to pursue knowledge transfer. To demonstrate the 
cost of knowledge transfer, which in the context of this thesis suggests the presence of   7 
stickiness, Arrow (1969, p. 29) examined the communication process involved in the 
transfer of technical knowledge . The communication process has four basic elements: 
“the sender,” “the recipient,” the knowledge that is being transferred and “the channel” 
used to transfer the knowledge (Arrow, 1969, p.33).  
 
The understanding that Arrow demonstrated in terms of “learning by doing”  (Arrow, 
1962, p. 155) and the costs that are associated with “doing” in the context of technical 
knowledge transfer were traced back to effects that derived from the main components of  
communication process (Arrow, 1969, p. 33). This is because “doing” (Arrow, 1962, p. 
155) is associated with each firm‟s actions and interactions, which are part of the firms‟ 
resources.  To  acquire  those  resources,  firms  need  to  purchase  devices  and  to  hire 
individuals with different skills and competencies.  
 
Arrow‟s (1962, p. 155) notion of “cost of transfer” was not taken up directly in the 
subsequent  intellectual  development  and  empirical  studies  associated  with  the 
investigation of stickiness. Teece (1977, p. 245), though, used something like Arrow‟s 
cost of transfer in the manufacturing technology, which led Teece to argue that the cost of 
transfer was associated with “royalty costs or rents”, which were incurred in order to 
“secure  access  to  the  technology,”  the  purchase  of  “physical  items”  and  other  costs 
associated with the use of the technology. The inference that Teece (1977, p. 245) drew 
from his examination of costs of transfer was that considerable resources were required in 
order to have knowledge transferred.  
   8 
While Teece (1977, p. 245) adapted Arrow‟s (1962, p. 155) notion of cost of transfer to 
reflect his understanding of what came to be understood as  stickiness in manufacturing 
technology transfer context, Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 61) carefully examined Arrow‟s 
(1962, p. 155) notion of “learning by doing” and (1982, p. 62) claimed that organisations 
can keep knowledge that they learnt through “a blueprint file” and tacit knowledge held 
by people at organisations. According to Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 99), firms perform 
two  important  activities,  namely  “remembering”  and  “doing”,  to  achieve  their 
organisational  goals.    “Remembering”,  for  Nelson  and  Winter  (1982,  p.  99),  is 
accomplished  when  organisations  give  tasks  to  knowledgeable  employees  who  are 
required to use their knowledge. As a result, the performance of these tasks produced 
experience  or  “memories”  (Nelson  &  Winter,  1982,  p.  99)  in  organisations,  but 
organisations cannot claim that experience or those memories as their own. To make the 
experience their own requires the second activity, which Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 99) 
call “doing”, in which  organisations turn them into “formal records.” This study suggests 
that the “formal records” referred to by Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 99) can be in the 
form of procedures, manuals or guidebooks, which mean that these experiences can be 
repeated by different employees at different times.  
 
Stickiness  in  knowledge  transfer  that  is  related  to  cost  has  been  identified  by  those 
scholars  who  treat  possession  of  or  access  to  such  resources  as  a  source  of 
competitiveness because they argue that such knowledge is not easy to copy (Barney, 
1991, p. 106; Dierickx & Cool, 1989, p. 1507; Wernerfelt, 1984, p. 172). Knowledge that 
is not easy to copy is costly to transfer. Wernerfelt (1984, pp. 172-173) demonstrated this   9 
approach to stickiness in terms of knowledge that is a unique organisational resource 
because it is generated through unique activities on the part of that organisation. Such a 
perspective  makes  knowledge  into  a  source  of  competitiveness  for  organisations. 
Subsequently, Dierickx and Cool (1989, pp. 1504-1505) expanded Wernerfelt‟s (1984, 
pp. 172-173) analysis of knowledge as a source of competitiveness to take into account  
the accumulation of knowledge in organisations that involved not only employees but 
also  other  stakeholders  who  were  linked  to  employees  and  organisations  outside  the 
organisation. Following Wernerfelt‟s (1984, pp. 172-173) argument, it is clear that a part 
of the stickiness of knowledge is due to its uniqueness, and this, for Dierickx and Cool 
(1989, pp. 1504-1505)  results from the process of accumulating knowledge. As Barney 
(1991, p. 109) has pointed out, knowledge that is not easy to copy provides a basis for an 
organisation‟s “sustained competitiveness.” 
 
The development of the approach that is here referred to as a stickiness approach was 
furthered by Von Hippel (1994, p. 430) in terms of the “incremental cost of transfer”.  
Von Hippel argued that the problem with knowledge when it is transferred to a new 
context is that it is not instantly useful. This phenomenon manifests “stickiness” because 
knowledge is not totally movable, even though the physical part of the knowledge has 
been  transferred  (Von Hippel,  1994,  p.  430). Based  on  Von  Hippel‟s  (1994,  p. 430) 
suggestion that there is “sticky” knowledge, Szulanski “unpacked” the phenomenon of 
the “stickiness” knowledge that makes knowledge difficult to transfer into two aspects: 
“knowledge  characteristics”  and  “situation  characteristics”  (Szulanski,  1995,  p.  437). 
Szulanski‟s (1995, p. 437) approach was based on Arrow‟s argument that knowledge   10 
transfer  must  be  understood  as  a  communication  process.  The  development  of  a 
stickiness  approach  was  furthered  by  Szulanski,  when  he  examined  empirically  122 
transfers  of  best  practice  in  eight  firms  (Szulanski,  1996,  p.  32).  Later,  Winter    and 
Szulanski  (2001,  p.  733)  argued  that  the  repeated  tasks  that  organisations  do  can  be 
duplicated by different branches in order to reduce cost of transfer through the use of 
“templates”.  These  “templates”  can  be  modified  to  fit  a  new  context  (Szulanski  and 
Jensen, 2004, p. 348).  
 
1.4 Stickiness understanding in practical terms 
The concept of stickiness is not only of theoretical interest, an understanding of stickiness 
is important in practical terms, specifically to assist policy makers, bureaucrats, and firms 
to use the idea of stickiness. Teece‟s (1977, p.245) practical understanding of stickiness is 
associated  with  reducing  the  monetary  costs  associated  with  knowledge  transfer. 
Reducing costs is of vital concern for any organisations because they affect their ability 
to achieve their objectives. Learning is important in organisations, but they have to spend 
money in terms of hiring or training qualified people to execute specific tasks repeatedly 
in order to achieve organisational goals (such as profit) (Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 99). 
Since  the  tasks  are  repeated,  organisations  need  to  record  organisational  routines  or 
repeated  tasks  in  the  form  of  manuals,  procedures  or  guidelines  to  be  used  by  new 
employees or employees in different branches of the organisation  (Nelson & Winter, 
1982, p. 99). However, not all organisational experience can be recorded because some 
experiences are embodied in the individuals who executed the tasks. This non recordable 
knowledge is identified by scholars as the “tacit” dimension of the knowledge that, to be   11 
passed  on,  requires  interpersonal  interactions  such  as  personal  training,  face-to-face 
meetings, and specialised classes (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). These activities are costly 
because companies need to allocate additional allowances to the existing employees or 
senior employees to transfer their experience to junior employees. This situation not only 
occurs  within  an  organisation  in  terms  of  knowledge  transfer  between  different 
departments or “business units” (Szulanski, 1996, p. 27), but also in multiple contexts 
such  as  in  partnerships,  joint  ventures  or  any  collaborative  arrangements  (Jensen  & 
Szulanski, 2004, p. 509; Kostova, 1999, pp. 308-309; Szulanski & Jensen, 2006, p. 937).  
 
Firms that have subsidiaries or operations in multiple locations, such as multinational 
firms, also have problems in transferring knowledge in terms of technological “know-
how”. They need to use similar procedures in executing tasks across operations that are in 
different locations and involve different employees (Szulanski & Jensen, 2004, p. 349). 
The parent company usually sends managers or other senior employees to recruit and 
train people in their subsidiaries and this exercise can be costly. To address stickiness in 
this problem, scholars suggested that multinational firms produce “working examples” or 
“templates” (Szulanski & Jensen, 2004, p. 348) for use by their subsidiaries that can 
operate using similar procedures (Jensen & Szulanski, 2004, p. 509; Kostova, 1999, p. 
309). The two concepts  -  “working examples”  and  “templates”  (Szulanski &  Jensen, 
2004,  p.  348)  are  related  to  stickiness  because  both  are  produced  by  people,  using 
organizational  resources  that  are  within  the  organization.    In  other  words,  the  firm‟s 
subsidiaries copy the procedures used in the parent firm or adapt the latter for the new 
context (Winter & Szulanski, 2001, p. 733). The “templates” or replicas that originate   12 
from the parent firm  might not be suitable for other locations that are governed, for 
instance, by different legal frameworks.  
 
As for policy makers, understanding stickiness in knowledge transfer is essential if they 
are to assist firms to participate in knowledge transfer. Policy makers can assist firms to 
reduce  the  cost  of  knowledge  transfer  through  economic  policies  that  facilitate 
knowledge  transfer.  By  doing  so,    they  encourage  firms  to  be  actively  engaged  in 
knowledge transfer because most firms now collaborate with firms from the rest of the 
world (Kostova, 1999, pp. 316-317). For instance, policy makers could formulate policies 
that encourage the establishment of a “one stop” centre to assist multinational firms with 
respect  to  licensing  matters  or  accessing  financial  sources  to  reduce  the  problem 
associated with recreating a “working example” (Szulanski & Jensen, 2004, p. 348) in a 
new context. Exact replication can save cost because firms do not have to modify the 
replicas,  which  can  be  costly.  Some  countries  replicate  the  original  context  of  the 
multinational firms to reduce difficulties in their operations (Kostova, 1999, pp. 316-
317). Further, local authorities can assist firms to reduce the cost of using “templates or 
working examples” (Szulanski & Jensen, 2004, p. 348) to enhance the technology.  
 
1.5 Research question and assumptions 
 
The research question of the study is “why is knowledge transfer between ICT firms in 
selected Malaysian technology parks difficult?” With this question, the study investigates 
whether  the  government  contributed  to  “macro”  level  stickiness  and  the  ICT  firms 
contributed to “micro” level stickiness.   13 
 
Based  on  the  research  question  -  “why  is  knowledge  transfer  between  ICT  firms  in 
selected  Malaysian  technology  parks  difficult?”  and  the  qualitative  nature  of  the 
investigation, the study proposes: 
 
Proposition 1 
The government contributed to “macro” level stickiness through economic policies that 
constrained firms by requiring that their decisions reflect the national agenda put forward 
by those in government. 
 
Proposition 2 
The study proposes that ICT firms contributed to “micro” level stickiness when they did 
not  want to be  involved in  knowledge  transfer  because  it was costly in  terms  of (a) 
transfer mechanism, (b) types of transfer, (c) knowledge barriers, and (d) transfer context. 
 
1.6 Research methodology 
This study uses qualitative method to get rich information about stickiness in knowledge 
transfer although the research methodology used in the previous studies was primarily 
quantitative method to examine knowledge transfer between firms. Arrow‟s (1962, p. 
155) examination of the effects of the costs associated with knowledge transfer used a 
quantitative method to analyse secondary data to demonstrate difficulties in knowledge 
transfer in the form of “learning.” Following Arrow, Teece (1977, p. 247) undertook 
quantitative  investigation  using  primary  data  that  was  derived  from  26  instances  of   14 
technology  transfers  among  factories  that  have  operations  in  multiple  places.  Teece 
(1977, pp. 245-246) found that the costs of knowledge transfer were expensive. 
 
Basing his work on Teece‟s (1977, p. 247) studies, Galbraith (1990, p. 61) also undertook 
a study to examine quantitative data concerning technology transfer in 32 factories. Later, 
Von Hippel (1994, p. 434) examined, again using quantitative methods, the primary data 
of knowledge transfer from 103 Danish firms. Von Hippel (1994, p. 434) used the term 
“sticky” to explain the difficulties of knowledge transfer among the companies studied. 
Szulanski  (1996,  p.  28)  applied  quantitative method  to  examine  the  transfer  of  “best 
practices” among eight firms. In other studies, Szulanski and Jensen used quantitative 
methods, in this case through an “experimental” format, to examine stickiness associated 
with knowledge transfer in the form of “templates” (Szulanski & Jensen, 2004, p. 348). 
Following Szulanski (1996, p. 28), Kostova (1999, p. 309) also used quantitative method 
to examine stickiness associated with knowledge transfer in multinational enterprises, in 
which the transfers were in multiple contexts. The same quantitative method was used in 
the examination of stages in knowledge transfer between firms that produced and was 
impeded by stickiness (Szulanski, 2000, pp. 12-13). It was also used to examine 122 
cross-border attempts at knowledge transfer (Jensen & Szulanski, 2004, pp. 508-509). 
Szulanski and Jensen (2004, p. 350) also used quantitative methods when they examined 
the role of the “template” at “Rank Xerox.” A similar method was used by Szulanski and 
Jensen (2006, p. 938) at “Mail Boxes Etc. (MBE).” 
   15 
This  research  used  a  personal  interview;  writing  down  key  points  of  informants 
concerning their experiences with respect to knowledge transfer. The informants were not 
willing to allow the use of electronic recording devices in their interview. The interview 
transcripts  were  typed  up  after  the  interview  session,  and  sent  to  the  informants  for 
verification. The study analysed manually contents of the verified interview transcripts in 
order to group the interview results according to important sub-themes related to the 
literature on knowledge transfer. 
 
1.7 Organisation of chapters 
The study is divided into eight chapters. This introduction constitutes Chapter 1. Chapter 
2 is a review of the literature related to knowledge transfer and stickiness. Chapter 3 
provides  a  background  to  this  study  by  explaining  the  policy  that  was  adopted  by 
Malaysian technology parks. Chapter 4 explains the research methodology used for the 
study. Chapters 5 and 6 combine to report the findings. Specifically, Chapter 5 addresses 
the  findings  in  terms  of  “macro”  level  stickiness  and  Malaysian  technology  parks. 
Chapter  6  addresses  the  findings  in  terms  of  “micro”  level  stickiness  and  Malaysian 
technology  parks.  Chapter  7  provides  a  discussion  of  the  findings  in  relation  to  the 
literature related to knowledge transfer and stickiness. Chapter 8 concludes the study.   16 
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter, the study examines the literature on stickiness and other material in which 
the difficulties associated with the transfer of knowledge between firms is discussed. The 
discussion  is  in  four  parts,  namely  (a)  a  discussion  of  the  origin  of  the  concept  of 
stickiness,  (b)  an  explanation  of  the  concept  of  “macro”  level  stickiness,  (c)  an 
explanation  of  the  concept  of  “micro” level  stickiness,  and  (d) a  summary.  Figure  2 
illustrates the discussion in Chapter 2. 
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2.1 Origin of stickiness 
The concept of stickiness has a number of precursors all of which represent the kind of 
thinking that emerged in the works of those who employed the concept of stickiness.  
One of the first ideas from which the concept of stickiness emerged was in the context of 
Arrow's examination of the transfer of what he referred to as that which had been learnt 
as a result of “doing” (Arrow, 1962, p. 155).  In short, Arrow argued that a significant 
proportion of the knowledge that arose was a result of “learning” and “doing.”  Thus 
Arrow combined both actions into a concept called “learning by doing” that did not relate 
immediately to what analysts were later to refer to as “stickiness.”  In his examination of 
“learning by doing,” for example, Arrow (1962, p. 155) did not use the word “cost”, and 
used “learning” to explain the process of knowledge transfer because “learning” was 
related to “experience.” 
 
In an analysis  of the transfer of technical knowledge, Arrow (1969, pp. 29-30) argued 
that technical knowledge was developed and updated gradually to meet the demands of 
the market. This argument indicates the way that his interest in the transfer of knowledge 
that has been acquired as a result of “doing” resulted in the development of an awareness 
of the costs associated with, and other constraints on, knowledge transfer.  In his work, 
Arrow presented the transmission of technical knowledge as having to occur on a gradual 
basis, which implies that a significant investment of time and resources had occurred in 
order to produce such knowledge.   
 
The transmission of the observation or of the revised probability judgments must 
take  place  over  channels  which  have  a  limited  capacity  and  are  therefore   18 
costly…the really limited channels are human minds, not telegraphs or printed 
words…Even  for  the  individual  there  is  a  problem  of  channel  capacity.  To 
transform his a priori into a posteriori probabilities as the result of observations 
which have taken time, he must remember his a priori probabilities; but memory 
is a channel for transmission between points of time and is notoriously limited in 
capacity and subject to error. Arrow (1969, p. 32) 
 
Arrow‟s analysis of technical knowledge transfer leads to the conclusion that the cost of 
transfer was related to the medium of knowledge transfer. This medium is employees, 
who  have  a  limited  capacity  to  transfer  and  receive  the knowledge.  Before  they  can 
transfer it, they need the ability to understand the knowledge, which Arrow (1962, pp. 32-
33) called “priori ”, then to “decode” (transfer) it to another human, or “recipient.” The 
employees are already expensive, in terms of wages and allowances, and to “use” them to 
transfer knowledge imposes additional costs. The more the employees lack a capacity to 
transfer and receive knowledge, the higher the cost will be.  
 
Arrow‟s (1969, pp. 29-30) work was widely cited by those who employed the concepts 
that are synonymous with stickiness.  Arrow‟s work is important for the development of 
the notion of stickiness because the cost of transfer can be seen as a starting point for the 
development of an understanding of the barriers that organisations face in knowledge 
transfer. This can indicate that knowledge is “inert” (Kogut & Zander, 1992, p. 383), 
“immobile”  (Attewell,  1992,  p.  2),  and  “difficult  to  imitate”  (Foss,  Knudsen,  & 
Montgomery, 1995, p. 2) and that organisations invest scarce resources on something that 
has yet to deliver a good outcome or to promote profitability ( in the case of for profit 
organisations).  
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Arrow‟s ideas were very influential on Teece‟s (1977, pp. 244-245) study of the transfer 
of the technical knowledge associated with the use of new technologies in manufacturing 
industries.  Teece (1977, p. 245) also focussed on the costs associated with technology 
transfer.    His  work  dealt  with  the  level  and  determinants  of  the  costs  involved  in 
transferring technology in multinational firms. This idea was based on Arrow‟s (1969, p. 
33) remarks: 
If  one  nation  or  class  has  the  knowledge  which  enables  it  to  achieve  high 
productivity, why is not the other acquiring that information? That a nation or 
class has a consistently high productivity implies a successful communication 
system  within  the  nation  or  class,  so  the  problem  turns  on  the  differential 
between costs of communication within and between classes.  
 
Teece (1977, p. 245) defined technology transfer costs as “the costs of transmitting and 
absorbing  all  of  the  relevant  unembodied  knowledge.”  Teece‟s  (1977,  pp.  245-246) 
examination  of  the  transfer  of  technology  included  both  “physical  items”  and  “non 
physical items.”  While the “physical items” were the machines themselves, the “non 
physical items” were the manuals or instructions that explained how to use the machine. 
The costs of knowledge transfer also included the fee to use the technology. Teece (1977, 
pp.  245-246)  argued  that  there  are  four  types  of  costs  associated  with  transferring 
knowledge, namely (a) costs associated with initiating the transfer process, (b) costs that 
were  incurred  during  the  transfer  process,  (c)  costs  associated  with  hiring  competent 
labour during and after the transfer process, and (d) costs that related to the application of 
the technology. 
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Nelson  and  Winter‟s  (1982,  pp.  99-101)  focus  on  “remembering”  and  “doing”  was 
indirectly influenced by Arrow‟s  work, and were very much influenced by the work of 
Schumpeter (1942, pp. 150-151) and Simon (1979, pp. 499-500). Schumpeter (1942, pp. 
150-151) championed technological changes and innovation as means to achieve long 
term  economic  development.  However,  Simon  (1979,  pp.  499-500)  argued  that 
innovation would not  happen without a human contribution, in terms of ideas and the 
translation of these ideas into something practical. To Simon (1979, p. 499), people have 
a limited ability to comprehend an idea because of their “bounded rationality.” Aware of 
both the need for long term technological changes and the limitations of people‟s ability 
to transmit what resides in their minds into something tangible, Nelson and Winter (1982, 
p. 9) used an “evolutionary” perspective in examining organisational knowledge transfer. 
This idea parallels  Arrow‟s (2006, p. 143) analysis of technology transfer that is related 
to  technological  changes  in  organisations;  although  Arrow  (2006,  p.  143)  did  not 
subscribe to Schumpeter‟s ideas.  
 
Nelson and Winter‟s (1982, pp. 9-11, 99-100) works were in line with Arrow‟s argument 
that knowledge transfer is costly because knowledge is transferred through human minds 
that  have  a  limited  capacity.  Nelson  and  Winter  (1982,  p.  99)  combined  the  idea  of 
“remembering” with “doing”, by which they meant the accumulation of experiences in 
the form of readable format (such as manuals, guidelines and procedures). Nelson and 
Winter (1982, p. 99) explained “remembering by doing” as: 
The idea that organizations “remember” a routine largely by exercising it is 
much like the idea than an individual remembers skills by exercising them. The 
point that remembering is achieved largely through exercise, and could not be 
assured totally through written records or other formal filing devices, does not   21 
deny that firms keep formal memories and that these formal memories play an 
important  role…cost  considerations  make  “doing”  the  dominant  mode  of 
information storage even in many cases where formal records could in principle 
be kept. 
 
Nelson and Winter‟s (1982, pp. 9-11, 99-100) works can be understood as an application 
and  extension  of  the  sort  of  thinking  that  Arrow    had  begun  because  it  enabled  the 
subsequent development of analyses of cost of transfer affects that significantly impeded 
knowledge transfer and the application of knowledge within organisations.  
 
Wernerfelt‟s  (1984,  pp.  172-173)  ideas  on  knowledge  as  an  important  resource  for 
organisation can be interpreted as stickiness in knowledge transfer because he viewed 
knowledge as an important organisational resource and regarded knowledge as both an 
input and an output in a production scenario. When knowledge is regarded as an input, it 
becomes a cost to organisations because organisations have to acquire this knowledge. 
The analysis that Wernerfelt put forward is a significant expansion of Arrow‟s (1969, pp. 
29-35) analysis of the cost of transfer that contributes to the development of stickiness in 
the knowledge transfer process.  
 
Arrow‟s notion of costs that caused difficulties in knowledge transfer has been applied by 
strategic management scholars such as Barney (1991, pp. 106-107), who argued that the 
uniqueness  of  knowledge  prevents  it  from  being  “imitable”  and,  therefore,  increases 
barriers to its transfer. Barney (1991, pp. 106-107) applied Wernerfelt‟s (1984, pp. 172-
173) resource-based analysis. The development of the concept of stickiness has been   22 
expanded from economics (cost of transfer) to strategic management (knowledge as hard 
to copy). 
 
The study of costs of transfer that result in stickiness has been extended by Von Hippel 
(1994, pp. 429-431), who argued that the cost of knowledge transfer increased as the 
distance between where the knowledge was acquired and where the knowledge is to be 
used increased. Von Hippel (1994, p. 430) said: 
We define the stickiness of a given unit of information in a given instance as the 
incremental  expenditure  required  to  transfer  that  unit  of  information  to  a 
specified locus in a form usable by a given information seeker. When this cost is 
low, information stickiness is low; when it is high, stickiness is high. 
 
Increases to the costs to transfer knowledge appear “incremental” in this analysis. Von 
Hippel  (1994,  p.  430)  argued  that  the  factors  that  contributed  to  the  stickiness  of 
knowledge included (a) the types of knowledge to be transferred, (b) the quantity of 
knowledge  that  was  required,  and  (c)  the  quality  of  the  relationships  between  the 
participants who are involved in the knowledge transfer process. 
 
Whether  later  scholars  applied  and  extended  Arrow‟s  studies  or  simply  paralleled 
Arrow‟s  argument,  this  application  has  much  influence  on  the  development  of  the 
concept of stickiness.  Szulanski (1996, pp. 27-28) extended Arrow‟s ideas to the context 
of  appropriating  long  term  monetary  value  (rents)  from  the  application  of  existing 
knowledge through the transfer of best practices among different units in an organisation. 
The way Szulanski (1996, pp. 27-28) applied the notion of cost of transfer was apparently   23 
not only to examine the ways in which knowledge could be made transferable, but also to 
maximise the immediate benefits from the application of such knowledge. 
 
Essentially, the origin of the concept of stickiness as it applies to knowledge transfer is 
related to three organisational actions: “doing,” “learning,” (Arrow, 1962, p. 155) and 
“remembering” (Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 99).  These actions were points at which 
stickiness in knowledge transfer between firms arises. Additionally, knowledge transfer is 
also not spared from the influence of external forces. The influence of the external forces 
goes beyond the control of firms; it can have an impact on the firms‟ daily tasks. Thus, 
the discussion of stickiness with respect to knowledge transfer between firms included 
“macro”  (outside  organisations)  (Mokyr,  2002;  Sweeney,  1996)  and  “micro”  (inside 
organisations) (Szulanski and Jensen, 2004) levels. The conceptualisation of macro-micro 
levels of stickiness in knowledge is drawn from the works of several authors, and is 
represented in Figure 2.2.  
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Knowledge 
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development 
Wellness in the 
economy 
„Macro‟ stickiness 
Economic policies  Technology parks 
Economic policies formulated by the government to bring wellness to the economy. To do so, technology needs 
to develop through (i) “improvements” and (ii) “innovation” (Sweeney, 1996, p.6). To encourage technology 
development, technology parks play a role to promote knowledge transfer between knowledge intensive firms. 
 
Knowledge 
transfer 
between firms 
Four aspects to consider in knowledge transfer between 
firms: 
1. Transfer mechanism (“replicate,” “adapt,” “template”) 
(Szulanski & Jensen, 2004, p.348; 2006, pp. 937-939) 
2. Types of transfer (“physical item” (Teece, 1977, p.245) 
“knowledge,” “best practice” (Szulanski, 1995, p.437)) 
3. Knowledge barriers (“knowledge” and “situation” 
(Szulanski, 1995, p.437)) 
4. Transfer contexts (“single” (Szulanski, 1995, p.437; 
Szulanski & Jensen, 2006, p.937) and “multiple” (Kostova, 
1999, pp.308-309)) 
„Micro‟ stickiness  The higher the cost, the more stickiness 
because ICT firms aim to reduce cost 
1. Develop 
„stickiness‟ concept 
2. Use „stickiness‟ 
concept 
Source: Sweeney (1996, pp. 6-7) and Mokyr (2002, pp.77-86) 
Figure 2.2. Framework for Stickiness   25 
 
2.2 “Macro” level stickiness 
The analysis of what is referred to here as “macro” level stickiness in knowledge transfer 
between firms began with the seminal works of Sweeney (1996) and Mokyr (2002). Both 
of these  authors  argued that there are  external forces  which  contributed  to  stickiness 
associated with knowledge transfer between firms. There are many forces that can affect 
knowledge transfer between firms. At firm-specific level, due to survival, firms resort to 
collaborating with other firms. This approach is taken with a consensus among firms. 
Eventually, the collaborations include other institutions such as universities and research 
organisations. Gradually, the collaborations produce a dedicated industrial area for both 
sectors  to  work  on  specific  projects  seriously.  Such  situations  have  attracted  the 
government to upgrade the projects at national level, to get more firms and research 
institutions involved. To facilitate the process, the government incorporated this effort 
into economic policies. However, the government‟s economic policies could not give 
adequate support for knowledge transfer between firms.  
 
Sweeney (1996, pp. 6-7) argued that governments contributed to stickiness in knowledge 
transfer  when  they  sought  for  “learning”  to  be  a  means  to  attain  economic  growth. 
Governments perceived that “learning” from others can lead to “technological progress”, 
which  boosts  economic  development.    Accordingly,  governments  invested  heavily  to 
encourage  firms  in  the  science  and  technology  sectors  to  expedite  technological 
development via “learning” between firms (Sweeney, 1996, p. 6). Sweeney (1996, p. 7) 
argued that investment in science and technology that generated “new knowledge” did   26 
not encourage knowledge transfer between firms. As such, the government contribution 
to “macro” level stickiness by introducing economic policies to boost economic growth 
that  were  not  consistent  with  the use  of  technology  parks  as  instruments  to  promote 
knowledge transfer between firms. 
 
2.2.1 Economic policies 
Governments play an important role in contributing to “macro” level stickiness through 
economic policies designed to achieve the desired level or rate of economic development. 
Governments  believe  that  economic  development  requires  the  development  of 
technology. 
 
While this knowledge can be generated within the country concerned, Sweeney (1996, p. 
6)  has  pointed  out  that  the  development  of  technology  can  be  achieved  through 
“learning.” Accordingly, Sweeney (1996, p. 6) contended that learning can contribute to 
the development of technology in two ways, namely (a) by improving the existing ways 
of doing things in organisations,  and (b) by introducing new ways of doing things in 
organisations. Both of these contributions can be achieved by investing in “learning” 
activities.  
 
Sweeney identified a number of factors that will affect the extent to which knowledge can 
be transferred between firms. As such, firms had to consider a variety of factors to ensure 
that “learning” takes place between firms. These included (a) “information behaviour” 
(Sweeney,  1996,  p.  8),  (b)  “socio-cultural”  effects  (Sweeney,  1996,  p.  9),  (c)   27 
“distinctiveness” (Sweeney, 1996, p. 11), (d) the “technology culture” within the firms 
(Sweeney, 1996, p. 13), (e) their “technological progressiveness” (Sweeney, 1996, p. 14), 
(f) “entrepreneurial vitality” (Sweeney, 1996, pp. 15-16), (g) the “interactive creation of 
innovation” (Sweeney, 1996, p. 17), and (h) the evaluation of “future and past structure” 
(Sweeney,  1996,  pp.  18-19).  Sweeney‟s  (Sweeney,  1996,  pp.  6-19)  discussion  of 
“learning,”  “technological  progress,”  and  “economic  development  are  illustrated  in 
Figure 2.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Sweeney (1996) illustration of “macro” level stickiness  
From: Sweeney (1996, pp. 6-19) Sweeney, G. (1996). “Learning efficiency, technological change 
and economic progress,” by G. Sweeney, 1996, International Journal of Technology 
Management, 11(1-2), pp.5-28. 
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economic growth   28 
Sweeney‟s (1996, pp. 6-7) argument concerning the role of governments in promoting 
knowledge  transfer  to  generate  economic  growth  through  increasing  the  intensity  of 
technology development is in line with Mokyr‟s (2002, pp. 77-86) work on the history of 
economic  development.  Mokyr  demonstrated  that  a  government  had  emphasised  the 
importance of technology as a key driver to bring about economic development in terms 
of economic growth and prosperity.  
 
The transition from “feudalism” to “capitalism”, according to Mokyr (2002, pp. 77-80) 
enabled and promoted investment in technological development. “Capitalism” provided 
“freedom” to individuals to use their property and knowledge to create personal fortunes. 
This situation meant that, if individuals or firms aimed for higher profits, they needed to 
look at the volume of their production, the types of machines they used and the types of 
knowledge (skills) that were used to produce outputs.  For example, Mokyr (2002, p. 77) 
argued:  
What the Industrial Revolution did was to create opportunities that simply did 
not exist before. There was, however, no mechanism that compelled any society 
to take advantage from them. Britain was simply the first to do so: in that sense 
the Industrial Revolution was British. All the same, Britain‟s leadership was 
neither a necessary condition for it to  happen nor  an equilibrium state that 
could survive in the long run in the world of competition and national jealousies 
that emerged in Europe after 1815… The great economic minds of the age, from 
Adam  Smith  to  David  Ricardo,  had  only  the  faintest  notion  of  the  pending 
changes.  
 
Once individuals become aware of the best available opportunity, they can maximize the 
use  of  knowledge  and  experience  to  increase  production  to  meet  demand.  Before 
production  became  sophisticated,  Mokyr  (2002,  p.  80)  argued  that  the  Industrial 
Revolution was two revolutions. In the “First Industrial Revolution” individuals invented   29 
instruments and tools to produce products demanded by the market. However, Mokyr 
(2002, p. 80) argued that such attempts did not have a significant impact on the economy. 
As a result, people worked even harder to invent better techniques to meet demand and to 
generate  economic  growth.  This,  for  Mokyr  (2002,  pp.  80-81),  was  the  “Second 
Industrial Revolution” (after 1860) in which people  created machinery that allowed for 
mass scale production. Thus, “learning” between firms occurred when they participated 
in the development of technology and know-how to meet the demand of the market. 
 
The  changes  that  Mokyr  (2002,  pp.  80-81)  observed  between  the  “First  Industrial 
Revolution”  and  the  “Second  Industrial  Revolution”  are  important  to  the  knowledge 
creation process. In the “first” situation, people invested in the invention of tools, but, 
given that this was small-sale production they did not understand their market in terms of 
the  quantity  of  demand.  In  moving  to  the  “second”  revolution,  they  invested  in 
understanding the market as well. Mokyr‟s (2002, pp. 85-86) point, in identifying the two 
revolutions,  was  that  people  needed  to  invest  not  only  in  the  knowledge  required  to 
introduce and use tools and equipment, but also in knowledge about the demands present 
within the market.  
 
For present purposes, the crucial question is “How does “macro” level stickiness occur in 
the “first” and “second” situations?” In the “first” revolution, people were interested in 
inventing tools and equipment because they believed that, based on previous experience, 
they would generate more wealth if they had better tools and equipment. However, they 
did not always see the results that they expected after inventing and using better tools and   30 
equipment. Once they took into account aspects other than tools and equipment, they 
started  to  introduce  changes  that  had  a  profound  effect  on  the  economy.  With  the 
combination of knowledge concerning both the machinery and the market, they could 
create more jobs and increase wealth in society.  
 
 The changes in the economic development described above were not possible without 
the presence of technology (machines) and knowledge (experience). The concern here, 
however, is to make clear that the changes that resulted reflected dynamism with respect 
to  learning.  The  changes  associated  with  this  dynamism  may  be    “radical”  or 
“incremental”  and  firms  must  decide  to  adopt  one  or  the  other  of  these  modes 
(Macdonald, 1998, p. 51). 
 
There are two factors involved when change occurs, namely (a) the change resulting from 
pressure on firms to adopt new technologies  (“technology push”) and (b) the pressure 
from the market to produce new technologies (“market pull”) (Macdonald, 1998, p. 45). 
These forces are beyond the firms‟ control (Macdonald, 1998, p. 45). However, these 
forces  serve  to  make  firms  proactive.  Macdonald  (1998,  pp.  46-47)  argued  that 
innovation is important to economic growth and that this means that  governments are 
motivated to encourage innovation. The efforts by governments are not purely in line 
with the those of business owners, however, because governments seek to gain political 
advantage by achieving good economic growth and prosperity (Joseph, 1997, pp. 289-
290). For instance, to address the slowing economic growth, some governments seek to 
activate  the  economy  by  increasing  spending  on  research  and  development  in  high   31 
technology in order to encourage (at least) domestic economic growth and also to provide 
more  employment  opportunities  that  are  associated  with  jobs  in  the  high  technology 
sector. In doing so, governments attempt to establish essential facilities, such as science 
or technology parks, to encourage innovation. Macdonald (1998, pp. 47-48) argued that 
the provision of such facilities is difficult and involved the use of significant amounts of 
taxpayers‟ money: 
The thinking behind science parks is similarly simple, and alarmingly linear: 
provide the right surroundings as an input to high technology and the output 
will be beneficial innovation. It is significant that public rather than private 
funds have provided most of these surroundings.  
 
Governments think about the innovation as a “linear” process (Macdonald, 1998, p. 47) 
because this makes it  easier to convince stakeholders that the government is doing the 
right thing to address a lack of economic growth. 
 
2.2.2 Technology parks 
Technology parks are not the only instruments to promote knowledge transfer between 
firms. There are other instruments that are equally functional to encourage knowledge 
transfer  between  firms  as  long  as  these  instruments  encourage  communication  and 
collaboration between firms. There are many ways firms communicate in order to be 
knowledgeable,  capable and  innovative.  Amongst others are  local  industrial meetings 
(Bathelt,  Malmberg,  and  Maskell,  2004),  sharing  of  resources  for  research  and 
development (R&D) (Belderbos, Carree, and Lokshin, 2004), teaming up to develop new 
products  (Chen,  2005),  and  informal  interactions  among  employees  (Cosway,  1995). 
However, these instruments are insufficient to encourage firms to communicate with all   32 
productive  sectors  and  institutions.  Nelson‟s  (2000,  pp.  11-26)  idea  of  “National 
Innovation Systems” is commendable as it attempts to connect all institutions that are 
able to sustain innovation through knowledge transfer.  
 
However,  technology  parks  are  discussed  in  this  research  as  specific  instruments  to 
demonstrate  stickiness  in  knowledge  transfer  between  firms.  In  addition,  technology 
parks are just physical infrastructure; this alone is not enough because they need input 
from all active industry participants and other institutions (Singh, 2001).  
 
Governments have used technology parks to encourage innovation in the high technology 
sector even though, as  Macdonald argued, this  is a risky sector in which firms are 
reluctant  to  participate  (Macdonald,  1998,  p.  162).    Governments  insist  that  lower 
technology ICT firms that operate in technology parks with high technology firms will 
gradually become interested in participating in innovation in the high technology sector. 
Nevertheless, governments focus on the physical aspects of the technology parks and pay 
inadequate attention to supporting knowledge transfer between the firms in that location 
(Joseph, 1994, p. 46).  
 
Governments in the UK, Europe, Australia, and some Asian countries have established 
technology  parks  to  support  the  growth  of  the  high  technology  industry.  These 
governments  used  the  United  States‟  Silicon  Valley  model  when  undertaking  these 
initiatives to address unemployment, low economic growth, and other socio-economic 
problems. Macdonald examined the Australian and British technology parks in relation to   33 
their role in addressing economic problems (Macdonald, 1983, p. 330, 1998, pp. 168-
170).  He  (1983,  pp.  330-331)  found  that  the  main  motive  for  the  establishment  of 
technology  parks  was  to  encourage  economic  development,  understood  as  economic 
growth and full employment. 
 
The  high  technology  sector  is  a  dynamic  industry  that  requires  that  participants  are 
proactive with respect to innovation; otherwise, they will not survive. Since the industry 
is  dynamic,  governments  established  technology  parks  to  assist  firms  in  acquiring 
knowledge  that  would  promote  innovation  that  contributed  directly  to  technological 
development.  The  enhanced  intensity  in  technological  development  is  taken  to  bring 
prosperity to society. Joseph (2004, p. 118) argued that the high technology sector is 
highly  knowledge  intensive  and  that  this  requires  participants  in  this  sector  to  be 
innovative.  Governments  have  continued  to  emulate  the  approaches  taken  in  other 
countries  (Cook  &  Joseph,  2001,  p.  378)  even  though  industry  players  are  not  yet 
convinced that the technology parks generate economic growth (Joseph, 1997, pp. 289-
290). Governments continue to believe that technology parks are powerful instruments to 
create innovation in the high technology sector, even though some question whether this 
is the case.  
     
2.3 “Micro” level stickiness 
In discussions of “macro” level stickiness, government is often identified as the major 
contributor to stickiness with respect to knowledge transfer. When it comes to “micro”   34 
level  stickiness,  ICT  firms  are  identified  as  principal  contributors  to  stickiness  in 
knowledge transfer.  
 
Based on investigations of Arrow (1962; 1963), Teece (1977), Nelson and Winter (1982), 
Von Hippel (1994), and Szulanski (1995), stickiness at the firm level presents stickiness 
as deriving from four aspects of any transfer process (a) transfer mechanisms, (b) types of 
transfer, (c) knowledge transfer barriers, and (d) transfer contexts. Table 2 summarizes 
the four aspects of stickiness at the firm level. 
     
 
    Table 2 
   A Summary of “Stickiness” Concept Development  
Authors  Concept  “Stickiness” in terms of  Aspects of 
stickiness 
Arrow (1962, 
p.155) 
“learning by doing”  investment in people and 
resources 
knowledge transfer 
barrier 
Arrow (1969, 
p.33) 
“learning by doing”  communicating technical 
knowledge to other 
people 
transfer 
mechanism 
Teece (1977, 
p.245) 
“learning by doing”  transfer of manufacturing 
technology 
type of transfer 
Nelson and Winter 
(1982, p.99) 
“remembering” and 
“doing” 
people, resource and 
organization interact to 
achieve organizational 
goals 
transfer context, 
knowledge transfer 
barrier 
Von Hippel (1994, 
p.430) 
“sticky” information  cost increase when 
transfer in other contexts 
transfer 
mechanism, 
knowledge barrier 
Szulanski (1995, 
p.437) 
“stickiness”  knowledge with people 
and situation 
transfer 
mechanism, 
knowledge barrier, 
transfer context 
 
2.3.1 Transfer mechanisms 
Firms used many ways to transfer knowledge in both intra- and inter- firm transfers. 
Regardless of whether it is through intra or inter-firm transfers, firms generate knowledge 
through the “replications of organisational routines,” which refers to the activities that   35 
firms undertake to attain their desired goals (such as profit) (Nelson and Winter, 1982, 
pp. 9-11,99). Nelson and Winter‟s (1982, pp. 9-11,99) notion of “replication” indicates 
that firms copy and repeat the actions and “know-how” of other firms that have already 
been successful in maximising their profits.  
 
Arrow‟s (1962, p. 155) notion of “learning by doing” and Nelson and Winter‟s (1982, p. 
99) “remember by doing” emphasised the action of “doing”, which, in this case, refers to 
activities that can be copied and practiced in a new context. Echoing this view, Winter 
and Szulanski (2001, p. 731) are convinced that the organisational knowledge that results 
from “doing” is replicable and can be worth replicating. Firms that acquire knowledge 
through  repeating  what  other  firms  have  done  also  engage  in  a  learning  process. 
Repeating the practice of other firms is to “diffuse” knowledge between firms. Winter 
and Szulanski (2001, p. 735) said: 
The learning process may begin from an idea of how something works; this idea 
is then used to create a template. Conversely, the process may begin with an 
attempt to replicate an existing template. The capability to replicate develops 
over time as repetition and experience reveal the effects of the attribute mix on 
the success, cost, and robustness of the replication process. 
 
Knowledge transfer within an organisation can occur when it tries to develop a firm 
standard  for  how  things  are  to  be  executed.  This  approach  is  called  “replication.” 
Szulanski and Jensen (2004, p. 348) argued that the “replication” of daily tasks within an 
organisation  can  reduce  costs  associated  with  knowledge  transfer  because  the 
organisation  is  copying  its  own  daily  routines.  Szulanski  and  Jensen  (2004,  p.  349) 
emphasised  that,  under  the  influence  of  external  forces,  organisations  will  face   36 
difficulties in copying daily routines adopted by other organisations because they are not 
directly involved in the activities. 
 
In  developing  their  analysis  of  knowledge  transfer  mechanisms,  Szulanski  &  Jensen 
(2006, pp. 937-939) asserted that firms can “adapt” knowledge acquired from other firms 
either through a “traditional adaptation approach” or through a “presumptive adaptation 
approach.”  When  firms  use  the  “traditional  adaptation  approach,”  they  modify  the 
original practices so that they fit the context of the firm seeking to adopt those practices. 
Unlike the “presumptive adaptation approach,” which involves firms “cautiously” and 
“gradually” integrating external knowledge into the firms‟ existing practices (Szulanski 
& Jensen, 2006, pp. 937-939). In practice, Szulanski and Jensen (2006, pp. 937-939) 
argued that the “traditional adaptation approach” can result in remarkably greater rates of 
knowledge transfer than the “presumptive adaptation approach.” 
 
Szulanski & Jensen‟s discussion of “replication” (2006, pp. 937-939) extends Arrow‟s 
concept of (1962, p. 155) “learning by doing” and Nelson and Winter‟s (1982, p. 99) 
“remember by doing” because “replication” (Szulanski & Jensen, 2006, pp. 937-939) is 
about acquiring  knowledge  from the accumulation of the experiences of firms.  Their 
“repetition” (Szulanski & Jensen, 2006, pp. 937-939) of the tasks  regularly carried out 
within other firms allows firms to create a “working example” or “template” that they can 
use to transfer knowledge within a firm  or from one firm to another. The high cost of 
“replication”  as a transfer mechanism, through “adaptation” and the use of “templates”   37 
(Szulanski  &  Jensen,  2006,  pp.  937-939)  contributes  to  “micro”  level  stickiness, 
particularly when firms seek to acquire knowledge from other firms.  
2.3.2 Types of transfer 
Technology  transfers  in  manufacturing  industries  are  subjected  to  regular  empirical 
examination because they allow more direct observation of the knowledge transfer that 
occurred. Arrow (1969, pp. 29-35) also used a manufacturing related technical type of 
knowledge transfer when he examined the costs of transfer related to “learning by doing” 
and  to  the  transmission  of  technical  knowledge.  Teece  (1977,  p.  245)  examined  the 
technology transfer difficulties that are associated with the cost of transfer in terms of the 
costs associated with obtaining and diffusing new technologies. Teece  (1977, p. 245) 
argued that a technology is transferred in two basic forms: the “physical item” and “non 
physical items.” Teece (1986, pp. 285-287) began to relate technology transfer to both 
types of technological innovation.  
 
Teece‟s distinction between costs of transfer associated with the transfer of “physical 
items”  and  “non  physical  items”,  such  as  knowledge  to  utilise  the  physical  items 
effectively, was reflected in Szulanski‟s work. Szulanski was interested in the latter part 
of technology transfer, in particular the transfer of “best practice”, because this can help 
organisations to enhance productivity by adopting a “template” or “working example” 
(Szulanski & Jensen, 2004, p. 348).  
 
Teece (2000, pp. 35-37) also argued that the study of technology type of transfer had 
become  outdated  because  “one  way”  technology  transfers,  such  as  from  a  parent   38 
company to its subsidiaries, were no longer  typical of the transfer of modern technology. 
Such a development implied that the cost of transferring and absorbing technology will 
increase significantly.  
 
In the modern era, technological development is progressing rapidly and consequently 
firms  must  respond  quickly  to  the  emergence  of  new  technologies.  Those  who  were 
unable to catch up with the latest technology will be left behind. This situation is not only 
occurring among firms but also within firms. As Szulanski (1996, p. 27) has argued, 
knowledge transfer within a firm is less costly because it does not have to deal with legal 
and  cultural  obstacles  (or  stickiness)  that    normally  arise  with  respect  to  knowledge 
transfer between firms. 
 
Szulanski (1996, p. 28) argued that the transfer of “best practice” was a practical way for 
an organisation to improve its performance. He argued that the transfer of best practice 
reflected the efforts of firms to copy others to improve their competitiveness. Whereas 
Arrow (1962, p. 155) and Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 99) referred to organisational 
routines  as  “doing”,  Szulanski  (1996,  p.  28)  used  “practice”  to  include  the  “tacit” 
dimension of organisational knowledge, which is contained partly in individual skills and 
partly in organisational arrangements. In addition, Szulanski (1996, p. 28) was inclined to 
refer to the “transfer” of knowledge, rather than its “diffusion”, because, to him, firms 
have unique experiences that are difficult to transfer to other firms and it is in transferring 
knowledge that stickiness arises. 
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Szulanski‟s discussion of the transfer of best practices was broadened to an examination 
of difficulties that arose with respect to different types of knowledge transfer. Stickiness 
arises  with  respect  to  the  “replication”  of  routines  to  improve  an  organisation‟s 
competitiveness (Winter & Szulanski, 2001, p. 733), the “adaptation” of organisational 
practices in different locations (Jensen & Szulanski, 2004, p. 509), the use of “templates” 
or “working examples” (Szulanski & Jensen, 2004, p. 348), and the use of  “templates” 
that have been modified to fit new contexts (Szulanski & Jensen, 2006, p. 937). Szulanski 
provides  an  understanding  of  stickiness  in  knowledge  transfer  in  terms  of  its 
characteristics, processes, different locations, templates and modified templates. 
 
2.3.3 Knowledge transfer barriers 
“Micro”  level  stickiness  has  also  been  examined  in  terms  of  barriers  to  knowledge 
transfer.  Szulanski  (1995,  pp.  438-439)  argued  that  there  are  two  major  barriers  that 
impede  knowledge  transfer.  These  are  (a)  the  nature  of  the  knowledge  (“knowledge 
characteristics”)  and  (b)  the  context  to  which  the  knowledge  is  to  be  transferred 
(“situation characteristics”). Szulanski argued that firms need to pay attention to both of 
these barriers (Szulanski, 1995, p. 437).  
 
The first transfer barrier derives from the uncertainty that firms can use the information 
they  have  gained  to  achieve  immediate  benefits  from  it.    A  lack  of  evidence  that 
knowledge has been useful indicates problems with the nature of the knowledge acquired 
(Szulanski, 1995, p. 438). Uncertainty with respect to their capacity to derive value from   40 
information, which has been acquired at some cost, causes firms to resist spending money 
to acquire such knowledge. 
 
The second transfer barrier relates to the contexts to which knowledge is to be transferred 
(Szulanski, 1995, p. 437). Szulanski argued that there are several characteristics of the 
contexts into which knowledge is to be transferred that affect its transfer. These include  
the willingness of those who hold the knowledge to transfer it, the perception of the 
quality of the knowledge on the parts of those who are to receive it, a lack of interest on 
the parts of the intended “recipients” of knowledge, a lack of “absorptive capacity” on the 
part of intended recipients, a lack of ability to absorb and retain knowledge on the part of 
intended recipients, a lack of support from the management of the organisations involved, 
and communication breakdowns between the “sources” and “recipients” of knowledge 
(Szulanski, 1995, pp. 437-439). 
 
Szulanski‟s  (1995,  pp.  437-439)  works  on  knowledge  transfer  barriers  influenced 
Simonin‟s (1999, pp. 464-465) examination of difficulties associated with transferring 
marketing knowledge. Simonin (1999, pp. 464-465) identified a number of factors that 
impede  knowledge  transfer  or  result  in  stickiness.  These  include  the  nature  of  the 
knowledge to be transferred, the willingness of the “source” and “recipients” to engage in 
transfer, the contexts into which the knowledge is to be transferred and received, and the 
quality of the relationship between the “source” and the “recipients” of the knowledge. 
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2.3.4 Transfer contexts 
The  literature  on  knowledge  transfer  has  examined  knowledge  transfer  in  single  and 
multiple  organisational  contexts.  Arrow  (1969,  pp.  29-35)  began  with  the  transfer  of 
technical knowledge in the context of a single organisation. Later, Teece (1977, p. 247) 
examined  26    technology  transfers  in  multiple  organisational  contexts  (multinational 
corporations). Basing  his  work on Teece‟s studies,  Galbraith  (1990,  p. 61)  examined 
knowledge transfer associated with manufacturing technology in 32 contexts. Von Hippel 
(1994,  p.  434)  examined  knowledge  transfers  between  103  firms  and  found  that 
“stickiness” impeded knowledge transfer in the multiple transfer contexts he examined.  
 
Szulanski (1996, p. 28) investigated stickiness that arose with respect to the transfer of 
“best  practice”  in  multiple  contexts  when  he  analysed  272  observations  of  122  best 
practice transfers in eight firms. The same context was used in the examination of the 
stages in knowledge transfer process at which stickiness arose (Szulanski, 2000, pp. 12-
13), and in the examination of 122 internal “cross-border transfers” (Jensen & Szulanski, 
2004, pp. 508-509). Szulanski and Jensen (2004, p. 350) examined knowledge transfer in  
single context of “Rank Xerox,” in the forms of  the transfer of “templates.” Likewise, 
Szulanski and Jensen (2006, p. 938) examined knowledge transfer in the single context of 
“Mail Boxes Etc. (MBE).” 
 
Szulanski‟s (1996, pp. 27-28, 2000, pp. 12-13) work on stickiness in knowledge transfer 
was reflected in  Kostova's  examination of knowledge  transfer  in  multi  organisational 
contexts, specifically in the contexts of multinational firms (Kostova, 1999, pp. 308-309; 
Kostova & Roth, 2002, pp. 221-223; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999, pp. 65-66).  Kostova   42 
(1999, pp. 308-309) conceptualised the problems related to the knowledge transfer in 
multiple  contexts  in  terms  of  several  factors  worth  considering,  such  as  the  legal 
environment of the country, the culture of the organisations and individuals involved in 
the transfer, and other socio-economic factors. Kostova and Zaheer (1999, p. 66) found 
that knowledge transfer in multiple contexts was difficult, such as that which was faced 
by Cargill in India.  
2.4 Summary 
This section discusses the gaps in the literature that demonstrated the aspects of “macro” 
and “micro” levels of stickiness in knowledge transfer between firms. Table 2.1 describes 
the evolution of “macro” stickiness concept from several authors, the terms that refer to 
stickiness,  the  aspects  of  stickiness,  and  the  gaps  between  the  literature  and  the 
proposition of the study. 
 
Table 2.1 
“Macro” Level Stickiness Concept Development and the Gaps 
Authors  Concept  “Stickiness” in 
terms of 
Aspects of stickiness  Gaps 
Sweeney (1996, 
p. 6-19) 
“Learning”  difficult to 
encourage 
“learning” 
“Macro” level, the 
government effort to 
encourage “learning” 
Reasons 
behind 
government 
actions to 
encourage 
learning 
“Technological 
progress” 
difficult to 
encourage 
“improvement” and 
“innovation” 
“Macro” level to 
encourage 
“improvement” and 
“innovation” 
the directions 
of the 
government to 
encourage 
“technological 
progress” 
“Economic 
development” 
difficult to use 
learning outcomes to 
stimulate economy 
“Macro” level, effort 
to convince firms to 
use “learning” 
outcomes for 
“improvement” and 
“innovation.” 
 
factors 
embedded in 
government 
economic 
policies 
Mokyr (2002,  “Technological  difficult to trigger  “Macro” level, effort  the level of   43 
pp.77-86)  “development”  firms to develop 
technology 
(machines and 
human) 
to convince firms to 
develop technology 
difficulties in 
convincing 
firms to 
develop 
technology 
Macdonald 
(1998, pp. 45-
47) 
“technology push” vs 
“market pull” 
difficult to make 
firms proactive and 
innovative 
“Macro” level, the 
government effort to 
make firms proactive 
and innovative 
difficulties in 
getting firms 
to be 
inovolved 
Macdonald 
(1998, p. 162) 
“technology parks”  difficult to convince 
firms to be in high 
technology 
“Macro” level, firms 
are reluctant to be 
proactive and 
innovative 
difficulties to 
convince 
firms to be 
active and 
innovative 
 
Table 2.2 highlights the development of “micro” stickiness concept from several lead 
scholars, the terms that refer to stickiness, and the aspects of stickiness.  
 
 
Table 2.2 
“Micro” Level Stickiness Concept Development  
Authors  Concept  “Stickiness” in 
terms of 
Aspects of stickiness 
Arrow (1962, 
p.155) 
“learning by doing”  investment on people 
and resources 
knowledge transfer barrier 
Arrow (1969, 
p.33) 
“learning by doing”  communicating 
technical knowledge 
to other people 
transfer mechanism 
Teece (1977, 
p.245) 
“learning by doing”  transfer of 
manufacturing 
technology 
type of transfer 
Nelson and 
Winter (1982, 
p.99) 
“remembering” and 
“doing” 
people, resource and 
organization interact 
to achieve 
organizational goals 
transfer context, knowledge 
transfer barrier 
Von Hippel 
(1994, p.430) 
“sticky” information  cost increase when 
transfer in other 
contexts 
transfer mechanism, knowledge 
barrier 
Szulanski (1995, 
p.437) 
“stickiness”  knowledge with 
people and situation 
transfer mechanism, knowledge 
barrier, transfer context 
 
Table 2.3 explains the development of “micro” stickiness concept from four aspects of 
stickiness with other information from the studies in terms of unit of analysis, method 
being applied, major findings and the gap. 
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Table 2.3 
Micro “Stickiness” Concept in Practice and the Gaps 
Micro 
stickiness 
aspects 
Authors  Unit of 
analysis 
Method  Major findings  Gap 
Transfer 
mechanisms 
Arrow‟s (1962, p. 
155) 
firms  Case 
study 
“learning by 
doing” 
cost in “learning by 
doing” difficult to 
transfer 
Nelson and Winter‟s 
(1982, pp. 9-11,99) 
firms  Case 
study 
“replication”  difficult to transfer 
“replication” 
Winter and Szulanski 
(2001, p. 731) 
firms  Case 
study 
“doing” is 
replicable 
difficult to transfer 
by replicating 
“doing” 
Szulanski and Jensen 
(2004, p. 348) 
firms  Case 
study 
“replication”  difficult to transfer 
“replication” 
Szulanski & Jensen 
(2006, pp. 937-939)  
firms  Experim
ent 
“adapt”  
“template” 
difficult to transfer 
as “template” and  
“adaptation” 
Types of 
transfer 
Arrow (1969, pp. 29-
35) 
firms  Case 
study 
technical type  technical together 
with technician, 
costly 
Teece (1977, p. 245)  firms  Case 
study 
technology transfer  transfer technical 
know-how and 
technicians, costly 
Szulanski (1996, p. 
28) 
firms  Case 
study 
“best practice”  transfer people, 
know-how and 
context; costly 
Szulanski & Jensen 
(2004, p. 348) 
firms  Experim
ent 
“template” or 
“working example” 
transfer people, 
know-how and 
context; costly 
Knowledge 
transfer 
barriers 
Szulanski (1995, pp. 
438-439) 
firms  Case 
study 
nature of the 
knowledge and the 
context of 
knowledge 
impede knowledge 
transfer, to bring 
both people and 
context  Simonin (1999, pp. 
464-465) 
firms  Case 
study 
knowledge, 
medium, and use 
Transfer 
contexts 
Arrow (1969, pp. 29-
35) 
firms  Case 
study 
Single context 
firm-specific 
context – people, 
context, and 
preference 
Szulanski and Jensen 
(2004, p. 350) 
firms  Experim
ent 
Single context 
(“Rank Xerox”) 
Szulanski and Jensen 
(2006, p. 938) 
firms  Experim
ent 
Single context of 
“Mail Boxes Etc. 
(MBE) 
Teece (1977, p. 247)  factories  Case 
study 
Multiple context 
(26 transfers) 
specific technology 
transfer among 
factories of 
different contexts 
Galbraith (1990, p. 
61) 
factories  Case 
study 
Multiple context 
(32 transfers) 
Von Hippel (1994, p. 
434) 
firms  Case 
study 
Multiple context 
(32 transfers) 
multiple contexts 
impede knowledge 
transfer between 
firms 
Szulanski (1996, p. 
28) 
firms  Case 
study 
Multiple context 
(272 observations) 
Szulanski (2000, pp. 
12-13) 
firms  Case 
study 
Multiple context 
(122 cases) 
Jensen and Szulanski 
(2004, pp. 508-509) 
firms  Case 
study 
Multiple context 
(122 cases)   45 
 
CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND TO TECHNOLOGY PARKS POLICY 
This chapter discusses the approaches to knowledge transfer adopted in the Malaysian 
economy, of which the technology park initiative was part. The discussion in this chapter 
is divided into two parts. The first part presents Malaysia‟s economic development as 
having  occurred  in  five  periods.  The  second  part  discusses  the  attempt  to  create  a 
knowledge-based economy and the establishment of Malaysian technology parks. Figure 
3.1 illustrates the contents of Chapter 3. 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  3.2 Five periods 
of Malaysian 
economic 
development 
3.3 Knowledge-
based economy 
and technology 
parks 
3.1.1 Economic approaches 
* Low cost to do business 
* Incentives and privileges 
* Profit maximisation 
3.1.2 Historical time line 
* Agriculture export trade  
(1786-1949) 
* Import substitution industrialisation 
(1950-1960) 
* Labour intensive industrialisation 
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* Capital intensive industrialisation 
(1981-1995) 
* Knowledge intensive industrialisation  
(1996-2007) 
3.2.1 Agriculture export trade  
(1786-1949) 
3.2.2 Import substitution 
industrialisation (1950-1960) 
3.2.3 Labour intensive 
industrialisation (1961-1980) 
3.2.4 Capital intensive 
industrialisation (1981-1995) 
3.2.5 Knowledge intensive 
industrialisation  
(1996-2007) 
3.3.1 Investment needs 
3.3.2 Knowledge-based 
economy indicators 
3.3.3 Reasons for 
knowledge-based 
economy 
Figure 3.1. Contents of Chapter 3   46 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a background to the development of technology parks policy in 
Malaysia. Malaysia did not formulate a stand alone technology park policy; rather the 
latter constitutes a sub topic on knowledge-based economy, technology transfers, and 
technology parks in national level economic policies. Normally, a policy is initiated and 
formulated by the federal government, and the various state governments tend to adopt it. 
Likewise,  when  the  federal  government  established  technology  parks,  the  state 
governments  will  also  establish  state  level  technology  parks.  The  study  argues  that 
“stickiness” occurs at “macro” and “micro” levels, with government the main contributor 
to “macro” level stickiness and firms the main contributor to “micro” level stickiness. 
The government contributed to “macro” level stickiness when it formulated the economic 
policies that were aimed both to produce technology transfer and to address social and 
economic  problems  simultaneously.  Another  cause  of  macro  level  stickiness  were 
government attempts to use technology parks to promote knowledge transfer, when the 
use  of  technology  parks  for  knowledge  transfer  has  proven  an  ineffective  economic 
development tool.  
 
Preceding  research  that  examined  stickiness  in  knowledge  transfer  between  firms  in 
Malaysia includes work by Drabble (2000, pp. 247-247, 121-147, 181-194, 235-266), 
Spinanger (1986, pp. 42-62), and Malaysian economists such as Jomo (1990, pp. 101-
117), Ali (1992, pp. 6-31), Rasiah (1995, pp. 48-49, 52-57), and Gomez (2003, pp. 59-
67). Apart from economists, evaluations by the sociologist Samad (1998, pp. 62-104)   47 
were also an important source of inspiration for this study. Drabble (2000, pp. 247-247, 
121-147, 181-194, 235-266)  discussed the historical analysis of the Malaysian economy 
from  1800  until  1990.  Likewise,  Spinanger  (1986,  pp.  42-62)  explained  Malaysia‟s 
economic  development  and  examined  it  from  a  mainstream  economics  perspectives. 
Jomo (1990, pp. 101-117) argued that Malaysia‟s approach to economic development is 
based on classical economic thought, which applied the reduction of cost approach to 
maximise profit making. By using this approach Malaysia managed to attract foreign 
direct investment. 
 
3.1.1 Economic approaches 
Like governments in all countries, the Malaysian government desired good economic 
growth, full employment, and sustainable competitiveness in the global economy. This 
ambition is not easy to achieve, however, given the status of economic performance in a 
developing country. The examination of Malaysian economic development by scholars 
such as Drabble (2000, pp. 247-247, 121-147, 181-194, 235-266), Spinanger (1986, pp. 
42-62), Jomo (1990, pp. 101-117), Ali (1992, pp. 6-31), Rasiah (1995, pp. 48-49, 52-57), 
Gomez (2003, pp. 59-67) and Samad (1998, pp. 62-104) suggested that the Malaysian 
government used three approaches to promote the profitability of firms. Firstly, it sought 
to reduce the cost of doing business in order to attract both local and foreign investment 
and  participation  in  the  country‟s  manufacturing  sectors.  Secondly,  the  government 
provided facilities and tax cuts to support each firm‟s attempts at profit maximization. 
Thirdly,  the  government  formulated  macro-economic  policies  to  support  the  profit 
maximisation objectives.    48 
 
From  his  examination  of  Malaysian  economic  development  in  terms  of  its 
industrialisation  process,  Ali  (1992,  pp.  55-56)  concluded  that  lowering  costs  was  a 
reasonable strategy to attract not only foreign capital, but also technology transfer in the 
manufacturing sector. Ali also emphasised the importance of foreign direct investment to 
accelerate economic growth; however, he argued that foreign firms were only interested 
in  the  investment  incentives.  He  argued,  further,  that  efforts  to  promote  technology 
transfer  were  inadequate  to  give  advantage  to  Malaysia,  in  terms  of  getting  foreign 
technology at a lower cost. In the short term, he suggested, foreign firms would get the 
benefits, and not local firms. 
  
Foreign firms are very sensitive to cost reduction and profit maximization initiatives. 
This has motivated the government to offer cheap labour as a means to reduce the cost of 
production. Rasiah (1995, pp. 199-200) further argued that the development of industrial 
zones, such as “Free Trade Zones (FTZ)”, was used to reduce the cost of production for 
foreign firms, particularly in the export-oriented sectors. Overall, Malaysia‟s economic 
planning has overemphasized foreign direct investment as a strategic approach not only 
for investment but also for achieving innovation, in terms of technology transfer, in the 
manufacturing sector.    
 
While governments may seek to attract foreign direct investment, they are responsible for 
ensuring political stability. Jomo (1990, p. 143) has claimed the 1969 riot in Malaysia 
reminded the government that it must always include national unity, poverty eradication,   49 
and a fair distribution of the economic “cake” in its economic policies. Gomez (2003, pp. 
60-64) argued that the government‟s desire to maintain the political stability necessary to 
achieve  good  economic  performance  has  motivated  the  government  to  formulate 
economic policies that are foreign direct investment friendly.  
 
3.1.2 History 
This chapter uses Malaysia‟s economic development history to indicate the stickiness 
associated with knowledge transfer.  Scholars, such as Jomo (1990, pp. 40-47), Ali (1992, 
pp. 6-31), Rasiah (1995, pp. 48-57), Drabble (2000, pp. 27, 121, 181, 235) and Gomez 
(2003,  pp.  60-64),  have  used  this  approach  in  examining  Malaysia‟s  economic 
development. Jomo (1990, pp. 40-47) analysed the industrialisation process in Malaysia 
and  identified  distinct  developmental  periods.    Ali  (1992,  pp.  6-31)  also  identified 
discrete periods of Malaysia‟s industrialisation process in relation to technology transfer 
and foreign direct investment. Rasiah (1995, pp. 48-57) used a similar approach when he 
examined Malaysia‟s industrialisation process with special reference to foreign capital 
and cheap labour. Drabble (2000, pp. 27, 121, 181, 235) identified different forms of 
economic planning in the colonial era, Japanese occupation, post Second World War, and 
under the affirmative action policy. Gomez (2003, pp. 60-64) focussed his attention on 
the periods before the affirmative action economic policy and after the implementation of 
this policy.  
 
The following discussion is based on the work by Jomo (1990, pp. 40-47), Ali (1992, pp. 
6-31), Rasiah (1995, pp. 48-57), Drabble (2000, pp. 27, 121, 181, 235) and Gomez (2003,   50 
pp. 60-64), but this history is extended to include a fifth period, which is the knowledge-
intensive industrialisation period. To appreciate the stickiness associated with knowledge 
transfer,  it  is  important  to  understand  the  five  periods  of  Malaysia‟s  economic 
development; namely (a) agriculture export trade (1786-1949), (b) import substitution 
industrialisation  (1950-1960),  (c)  labour  intensive  industrialisation  (1961-1980),  (d) 
capital  intensive  industrialisation  (1981-1995),  and  (e)  knowledge  intensive 
industrialisation (1996-2007). Each of these periods is discussed below. 
 
3.2 Five periods of Malaysian economic development 
This section discusses five periods of Malaysian economic development: (a) agriculture 
export trade (1786-1949), (b) import substitution industrialisation (1950-1960), (c) labour 
intensive  industrialisation  (1961-1980),  (d)  capital  intensive  industrialisation  (1981-
1995), and (e) knowledge intensive industrialisation (1996-2007). 
 
3.2.1 Agriculture export trade (1786-1949) 
This period explains important efforts initiated by British colonists in Malaya (the then 
Malaysia)  to  fully  utilise  raw  material  and  resource  advantages  to  support  the 
manufacturing boom in Britain by reducing the cost of production. The examinations of 
the economic development in this period by Drabble (2000, pp. 27-47), Spinanger (1986, 
pp. 40-47), and Jomo (1990, pp. 118-165) suggest that the British colonial government 
undertook  three  important  initiatives.  Firstly,  it  introduced  the  British  colonial 
administrative  system  and  enforced  the  acceptance  of  this  system  in  order  to  reduce 
resistance  from  local  people.  Secondly,  the  British  colonial  government  identified   51 
different races in Malaya and linked each with a particular trade or occupation. With such 
identification, members of each race focused on the specific trade that supported overall 
economic activities. Finally, the colonial administration invited foreign investors (mainly 
from Britain) to provide capital, machinery, and expertise to accelerate economic activity.  
 
The British colonial government introduced its administrative system and enforced this 
system in order to reduce resistance from the local people. The main objective of the 
British colonial office was to get raw materials at the lowest cost possible for supply to 
the manufacturing sector in Britain, the pioneer of the Industrial Revolution (Drabble, 
2000, pp. 70-73).  To achieve this goal, British colonists‟ initiatives were affected by the 
local context. Drabble (2000, pp. 63-73) examined the patterns of land ownership and the 
migration of foreign workers. He found that the land was occupied by the Malays as the 
traditional owners of the land and the Chinese migrated to this land to mine tin (Drabble, 
2000, pp. 63-64). Malays were active in the traditional agriculture sector such as the rice 
cultivation and also assumed administrative positions, while the Chinese people were 
actively involved  in  tin  mining  and  trading.  Due  to  their  different occupations,  most 
Malays lived in rural areas while most Chinese lived in urban areas. The scale of mining 
production  was  not  great  because  the  Malays  and  Chinese  miners  used  a  traditional 
“water pump” technique (Drabble, 2000, p. 70). This technique did not require a high 
level of knowledge, as it was easy to operate the water pump.  
 
Essentially, the British came to Malaya to get all the raw materials for the manufacturing 
sector in Britain, such as tin and rubber (Drabble, 2000, pp. 130-138). British companies   52 
brought in capital in terms of human experts, machineries and equipment to get these raw 
materials (Drabble, 2000, pp. 54-62). While tin was available for mining, rubber latex, 
which  was  also  needed  by  Britain‟s  manufacturing  sector,  was  not  readily  available. 
British  companies  planted  rubber  trees  and  provided  essential  facilities  to  transport 
rubber from to the plantation to the nearest seaport. 
 
British companies had to employ foreigners because the local Malays were inexperienced 
in tin mining and operating rubber plantations (Drabble, 2000, pp. 111-117; Jomo, 1990, 
pp.  118-123).  These  companies  requested  the  assistance  of  the  British  colonial 
administration to supply foreign labour (Drabble, 2000, pp. 66-68). While local Malays 
were involved in agriculture, British companies employed workers from Indonesia in the 
local agricultural sectors, such as for rice cultivation, (Drabble, 2000, pp. 63-64). The 
main reason for employing foreign labour was to ensure that the workplace was one in 
which British companies were confident that they would achieve cost reductions. British 
companies would not employ local Malays because they were afraid that the latter would 
resist  British  system.    British  companies  also  gradually  replaced  existing  work 
techniques. For instance, in tin mining, British mining company introduced dredging to 
intensify mining activities (Drabble, 2000, pp. 72-73). The British did not immediately 
replace the existing water pump technique used by Chinese tin miners, and, by moving to 
the dredging technique, the British managed to „control‟ tin mining on a mass scale. 
 
Knowledge  transfer  at  this  time  was  in  terms  of  the  introduction  of  new  machines, 
equipment, and foreign workers, which were brought to Malaya by British companies,   53 
and the introduction of the British colonial administrative systems..  The replacement of 
the water pump technique by the dredging technique provides an interesting example of 
technology transfer. The Chinese miners had already been using water pump technique to 
extract tin minerals but the British mining companies were not convinced that such a 
technique could produce tin on the mass scale needed for British manufacturers. British 
dredging  technique  had  proven  workable  and  Chinese  miners  worked  together  with 
British  mining  companies  to  introduce  this  technique.  The  transfer  of  the  dredging 
technique to Chinese miners was done in a single organisational context in which the 
British owned mining sites that were previously held by Malay rulers. Drabble (2000, pp. 
72-73) 
 
3.2.2 Import substitution industrialisation (1950-1960) 
The British introduced the colonial system to replace the system of local government in 
the first period of the economic development of Malaysia. Drabble (2000, pp. 121-147) 
has  argued  that  the  British  introduced  the  colonial  administrative  system  to  maintain 
political stability and reduce the threat of  local resistance. Previously it had introduced 
an agriculturally-based export system, but the system was not successfully implemented 
due to the disruption that resulted from the Japanese occupation of Malaya during World 
War II (Drabble, 2000, pp. 149-152). 
 
Essentially, the British colonists changed the economic system from agriculture export 
trade  to  import  substitution  industrialisation  during  the  1950s  in  order  to  protect  the 
British economic interest. The examination of the literature on the Malaysian economy   54 
during this period (such as that of Drabble (2000, pp. 121-147), Jomo (1990, pp. 40-47), 
and Samad (1998, pp. 62-79)) suggests that, at least, three factors led to the introduction 
of import substitution industrialisation. These were the formation of political parties, a 
change in the nature of administration, and the building of local expertise in and support 
for import substitution industrialisation. 
 
The first factor that led to the introduction of import substitution industrialisation was the 
formation of political parties by the three major Malaysian races (Malays, Chinese, and 
Indians).  Each  established  its  own  racially-based  political  party;  the  United  Malays 
National  Organisation  (UMNO)  for  the  Malays,  the  Malayan  Chinese  Association 
(MCA)  for  the  Chinese,  and  the  Malayan  Indian  Congress  (MIC)  for  the  Indians 
(Drabble, 2000, p. 152; Jomo, 1990, p. 143). Samad (1998, pp. 100-104) argued that 
every political party demanded an independent Malaya. The Japanese army occupation of 
Malaya  demonstrated  that  the  British  military  capability  could  be  defeated.  This 
promoted the emergence of new political parties who were also willing to challenge its 
economic system. 
 
The  change  in  the  local  people‟s  attitudes  towards  British  supremacy  motivated  the 
British government to introduce the import substitution industrialisation policy (Jomo, 
1990, p. 165). Through such a change, the colonial government revised the agriculture, 
export-import based economy to counter negative perceptions of British rule. Drabble 
(2000, pp. 121-147) argued that the standard of living was very poor during the war due 
to  slow  economic  growth.  To  respond  to  social  and  economic  problems,  such  as   55 
unemployment  and  political  instability,  the  colonial  government  introduced  import-
substitution  industrialisation  (Drabble,  2000,  p.  187).  Under  this  system,  British 
companies  could  use  raw  materials  to  manufacture  some  products  locally,  which 
provided employment opportunities for the local people. In the meantime, the British 
colonial government maintained the export of raw materials, such as tin and rubber. This 
approach was considered cost effective for the “recovery” period after the Second World 
War.  
 
The British government introduced the Malayan Union in 1948 in which Malaya would 
be directly controlled by the British colonial administration in India (Samad 1998, pp. 29-
30). This was an attempt to reduce the administrative role of the Malay rulers in Malaya. 
The Malay people protested against the Malayan Union through their political party, the 
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). Fearing that such resistance would create 
unnecessary burdens for British economic activities in Malaya; the British government 
met the Malay leaders and agreed to give them political power, provided that they shared 
it with the Chinese and Indians.  The British introduced a democratic political system as a 
mechanism to share the political power. Subsequently, the British colonial government 
organised the Kuala Lumpur Municipal election in 1952 as a test for a democracy in 
Malaya  (Samad, 1998, p. 52).  With  the results of the local government election, the 
British  government  was  convinced  that  local  leaders  could  form  an  independent 
government. Accordingly, a general election was held in 1955. As a result, a first local 
cabinet comprising leaders from three major races (Chinese, Indians, and Malays) was 
formed in 1955. The local people had undergone a learning process to form a local and   56 
national government through the election and this was important for the introduction of 
import substitution industrialisation. 
 
The  second  factor  that  led  to  the  introduction  of  import  substitution  industrialisation 
resulted from the transition in administration from the British to the local people. British 
colonists trained the local people to run a government that was based on the British 
system. Drabble (2000, pp. 152-154, 181-187) argued that the British sought to ensure 
the local people subscribed to the British approach so the British could continue to trade 
in  Malaya  and  British  firms  capitalise  on  their  investments  in  tin  mining,  rubber 
plantation and manufacturing facilities.  In a well organised power handover, the British 
protected  their  interests  by  training  local  politicians,  who  would  support  import 
substitution industrialisation (Jomo, 1990, pp. 118, 144).  
 
The third factor that led to the import substitution industrialisation policy was the ability 
of the British colonial government to train the local administrators to formulate economic 
policy that protected British economic interests. Drabble (2000, pp. 152-154, 181-187)  
argued that this situation led local government officials, who were elected by the people 
of Malaya, to support the British system. Those involved in the local government had 
learnt the basics of policy making from the British colonial government. Jomo (1990, pp. 
103-105) argued that the British government‟s training caused local people to formulate 
the “Draft Development Plan” (1950-1955) and the “First Malayan Plan” (1956-1960).  
Interestingly enough, an early example of the Malayan administration‟s training in policy 
formulation  was  the  import  substitution  industrialisation  policy,  which  was  the  first   57 
formal  industrialisation  policy  ever  created  in  Malaya.  The  import  substitution 
industrialisation challenged local leaders to produce locally while ensuring that British 
companies continued their operations by providing them with protection, in terms of tax 
exemptions and “pioneer” status. 
 
In essence, the import substitution industrialisation (ISI) differs from agriculture export-
import trade in terms of its focus on manufacturing industrialisation. Drabble (2000, pp. 
187-188) emphasised that, during the agriculture export-import trade period, the only 
activity  carried  out  was  the  production  of  raw  materials  (mainly  tin  and  rubber)  for 
export. Sophisticated technology was not required to enable raw materials to be exported. 
Existing transportation technology, such as road, railway, and shipping, could be used 
and  there  was  hardly  any  attempt  to  convert  raw  materials  into  semi  or  fully 
manufactured goods for local consumption because finished goods could be imported 
from overseas.  This strategy did not provide greater exposure for the local industry to 
meet local and overseas demand, as it was limited to raw materials processing for export 
and food production for local consumption (Jomo, 1986, p. 219). 
 
3.2.3 Labour intensive industrialisation (1961-1980) 
The import substitution industrialisation policy lasted until 1957, when Malaya gained its 
independence.  At first, the Malayan government retained this policy in order to foster 
national unity among the different races that were divided during the colonial period. At 
the same time, as Jomo (1990, pp. 144-147) argued, the Malayan government also needed 
to address high levels of unemployment. Facing the related pressures of unemployment   58 
and slow economic growth, the government decided to change the focus of its economic 
policy and it moved to introduce labour intensive industrialisation.  
 
Labour intensive industrialisation policy was implemented in two contexts (Jomo, 1990, 
pp.  118-165;    Gomez,  2003,  pp.  59-64;  and  Drabble,  2000,  pp.  181-187).  The  first 
context was the British free market system, which allowed market forces to naturally 
determine production and prices in the economy. The second situation was one of active 
intervention by the government to determine the nature of the economy. Jomo (1990, p. 
166) has argued that the introduction of an affirmative economic action under the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970 meant that the economy was no longer determined by 
the  market  forces,  but  was  under  the  government‟s  influence.  As  such,  the  second 
situation was influenced by the NEP, in which the government directly controlled the 
economy. The government‟s justification for the decision to implement the NEP was to 
eradicate poverty and restructure society (Gomez 2003, pp. 59-60). These were seen as 
ways to avoid racial conflicts within the multiethnic society, such as those that occurred 
in 1969. Abdullah (1997, pp. 189-192) argued that the government decided to use the 
NEP in order to eradicate poverty and restructure society because these factors have been 
identified as key causes of the 1969 riot. Indeed, Drabble (2000, pp. 197-206) argued that 
the British laissez faire economic approach was only concerned with the production of 
raw materials and import substitute products. In addition, poverty and unemployment 
problems  were  not  good  for  the  reputation  of  the  newly  independent  Malayan 
government, whose ruling party wished to sustain its power. 
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Essentially,  Malaysian  public  policies  replicated  those  introduced  by  the  British 
administration, from whom the Malaysian government had learnt to formulate economic 
policy.  Moreover,  the  economy  was  based  on  classical  economic  thinking,  which 
suggested that any  developing  country must  acquire more capital to create economic 
growth.  Since  capital  or  investment  was  important  for  developing  the  economy,  the 
government  formulated  economic  policies  to  achieve  this  end,  particularly  five-year 
economic plans (Drabble, 2000, pp. 197-206). The labour industrialisation approach was 
administered through the Second Malayan Plan (1961-1965) and the First Malaysia Plan 
(1966-1970). 
 
The government controlled the economy because of the inability of local companies to 
provide adequate employment opportunities. The government had no alternative other 
than to attract foreign companies to invest in the manufacturing sector (Rasiah, 1995, pp. 
56-57). Foreign companies could only be attracted to invest, however, if incentives and 
protection were provided by the government. The government introduced the Investment 
Incentives Act in 1968, which was a revised version of the Pioneer Industries Ordinance 
of  1958.  The  essence  of  such  incentive  was  to  attract  foreign  investors  to  invest  in 
Malaysia for reasons other than the availability of local cheap labour. 
 
Government involvement was crucial to speeding up industrial development. Industrial 
development could only occur  with institutional supports (Spinanger 1986, pp. 45-48). 
As a result, the government formed a coordination body that served as a one-stop-centre 
for foreign investors. This coordination body was established in 1965; it was first called   60 
the Federal Industrial Development Authority (FIDA) and later became known as the 
Malaysian  Industrial  Development  Authority  (MIDA).  MIDA  is  the  Malaysian 
Government's  principal  agency  for  the  promotion  and  co-ordination  of  industrial 
development in Malaysia. It is the first point of contact for investors who intend to set up 
manufacturing projects and related services in Malaysia.  
 
The  government‟s  interference  in  the  economy  was  introduced  under  the  Second 
Malaysia  Plan  (2MP)  (1971-1975)  and  the  National  Economic  Policy  (NEP)  (1971-
1990). The rationale for the NEP was to eradicate poverty and to restructure society. The 
government  learnt  that  it  was  necessary  to  interfere  in  the  economy  because  of  its 
experience during the 18 months of restoring peace after  the racial riot in 1969 (Samad, 
1998,  pp.  80-100).  Positive  action,  such  as  the  NEP,  was  necessary  to  keep  society 
peaceful and stable, as poverty and economic inequality were the main causes of the riot. 
The introduction of the 2MP and NEP, after the racial riot, were part of the government‟s 
attempt to promote industrialisation (Gomez, 2003, pp. 59-64; Samad, 1998, pp. 80-100). 
  
The  government  also  recognised  the  importance  of  the  transfer  of  knowledge  and 
technology  from  foreign  companies  to  local  companies;  however  the  focus  of  the 
government  at  that  time  was  to  create  more  jobs  through  labour-intensive 
industrialisation. This policy was aimed to create as many jobs as possible, through the 
increased  use  of  labour,  and  to  earn  as  much  income  as  possible,  through  foreign 
currency derived from the export trade. The government was less concerned with the 
development  of  domestic  companies,  as  the  separation  of  domestic  companies  from   61 
foreign  companies  in  the  Free  Trade  Zones  (FTZs)  had  reduced  the  opportunity  for 
knowledge  transfer  (Rasiah,  1995,  pp.  13,  78-80).  The  exclusiveness  of  these  zones 
created  an  invisible  barrier  to  knowledge  transfer  (Rasiah,  1995,  pp.  78-80).  This 
situation  was  aggravated  by  the  regulation  of  the  equity  structure  and  terms  of 
employment imposed by the NEP (Jomo, 1990, pp. 164-165). 
 
To provide institutional support for Malaysia‟s industrialisation process, the government 
established  Malaysian  Industrial  Development  Authority  (MIDA).  Later,  in  1976,  the 
government established the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment which 
emphasised technology transfer (Ali, 1992, pp. 95-96). These institutions were created to 
promote research in advanced manufacturing technologies. Taylor (2003, pp. 117-118) 
has suggested that the rigidity and inflexibility of the government‟s policies were not 
effective to facilitate technology transfer between foreign and domestic companies. Ali 
(1992, pp. 95-96) argued that this was because these institutions were established on a ad-
hoc basis. The government was criticised by domestic companies (mainly Chinese owned 
companies) for its pro-foreign investment policies. 
 
Knowledge transfer in this period was associated with the desire to attract foreign direct 
investment  to  attain  economic  growth.  Labour  intensive  industrialisation  policy  was 
implemented in two contexts. The first context was the British free market system. The 
second context was one in which government played an active role in the economy. To 
make Malaysia attractive to foreign investors, investment incentives, cheap labour, and 
special  facilities  were  provided  as  cost  reduction  mechanisms.  In  doing  so,  some   62 
adjustments were made to legal procedures and institutional support was provided to 
implement all the incentives that were created to promote investment.  
 
3.2.4 Capital intensive industrialisation (1981-1995) 
The need to provide employment opportunities to the people remained an issue. In this 
period,  the  government  wanted  to  increase  employment  opportunities  in  the  high 
technology sector to add to the already massive employment in the manufacturing sector. 
Jomo  (1990,  pp.  128-130)  argued  that  this  period  is  called  one  of  capital  intensive 
industrialisation because of the intensity of the investment in high technology (advanced 
machinery)  by  foreign  and  local  companies.  Malayasia‟s  focus  on  promoting  capital 
intensiveness  was  inspired  by  the  development  of  heavy  industries  in  newly 
industrialized countries, such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Prior to this period, the 
government had encouraged technology transfer between local and foreign companies 
involved in manufacturing (Ali 1992, pp. 95-96). This commitment was put into effect by 
the establishment of the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment and the 
Technology Transfer Unit under the Ministry of Trade and Industry. However, Rasiah 
(2003a, pp. 785-791) has argued that foreign direct investment remained a key driving 
force for capital-intensive industrialisation. 
   
The implementation of capital intensive industrialisation was in two phases (See Jomo 
(1990, pp. 128-132), Ali (1992, pp. 95-96),  Samad (1998), Drabble (2000, pp. 235-266) 
and Rasiah (2003a, pp. 785-791)). Phase 1 was the period between 1981 and 1985 and 
Phase 2 was between 1986 and 1995. The first phase was implemented under the Fourth   63 
Malaysia Plan (4MP) (1981-1985), the New Economic Policy (NEP) (1970-1990) and the 
First Outline Perspective Plan (OPP). Within that framework, the implementation of the 
capital intensive industrialisation was limited to fulfilling the national agenda to eradicate 
poverty, to restructure society, and to encourage Malay participation in the economy. In 
this  first  phase,  however,  most  of  the  work  involved  preparing  to  go  into  the  high 
technology sector. 
 
The  second  phase,  between  1986  and  1995,  was  partially  under  the  New  Economic 
Policy (1970-1990). During this phase, the government decided to discontinue the New 
Economic  Policy  and  to  adopt  liberal  economic  policies  to  promote  high  technology 
industry. The Vision 2020 plan was launched in 1991 with the stated aim of liberalising 
the  Malaysian  economy.  The  government  formulated  the  Second  Outline  Perspective 
Plan  (1991-2000)  in  order  to  achieve  its  Vision  2020  objectives.  The  immediate 
implementation  of  Vision  2020  and  the  capital  intensive  industrialisation  were 
incorporated  into  the  Fifth  Malaysia  Plan  (1986-1990)  and  the  Sixth  Malaysia  Plan 
(1991-1995). The main policy document that reduced the government‟s participation in 
the  economy  was  the  Privatisation  Plan,  or  “Malaysia  Incorporated”,  which  was 
introduced  in  1991.  Under  that  policy,  the  implementation  of  the  capital  intensive 
industrialisation was to be decided by the market itself.  
 
The implementation of the first phase of the capital intensive industrialisation was not 
very successful. The slow economic growth that resulted from the world recession meant 
that it was not timely for the government to introduce capital intensive industrialisation   64 
(Jomo 1990, pp. 121-122). Moreover, Drabble (2000, pp. 181-187, 265-266) has asserted 
that investors were not ready to participate in the high technology industry because they 
believed that economic policy was still under the influence of the New Economic Policy 
(1970-1990).  The government implemented the Fifth Malaysia Plan (5MP) (1986-1990) 
together  with  the  First  Industrial  Master  Plan  (IMP)  (1986-1995)  and  the  Promotion 
Investment Act (PIA) 1986 in order to stimulate the economic growth through capital-
intensive  export  orientated  industrialisation,  as  an  immediate  response  to  a  quick 
recovery from the recession (1984-1985) (Ali 1992, pp. 32-37). 
 
The  government‟s  decision  to  implement  capital  intensive  industrialisation  has  been 
criticised by local economists. For instance, Jomo (1990, pp. 128-129) has argued that the 
government  decision  to  implement  this  policy  was  an  attempt  to  emulate  the  high 
technology industrialisation of developed countries in East Asia, such as Japan, Taiwan, 
and South Korea. Indeed, the government introduced the “Look East Policy” to show its 
commitment to acquiring approaches to industrialisation from East Asian countries. Jomo 
(1990,  pp.  140-141),  however,  has  asserted  that  the  implementation  of  the  capital 
intensive industrialisation policy was merely going back to the British import substitution 
policy that was implemented in the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
A number of high technology projects were initiated by the government under capital 
intensive industrialisation. One of them was the national car project. The national car 
project, for example, was a collaboration with a Japanese car manufacturer, in which the 
government  sought  to  acquire  automobile  technology  through  its  own  national  car   65 
manufacturing company (Jomo 1990, p. 128). Such a project was part of the “Look East” 
policy launched by the government to acquire foreign high technology. The creation of 
the national car manufacturing company however was not a successful attempt to acquire 
Japanese automotive technology due to an overemphasis on short term profit making on 
the  part  of  the  Japanese  car  manufacturers.  Nevertheless,  people  benefited  from  the 
project in terms of increased employment opportunities. 
 
Malaysia continued to emphasize employment creation and economic growth even in the 
post  New  Economic  Policy  (NEP)  (1971-1990)  era.  The  task  of  developing  a  sound 
economy was shared with the private sector through a national plan for privatisation 
(Jomo 1990, pp. 143-165). This was known as the Privatisation Master Plan, which was 
introduced  in  1991  (Malaysia,  1991a,  pp.  2-5).  This  plan  was  part  of  a  post-NEP 
economic development instrument called the National Development Policy. This policy 
was  incorporated  into  the  Sixth  Malaysia  Plan  (1991-1995),  the  Second  Outline 
Perspective Plan (OPP2) (1991-2000), and Vision 2020 (1991-2020) (Malaysia, 1991b, 
1991c, 1996a, 1996b, 2001a). 
  
The Sixth Malaysia Plan (6MP) (1991-1995) and the Second Outline Perspective Plan 
(OPP2) (1991-2000) were medium-term economic planning tools intended to stimulate 
the  development  of  the  high  technologies  associated  with  the  heavy  industry  sector 
(Malaysia,  1991b,  1991c).  This  policy  was  the  government‟s  attempt  to  address 
unemployment and slow economic growth.  Vision 2020 was launched in 1991, and was   66 
a long-term economic plan for Malaysia to become an industrialized nation by the year 
2020 (Mahathir Mohamed, 1991, pp. 2-3, 2003a, p. 5, 2003b, pp. 1-7). 
   
The privatisation plan was criticised; one criticism was that the privatisation plan was not 
suitable for the characteristics of Malaysian firms due to their lack of key competencies 
and entrepreneurial capability (Jomo & Hui, 2003, pp. 441-456). Moreover, the plan was 
criticised  because  some  of  these  enterprises  were  formerly  state  owned  enterprises. 
Samad (1998, pp. 100-104) has argued that political influence had penetrated these state 
owned enterprises due to the appointment of former politicians and retired government 
officials to key positions in these enterprises. The result was that these enterprises were 
affected by federal political influence, although they were supposed to work under the 
“Malaysia Incorporated” policy. 
   
Under Malaysia‟s privatisation policy, the government established private enterprises to 
replace agencies that had previously operated under the government administration to 
provide essential facilities, such as electricity, water, and telecommunications. A problem 
with the implementation of this policy, Gomez and Jomo (1997, pp. 25-27) argued, was 
the decision to appoint former politicians and bureaucrats as key personnel caused these 
personnel  to  award  public  contracts  that  reflected  their  political  connections.  For 
instance,  a national water supply project was awarded to a government related enterprise 
on the basis of political connections, but the enterprise was unable to implement the 
project (Alavi 1999, pp. 329-359). As a result, the enterprise subcontracted the project to 
a British engineering company.  Instead of playing the role of the principal builder for the   67 
project, the local enterprise acted as its project manager. As a result, the local enterprise 
lost the opportunity to advance itself through this high technology project. 
  
The implementation of capital intensive industrialisation occurred in two phases. The first 
phase (1981-1985) was a preparation stage that was intended to enhance the economy 
through the acquisition of high technology. A reinforcement of high technology or capital 
intensive industrialisation was implemented in the second phase (1986-1995).  In this 
phase, the government introduced policies and revised investment incentives in order to 
intensify the rate of economic growth under capital intensive industrialisation. At this 
stage, knowledge transfer occurred through technology transfer arrangements that came 
with the investment packages that were introduced.  
 
3.2.5 Knowledge intensive industrialisation (1996-2007) 
Knowledge  intensive  industrialisation  is  the  continuation  of  capital  intensive 
industrialisation in the context of the knowledge-based economy. The knowledge-based 
economy  first  emerged  in  1996.  Since  Malaysia  is  part  of  the  global  economy,  the 
government decided to engage with  the knowledge-based economy in its mainstream 
economic policy. Rasiah (2003b, pp. 305-333) has argued that the government‟s decision 
to  develop  a    knowledge-based  economy  was  due  to  the  presence  of  semiconductor 
manufacturing that produced electronic components for digital technologies associated 
with  new  information  and  communication  technologies  (ICTs).  The  government  was 
convinced  that  the  decision  to  develop  a  knowledge-based  economy  was  a  timely 
initiative  to  take  advantage  of  its  ICT  industry.  This  period  is  called  a  period  of   68 
knowledge intensive industrialisation because it reflected the emergence of information 
and  communication  technology  industries,  for  which  knowledge  is  a  key  driver  of 
economic  growth  (Rasiah,  2003b,  pp.  305-333).  Such  an  emphasis  is  in  line  with 
Drucker‟s  (1993,  p.  38)  projection  that  the  ICT  era  will  be  about  the  application  of 
knowledge to create new knowledge. 
  
In following the global trend, the government sought a knowledge-based economy in 
order  to  ensure  that Malaysian industrialisation remained  competitive  and  sustainable  
(See Fleming and Søborg (2002, pp. 145-170), Gomez (2003, pp. 59-70) and Ritchie 
(2002, pp. 1110-1118)). This was threatened by the emergence of new sources of cheap 
and skilled workers in neighbouring countries, such as Indonesia, the Philippines and 
China. Fearing that foreign firms in Malaysia would move to other countries looking for 
cheaper labour; the government introduced further incentives to induce current investors 
to remain in Malaysia.  
  
Consequently, the government introduced the Seventh Malaysia Plan (7MP) (1996-2000) 
and the Second Industrial Master Plan (IMP 2) (1996-2005) that incorporated policies 
designed to develop a knowledge-based economy in order to increase productivity and to 
generate new sources of economic growth (Malaysia, 1996a, pp. 1-11, 1996b, pp. 2-7, 
2001a,  p.  11).  Investment  incentives  were  essential  to  mobilise  the economy.  Rasiah 
(2003a, p. 785) has argued that the incentives to invest continued to be used to attract 
foreign direct investment in ICT industries. In the labour intensive industrialisation, the 
government established special regions, called Free Trade Zones (FTZs), to provide a   69 
friendly  environment  for  direct  investment  by  foreign  manufacturing  companies.  The 
government continued to use the FTZ idea to attract foreign direct investment in the ICT 
industry (Wahab 2003, p. 5) and combined the FTZ concept with features of Silicon 
Valley to differentiate between an environment for the manufacturing and one for the 
ICT  industry  (Gwynne,  1997,  pp.  5-11).  As  a  result,  the  government  established  the 
Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC).  
 
The  Multimedia  Super  Corridor  (MSC)  was  established  in  1997  to  encourage  global 
companies to invest in the information and communication technology industry (Wahab 
2003, pp. 5-6). The MSC includes several technology parks, such as Technology Park 
Malaysia (TPM), Cyberjaya, Selangor Science Park, and UPM-MTDC Park.  In making 
these technology parks attractive, the government offered incentives for investment and 
for  innovation  to  foreign  ICT  companies  (Multimedia  Development  Corporation 
Malaysia, 2004b, no page number). For instance, the period of tax breaks was extended 
by  up  to  ten  years,  ICT  equipment  was  made  duty  free,  the  equity  and  ownership 
structures were freed, and the use of foreign workers was allowed. The MSC has been 
widely cited as national landmark for Malaysia‟s ICT industry (Mohan, Omar, & Aziz, 
2002, pp. 265-271; Ramasamy, Chakrabarty, & Cheah, 2004, pp. 871-883). 
 
The government was convinced that the establishment of the MSC and other technology 
parks  would  serve  as  a  catalyst  to  accelerate  the  growth  of  Malaysia‟s  ICT  industry 
(Zainuddin,  2000,  pp.  1-11).  The  government  continued  to  believe  that  multinational 
companies would be attracted by their incentives for investment (Rasiah 2003b, pp. 305-  70 
307). In order to encourage foreign companies to locate and register their operations in 
the MSC zone, the government promised to protect these companies through its „Bill of 
Guarantees,‟  a  world-class  infrastructure,  the  introduction  of  cyber  laws,  and  the 
provision  of  investment  incentives  (financial  and  non  financial)  (Multimedia 
Development Corporation Malaysia, 2004b). The concept of the MSC is similar to the 
Free  Trade  Zones  (FTZ)  concept  developed  in  the  late  1960s,  which  was  to  assist 
multinational corporations in exporting their products. In fact, the criteria under which it 
was gained and the privilege provided for foreign companies remain unchanged. 
  
The only difference is that the MSC zone is concentrated on ICT-related products and 
services, which represents an extension of existing electronics and electrical products 
(Wahab, 2003, pp. 10-11). In 2004, there were 1,045 companies registered with the MSC, 
with 50 of these being world-class companies (Multimedia Development Corporation 
Malaysia, 2004a). The MSC remains crucial to Malaysia‟s attempts to attract giant ICT 
companies to help Malaysia‟s ICT industry to develop. The current Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, Dato‟ Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2004, p. 1) said: 
The MSC continues to offer leading world companies an exceptional environment 
to not only expand their businesses, but also to undertake research, develop new 
products and technologies, and export their products.  
 
The government launched the Third Outline Perspective Plan (OPP 3) (2001-2010) which 
emphasised the need to create knowledge that enabled growth in the ICT industry and its 
engagement with the knowledge-based economy (Malaysia, 2000b). The Eighth Malaysia 
Plan  (2001-2005)  addressed  the  issues  of  human  resource  development,  science  and 
technology,  research  and  development,  the  information  technology  structure,  and   71 
attracting  venture  capital  for  knowledge  intensive  industries  (Malaysia,  2000a).  The 
Ninth Malaysian Plan (2006-2010) emphasised the development of “human capital” to 
attract  foreign  direct  investment  in  Malaysia‟s  knowledge-based  economy  (Malaysia, 
2006).  Thus  incentives  to  attract  foreign  direct  investment  remain  relevant  to  the 
knowledge-based economy (Fleming & Søborg, 2002, pp. 145-170; Gwynne, 1997, pp. 
5-11). Foreign ICT multinationals are seen to be capable of creating new sources of 
wealth and growth in the knowledge-based economy (Ramasamy et al., 2004, pp. 871-
883). 
 
The problem, as Fleming and Søborg (2002, p. 169) pointed out, is that multinational ICT 
companies  were  hesitant  about  Malaysia‟s  knowledge  economy,  particularly  the 
Multimedia  Super  Corridor  (MSC).  The  reasons  for  their  hesitance  include:  that  tax 
breaks were no longer attractive in the absence of skilled and educated workers; that a 
significant investment was required to train knowledge workers; uncertainty about the 
profitability of IT products and services; and lack of transparency in governance. These 
factors have motivated the government to increase its efforts to train knowledgeable and 
skilful workers. 
   
Knowledge transfer in the knowledge intensive industrialisation was also related to an 
overemphasis on incentives for foreign direct investment instead of innovation, although 
the knowledge-based economy was supposed to deal with the details associated with 
innovation. 
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3.3 Knowledge-based economy and Technology Parks 
The  discussion  in  this  section  is  divided  in  three  parts.  The  first  part  discusses  the 
adoption of a knowledge-based economy in Malaysia, which was influenced by the need 
to attract foreign direct investment. The second part explains the main indicators of a 
knowledge-based  economy.  The  final  part  explains  the  reasons  for  the  pursuit  of  a 
knowledge-based economy. All these factors led to the need for technology parks for 
Malaysia‟s ICT industry. 
 
3.3.1 Investment needs 
Malaysia‟s  approach  to  developing  a  knowledge-based  economy  is  to  give  great 
emphasis to incentives for foreign direct investment. Economic policies biased toward 
promoting foreign direct investment have a significant effect on the relationships between 
domestic and overseas companies (Chesnais, 1992, pp. 265-295; Easson, 1992, pp. 387-
391; Kumar & Marg, 2000, pp. 1253-1269). At the same time, foreign companies that 
specialized  in  exports  continued  to  operate  in  Malaysia‟s  Free  Trade  Zones  (FTZ) 
(Drabble, 2000, p. 202; Jomo, 1990, pp. 128-134). Indeed, these zones provide special 
facilities and incentives, such as tax cuts, and capital allowances. 
 
Malaysia is not isolated from the global economy and needs to strike a balance between 
fulfilling its domestic promises and meeting global challenges. In doing so, Malaysia 
continues to adopt „global‟ economic policies so that it is in line with the rest of the 
world,  especially  with  current  and  future  foreign  investors  (Hill,  2004,  pp.  446-447; 
Mani,  2004,  pp.  29-44;  Raymond,  2003,  pp.  260-267).  Most  investors  came  from   73 
advanced  countries.  Malaysia  is  convinced  however  that  the  implementation  of  the 
knowledge-based economy will allow it to strike a balance between domestic needs and 
globalization‟s pressures (Gwynne, 1997, pp. 5-11; Mohan et al., 2002, pp. 265-271).  
 
Malaysia needs foreign direct investment (FDI) to advance its economy. FDI is crucial to 
improve  a  national  economic  growth  and  employment  (Ali,  1992,  pp.  6-31).  Most 
importantly, it brings capital and potential foreign technology into Malaysia. However, 
there are only a few policies that will motivate foreign companies to invest in a country; 
these include ownership-specific advantages, internalization opportunities and locational 
advantages. In any venture, investors always expect a high investment return (Ahmed, 
Mohamad,  Tan,  &  Johnson,  2002,  pp.  805-813).  Thus,  choices  of  an  investment 
destination  are  not  easy  to  make.  Globalization  has  a  significant  effect  on  foreign 
companies‟ decisions on where to invest (Ansari, 2002, pp. 155-157). Government policy 
also has an impact on FDI inflows because it shapes business conditions and other socio-
political and environmental factors (Nunnenkamp, 2002, pp. 1-14). Therefore, Malaysia 
tried to formulate state policies which were attractive for foreign direct investment.    
 
When the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries 
announced the emergence of a new knowledge-based world economy, Malaysia promptly 
adopted the concept in its economic policies (Zainuddin, 2000, p. 5). The government 
made  this  decision  because  it  wanted  to  keep  pace  with  OECD  countries,  so  that 
Malaysia will not lose its foreign direct investment to other countries (Zainuddin, 2000, 
pp. 5, 10-11). The document outlining plans for Malaysia‟s knowledge-based economy   74 
was called the Knowledge-based Master Plan (Economic Planning Unit, 2002, pp. 117-
143).  This  Master  Plan  summarized  the  important  initiatives  that  were  essential  for 
Malaysia  to  develop  a  knowledge-based  economy.  The  Master  Plan  was  formulated 
during the fourth Prime Ministership of Dr. Mahathir Mohamed who  emphasized that the 
Plan was “to migrate from a production-based economy to a knowledge-based economy 
and  the  development  of  a  Master  plan  to  chart  the  strategic  direction  towards  the 
knowledge-based  economy  were  first  announced  in  Budget  2000”  (as  quoted  in 
Economic Planning Unit, 2002, p. i, "Forward").   
 
Malaysia had been an agriculture-based economy during its colonial days (Drabble, 2000, 
pp. 109-111; Jomo, 1990, pp. 101-117). However, after Independence, Malaysia sought a 
production-based economy, especially in the manufacturing sector, in order to provide 
significant employment opportunities for the people (Drabble, 2000, pp. 187-189; Jomo, 
1990, pp. 118-134). In 1970, an affirmative economic policy, called the New Economic 
Policy  (NEP)  (1970-1990),  was  introduced  to  respond  to  the  needs  of  disadvantaged 
people – mostly Malays and indigenous people (Drabble, 2000, pp. 197-206; Jomo, 1990, 
pp. 143-165). However, the manufacturing sector offered only non or low skilled job 
opportunities, which made little contribution to sustaining the economy (Drabble, 2000, 
pp.  197-206;  Jomo,  1990,  pp.  143-165).  This  problem  was  not  crucial  at  that  time, 
however, due to the priority of providing more jobs for the people (Drabble, 2000, pp. 
181-187; Jomo, 1990, pp. 145-154). These factories provided massive job opportunities 
for  the  people  and,  eventually,  this  policy  addressed  unemployment  and  poverty 
problems.    75 
 
In 1980, Malaysia‟s production-based economy advanced further into heavy industries, 
especially in the automotive sector, with the national car project (Drabble, 2000, pp. 235-
266;  Jayasekaran,  1993,  pp.  272-285;  Jomo,  1990,  pp.  128-134).  This  sector  offers 
massive  opportunities  for  local  people  to  learn  automotive  production  skills  through 
technology transfer activities. In the meantime, Malaysia managed to encourage more 
foreign electronics companies to open more factories. The reason that these companies 
chose to operate in Malaysia was due to its foreign direct investment friendly policies and 
the availability of a significant supply of  cheap labour (Ali, 1992, pp. 29-31; Rasiah, 
1995, pp. 56-57). Since the electronics industry is much closer to the ICT industry than 
other manufacturing industries, Malaysia decided to advance its economy by developing 
an ICT industry (Zainuddin, 2000, pp. 4-5). 
 
Malaysia  made  a  paradigm  shift  in  its  economic  policies  in  order  to  ensure  its 
competitiveness. In fact, in his Budget 2000 speech, Malaysia‟s then Finance Minister, 
Daim Zainuddin, emphasized that 
We  must  now  make  a  paradigm  shift  from  a  production-based  economy  (P-
economy) to a K-based economy. This is in line with the Government‟s efforts to 
intensify the development of a high technology industry as well as make IT the 
catalyst for growth in the 21
st century. (Zainudin, 2000, point no. 48) 
 
Malaysia believed that it had the capability to shift to the knowledge-based economy 
because of its sound economic performance. Table 3.1 compares Malaysia‟s economic 
performance against selected advanced countries. 
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Table 3.1 
Malaysia‟s Economic Performance (1997) 
Countries 
(1997) 
GDP 
(US$) 
Services/GD
P (%) 
K-skills 
workforce (% 
total 
workforce) 
Investment 
in 
R&D/GDP 
(%) 
Patents 
granted 
(1994-1995) 
United States  31,469  72  10.7  2.5  55,903 
Finland  23,636  65  22.9  2.6  898 
South Korea  13,580  50  26.4  2.8  6,175 
Taiwan  14,200  61  15.1  1.9  13,278 
Singapore  27,565  64  15.5  1.4  8 
Japan  22,720  60  50.0  2.8  83,781 
Malaysia  10,680  45  17.5  0.5  25 
Note: GDP – Gross Domestic Products; R&D – Research and Development; US$ - United States Dollars 
From Economic Planning Unit (2002, p. 111).  
 
Based on the indicators in Table 3.1, Malaysia‟s position is not too far from that of 
industrialized  countries  in  the  region,  such  as  South  Korea  and  Taiwan,  in  terms  of 
national income, or GDP. In terms of the percentage of the workforce using knowledge 
skills, though, Malaysia is ahead of neighbouring countries, like Taiwan and Singapore. 
However, its investment in R&D per GDP needs to increase in order to compete with the 
rest of the world. These indicators led Zainudin, to suggest that Malaysia can improve 
further and become a developed country (Zainudin, 2000, no page number but points 48, 
49 and 50).  
 
The  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  (OECD,  1996,  p.  7) 
defined  a  knowledge-based  economy  as  one  “directly  based  on  the  production, 
distribution, and use of knowledge and information...towards growth in high technology 
investments,  high-technology  industries,  more  highly-skilled  labour  and  associated 
productivity  gains.”  This  definition  implies  that  a  knowledge-based  economy  is 
developed as an evolutionary process. It does not totally ignore current practice, but is 
introduced  through  a  gradual  improvement  to  the  economy.  Accordingly,  the   77 
development  of  a  knowledge-based  economy  cannot  be  done  in  isolation  from  the 
production-based  economy;  rather  it  works  with  it.  Malaysia  follows  the  OECD‟s 
definition because it wants to align itself with OECD countries. The Economic Planning 
Unit Malaysia (2002, p. 1, in Chapter 1) defines a knowledge-based economy as “an 
economy  in  which  knowledge,  creativity  and  innovation  play  an  ever-increasing  and 
important role in generating and sustaining growth.”   
 
Malaysia  is  convinced  of  this  approach  because  it  is  not  only  attracts  foreign  direct 
investment,  but  it  is  also  effective  in  developing  the  quality  of  its  human  resources 
(Bogenhold, 2004, pp. 165-171). Indeed, knowledge has a significant role in not only 
transforming an economy, but also in  adding value to the economy and promoting well 
being of the society (Mokyr, 2002, pp. 80-81). Knowledge provides value to the economy 
in terms of increasing total factor productivity (TFP) (Economic Planning Unit Malaysia, 
2002,  p.  24).  Figure  3.2  demonstrates  the  role  of  knowledge  in  strengthening  the 
economy.  
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Figure 3.2. Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and Knowledge 
From Economic Planning Unit (2002, p. 24) 
 
TFP originated from Solow‟s (1988, p. 313) growth theory. Such an approach emphasises 
the important role of the capital (investment) in generating economic growth, in which 
cost  reduction  is  the  main  way  to  increase  profits.  The  Economic  Planning  Unit  of 
Malaysia (2002, p. 24) defines “Total Factor Productivity” (TFP)  as: 
the additional output generated through enhancements in efficiency accounted 
for  by  such  things  as  advancement  in  human  capital,  skills  and  expertise, 
acquisition of efficient management techniques and know-how, improvements in 
an  organisation,  gains  from  specialization,  introduction  of  new  technology, 
innovation or upgrading present technology and enhancement in Information 
and Communication Technology (ICT). 
 
Table 3.2 summarizes the contribution of TFP to Malaysia‟s to growth in national income 
(GDP).  
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Table 3.2 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in Malaysia‟s Economy 
Factors  6
th Malaysia Plan 
(1991-1995) 
7
th Malaysia Plan 
(1996-2000) 
8
th Malaysia Plan 
(2001-2005) 
Growth  Share  Growth  Share  Growth   Share 
GDP  9.5  100  4.7  100  7.5  100 
Labour  2.3  23.9  1.2  25.0  1.6  21.5 
Capital  4.7  50.2  2.3  50.2  3.1  41.3 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
2.5  25.9  1.2  24.8  2.8  37.2 
Note: GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
From Economic Planning Unit (2002, p. 24) 
 
3.3.2 Knowledge-based economy indicators 
Accordingly, Malaysia‟s knowledge-based economy seeks to use knowledge to produce 
more  valuable  knowledge  and  innovation.  Thus,  all  industries  emphasize  the  use  of 
knowledge and, in this regard, Malaysia promotes knowledge-based industries, as defined 
by the OECD. Knowledge-based economic indicators provide signs of an economy that 
emphasised  the  production  of  knowledge.  In  Malaysia,  the  Economic  Planning  Unit 
(EPU)  is  the  federal  government  agency  that  ensures  that  the  Malaysian  economy  is 
developing into a knowledge-based economy. The EPU (2002, pp. 132-133) identified 
seven indicators of a Malaysian version of a knowledge-based economy; namely (1) the 
capacity  to  train  sufficient  skilled  workers,  (2)  the  readiness  of  public  and  private 
institutions  to  support  a  knowledge-based  economy,  (3)  the  continuous  provision  of 
incentives and infrastructure, (4) the ability to acquire and apply science and technology, 
(5) the ability to get the private sectors to play an active role in the market , (6) active 
involvement  of  the  public  sector,  and  (7)  the  bridging  the  gap  between  the  
knowledgeable and those who lack knowledge. Each of these indicators is elaborated 
below. 
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1. the ability to train sufficient skilled workers  
Malaysia  requires  qualified  workers.  To  achieve  this,  Malaysia  needs  education  and 
training systems that produce a qualified work force. The process begins at the primary 
and secondary levels of school education. Table 3.3 shows the figures for enrolments in 
primary and secondary education. These figures indicated that Malaysia has increased its 
potential to provide well trained knowledge workers.  
 
Table 3.3 
School Students in Malaysia 
Year  Primary  Secondary 
1993  2,675,856  1,491,960 
1994  2,762,166  1,566,973 
1995  2,827,634  1,651,684 
1996  2,847,119  1,735,756 
1997  2,878,852  1,819,036 
From Economic Planning Unit (2002, p. 121). 
 
The figures in Table 3.3 show a huge enrolment at primary level that declines at the 
second level of education (which also drops at the tertiary level). An immediate effort is 
necessary  to  address  the  declining  numbers  at  the  tertiary  level.  This  situation  is 
important  to  ensure  that  knowledge  workers  are  trained  to  meet  the  demands  of  the 
knowledge-based economy (Economic Planning Unit, 2002, pp. 132-133).  
 
Another disturbing trend is that the tertiary level of education sector not only shows the 
production of small numbers of potential knowledge workers, but also indicates small 
enrolments  in  disciplines  that  play  very  active  roles  in  producing  knowledge  for  the 
economy. These figures are presented in Table 3.4a, which shows small enrolments at the   81 
undergraduate  tertiary  level  in  three  academic  disciplines,  namely  science,  applied 
science and technical education.  Such a trend also occurs at the graduate level of tertiary 
education. These figures are presented in Table 3.4b. 
 
Table 3.4a 
Potential Workforce from Undergraduate Tertiary Level in Malaysia 
Year  Science  Applied Science  Technical  Total 
1993  4,621  4,277  7,129  16,027 
1994  4,782  4,664  8,557  18,003 
1995  4,832  5,125  9,988  19,945 
1996  4,614  5,960  12,665  23,239 
1997  5,060  12,150  17,590  34,800 
From Economic Planning Unit (2002, p. 121). 
 
Table 3.4b 
Potential Workforce from Graduate Tertiary Level in Malaysia 
Year  Science  Applied Science  Technical  Total 
1993  1,025  1,054  1,138  3,217 
1994  1,055  1,091  1,173  3,319 
1995  1,221  1,079  1,214  3,514 
1996  1,137  1,107  1,306  3,550 
1997  998  1,763  1,798  4,559 
From Economic Planning Unit (2002, p. 121). 
 
In addition to addressing these low enrolments, Malaysia also needs to give significant 
attention to its professional and technical workforce. Table 3.5 shows Malaysia‟s position 
in comparison with other advanced countries. It needs to improve the situation in order to 
strengthen its knowledge-based economy (Economic Planning Unit, 2002, p. 121). 
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Table 3.5 
Percentage of Professional, Technical and Related Workers of Total Employment in 1997 
Country  Percentage (%) 
Germany  32.0 
United States  28.4 
Australia  27.9 
Singapore  26.4 
Japan  22.9 
Hong Kong  21.5 
United Kingdom  15.1 
Malaysia  10.7 
From Economic Planning Unit (2002, p. 122) 
 
While Malaysia is on the right track to train sufficient skilled workers, the present ability 
to do so is insufficient. 
 
2. The readiness of public and private institutions to support a knowledge-based economy 
Malaysia needs  to  ensure that its  public and  private sectors  are ready to  support the 
implementation  of  a  knowledge-based  economy.  These  institutions  are  important  for 
driving Malaysia to become a knowledge-based economy.  Malaysia had use a systematic 
approach, or planning process, to formulate the economic policies in preceding periods. It 
used a similar approach for its knowledge-based economy.  
 
This  practice  was  reflected  in  the  government‟s  establishment  of  the  National 
Knowledge-based  Economic  Development  Council  (NKDC)  which  collaborated  with 
other government agencies, including other councils and secretariats, to formulate social 
and  economic  policies  for  the  knowledge-based  economy  (Economic  Planning  Unit, 
2002, pp. 123-124). Figure 3.3 illustrates the policy making process in Malaysia. 
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Figure 3.3. The Flow of Policy Making in Malaysia 
From Economic Planning Unit, http://www.epu.gov.my (26 July 2007). 
 
3. The continuous provision of incentives and infrastructure 
Malaysia  needs  to  provide  incentives,  infrastructure,  and  info-structure  to  enable 
knowledge  application  in  knowledge-based  industries.  One  important  aspect  of  the 
knowledge-based economy is the extensive creation and use of knowledge across the 
economy. Knowledge is an abstract term, but policy makers use several indicators  to 
calculate its presence, such as the publication of daily newspapers, the dissemination of 
information  through  radio  and  television,  communication  via  telephones  (including 
mobile phone, fax machines, and land telephone), and the presence of Internet-mediated 
and  multimedia  communication  technologies  (see  Table  3.6).    Policy  makers  are 
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comfortable  with  these  indicators  because  there  are  easy  to  publish  and  explain. 
Unfortunately,  they  have  overlooked  other  important  components  necessary  to  make 
knowledge useful and to sustain economic growth and the well being of society (Mokyr, 
2002, pp. 80-81; Taylor, 2003, pp. 115-118). 
 
Table 3.6 
Access to Information and Knowledge 
Country  Daily 
newspaper 
(2000) 
Television 
sets (2003) 
Telephones 
(2002) 
Mobile 
phones 
(2003) 
Personal 
computers 
(2003) 
Internet hosts 
(2003) 
Germany   291  675  635  785  484.7  315.4 
Japan   566  785  604  679  382.2  1,015.7 
UK   326  950  613  841  405.7  545.3 
US  196  938  701  543  658.9  5,557.8 
Australia   161  722  630  719  565.1  1,428.1 
Hong Kong   218  504  566  1,079  422.0  869.3 
Singapore   273  303  472  852  622.0  1,155.3 
Korea   393  458  457  701  558.0  797.6 
Mexico   94  282  137  291  82.0  130.6 
Brunei   71  417  263  -  74.6  176.9 
Indonesia   23  153  34  87  11.9  2.9 
Malaysia   95  210  206  442  166.9  42.9 
Philippines   67  182  46  270  27.7  3.5 
Thailand   197  300  98  394  39.8  16.4 
Vietnam   6  197  26  34  9.8  0 
China   59  350  138  215  27.6  1.3 
From Economic Planning Unit (2005, p. 47). 
 
The provision of “infostructure” and other related infrastructure is essential to encourage 
the knowledge transfer processes (Economic Planning Unit, 2005, p. 47). Malaysia must 
improve in this respect to ensure that its knowledge-based economy policy is workable 
(Taylor,  2003,  pp.  115-118).  Table  3.7  shows  the  Knowledge-based  Economy  Index 
(KDI), which, as its name suggests, indicates the state of Malaysia‟s knowledge-based   85 
economy. Malaysia needs a significant shift in its economic orientation to maintain its 
status as a knowledge-based economy (Malaysia, 2006). 
Table 3.7 
Knowledge-based Economy Development Index 2000-2004 
Countries/Rank  Computer 
Infrastructure 
Infostructure  Education & 
Training 
R&D and 
Technology 
Overall 
   2000  2004  2000  2004  2000  2004  2000  2004  2000  2004 
USA   1  1  4  5  9  6  3  2  1  1 
Sweden   6  6  1  1  2  4  2  3  2  2 
Denmark   7  4  5  6  1  2  9  7  5  3 
Japan   14  9  12  14  11  9  1  1  6  4 
Finland   4  7  2  12  5  7  5  4  3  5 
Norway   3  11  3  2  3  1  12  11  4  6 
Switzerland   10  12  10  9  10  8  4  5  7  7 
Netherlands   8  2  11  3  14  13  8  10  11  8 
United 
Kingdom  
5  3  8  4  12  2  13  13  10  9 
Canada   2  8  9  13  7  3  14  14  8  10 
Australia   9  10  6  7  6  10  15  15  9  11 
Germany   13  5  14  11  13  14  7  8  12  12 
Ireland   15  16  16  8  4  5  10  12  13  13 
Singapore   12  14  15  10  15  15  6  6  14  14 
New Zealand   11  13  13  15  8  11  18  18  15  15 
Korea   16  15  7  16  16  17  11  9  16  16 
Malaysia   17  17  17  17  18  16  17  17  17  17 
China   18  18  18  18  19  19  20  19  19  18 
Thailand   19  19  20  20  17  18  19  20  18  19 
The 
Philippines 
21  20  21  19  21  21  16  17  20  20 
Indonesia   22  22  19  22  20  20  21  21  21  21 
India   20  21  22  21  22  22  22  22  22  22 
From Economic Planning Unit (2005, p. 49). 
4. The ability to acquire and apply science and technology 
Malaysia needs to increase its capacity to acquire and apply science and technology in all 
areas  of  the  economy  (Economic  Planning  Unit,  2002,  p.133).  This  is  important  for 
enabling effective knowledge creation, transfer and use activities. In addition to physical 
infrastructure and administrative support, readiness for a knowledge-based economy can 
be viewed in terms of science and technology indicators. These include the number of   86 
scientists and engineers, the amount of money spent on research and development (R&D) 
out of gross domestic product (GDP), and the volume of exports of high technology  
(Economic Planning Unit, 2005, p. 48) (see Table 3.8). These numbers may provide good 
signs but they do not necessarily explain the existing capacity for knowledge acquisition 
(Bagchi, 2005, p. 48). For instance, it is not clear as to whether these scientists and 
engineers are capable of transferring knowledge to one another so that it can benefit the 
society at large. More importantly, they do not indicate in what way the money spent on 
R&D benefits people and institutions. Some institutions may not communicate with each 
other due to the rigidity of their members‟ goals and ambitions.  
Table 3.8 
Science and Technology Indicators 
Country  Scientists 
& 
engineers 
in R&D 
per 
million 
people 
(1996-
2002) 
Technicians 
in R&D per 
million 
people 
(1996-
2002) 
Total 
expenditure 
on R&D 
(% of 
GDP) 
(1996-
2002) 
High-
technology 
exports 
(US$ 
millions) 
(2003) 
High-
technology 
exports % of 
manufactured 
exports (US$ 
millions) 
(2003) 
Royalty 
& 
license 
fees 
receipts 
(US$ 
millions) 
(2003) 
Royalty 
& license 
fees 
payments 
(US$ 
millions) 
(2003) 
Germany   3,222  1,435  2.5  102,869  16  4,262  5,242 
Japan   5,085  667  3.1  105,454  24  12,271  11,003 
UK   2,691  1,014  1.9  64,511  26  10,245  7,382 
US  4,526  -  2.7  160,212  31  48,227  20,049 
Australia   3,446  792  1.5  2,760  14  394  1,268 
Hong 
Kong  
1,568  226  0.6  1,845  13  196  491 
Singapore   4,352  381  2.2  71,421  29  197  3,334 
Korea   2,979  564  2.5  57,161  32  1,326  3,597 
Mexico   259  184  0.4  28,734  21  84  608 
Brunei   -  527  0.1  -  -  -  - 
Indonesia   -  -  0.04  4,580  14  -  - 
Malaysia   294  57  0.7  47,042  58  20  782 
Philippines   156  22  0.08  23,942  74  2  273 
Thailand   289  116  0.2  18,203  30  7  1,268 
China   633  202  1.2  107,543  27  107  3,548 
From Economic Planning Unit (2005, p. 48).   87 
 
5. The ability to get the private sector to play an active role in the market  
Malaysia‟s knowledge-based economy also needs full support from the private sector to 
provide capital, skilled workers and the technology necessary to implement knowledge-
based economic activities (Economic Planning Unit, 2002, p.133). The private sector has 
played a significant role in the Malaysian economy. The role of the private sector can be 
explained in terms of the amount of capital that was contributed to the economy. Table 
3.9 shows the amount of capital contributed by the private sector and the government to 
the Malaysian economy.  
 
Table 3.9 
Private and Government Fixed Capital Formation  
(% Gross Domestic Product) (1970-2005) 
Year  Sector 
Private  Government 
1970  10.1  5.9 
1975  14.1  8.5 
1980  19.6  11.7 
1985  14.7  16.6 
1990  22.4  11.4 
1995  35.2  14.0 
1996  35.6  12.8 
1997  36.3  12.9 
1998  17.6  12.6 
1999  13.6  13.3 
2000  15.2  14.8 
2001  16.0  15.3 
2003  34.2  65.8 
2004  43.3  56.7 
2005  44.8  51.2 
From Bank Negara Malaysia (Central Bank of Malaysia) (1970-2005) 
 
The private sector needs to increase its commitment to providing capital to the market. 
Table 3.10 demonstrates the contribution of the private sector in the make-up of the 
Malaysian economy. 
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Table 3.10 
Private and Government Fixed Capital Formation  
(% of Total Gross Fixed Capital Formation) (1970-2005) 
Year  Sector 
Private  Government 
1970  63.3  36.7 
1975  62.3  37.7 
1980  62.6  37.4 
1985  47.0  53.0 
1990  66.2  33.8 
1995  71.6  28.4 
1996  71.6  26.4 
1997  73.8  26.2 
1998  58.3  41.7 
1999  50.4  49.6 
2000  50.8  49.2 
2001  51.3  48.7 
2003  34.2  65.8 
2004  43.3  56.7 
2005  44.8  51.2 
From Bank Negara Malaysia (Central Bank of Malaysia) (1970-2005) 
 
6. The active involvement of the public sector 
Malaysia also needs the active participation of the public sector in its knowledge-based 
economy (Economic Planning Unit, 2002, p.133). The government needs to ensure that 
the public sector embraces the knowledge-based economy approach in delivering services 
to the public. Thus, all government agencies, at the federal, state and territorial levels, 
must practise knowledge-based approaches in executing government policies. 
  
7. The bridging of the gap between the knowledgeable and those who lack knowledge 
Malaysia must also ensure that the people receive a good education and have access to 
the Internet (Economic Planning Unit, 2002, p.133). This is essential to ensuring that the 
people  can  participate  in  Malaysia‟s  knowledge-based  economy  (Fleming  &  Søborg, 
2002,  pp.165-170;  Hoffmann  &  Novak,  1998,  pp.130-131).  When  people  are  not 
educated and are not Internet literate, a gap is created in the knowledge-based economy 
between the knowledgeable and those who lack knowledge (Hoffmann & Novak, 1998,   89 
pp.131-132). If such a situation occurs in a knowledge-based economy, the situation is 
just like that in a non knowledge-based economy that has an income division between the 
rich and the poor. This situation creates digital divides in the knowledge-based economy. 
As an immediate effort to address the digital divide, the government has to ensure that 
every citizen is exposed to the latest technology (Ramasamy,  Chakrabarty, & Cheah, 
2004, pp.881-883). This exposure allows greater participation in knowledge activities.  
 
3.3.3 Reasons for the knowledge-based economy 
There  are  a  few  reasons  for  Malaysia‟s  decision  to  move  into  the  knowledge-based 
economy  (Economic  Planning  Unit,  2002,  pp.  2-5).  First,  it  has  lost  its  global 
competitiveness, and has fallen from 18
th in 1994 to 29
th in 2001 with respect to FDI. 
This  will  affect  its  future  economic  performance.  Second,  Malaysia  worries  about 
increasing  competition  from  China,  India,  and  Vietnam,  as  these  countries  can  offer 
cheaper labour. Third, Malaysia‟s economic policies have been affected by the impact of 
globalization and neo-liberalism. Fourth, Malaysia needs to provide workers who can 
“value-add” (Economic Planning Unit, 2002, p. 4). Fifth, Malaysia needs to make its 
manufacturing sector profitable. Sixth, Malaysia needs to find new sources of “growth” 
in its economy. Finally, Malaysia needs to improve the contribution of  “total factor 
productivity”, in terms of improving the quality of employees, methods of doing things, 
and other delivery activities (Economic Planning Unit, 2002, p. 5).  
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Table 3.11 shows huge foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows into China instead of 
other developing countries, including Malaysia. This trend signals problems for Malaysia 
in remaining competitive in the global economy.  
Table 3.11 
Total FDI Inflows by Country (1990-1997) (in US$) 
Countries  FDI inflows (US$) 
China  200,578 
Singapore  49,173 
Malaysia  33,177 
Indonesia  23,684 
Thailand  17,177 
South Korea  10,543 
Philippines  8,379 
From Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1999). 
 
The  availability  of  cheap  labour  and  low  cost  production  facilities  remain  important 
factors  in  foreign  direct  investment  decisions  (Economic  Planning  Unit,  2002,  p.  5). 
Table  3.12  shows  labour  costs  and  the  value  added  contribution  from  labour  in  the 
manufacturing sector in Malaysia. Malaysia may not be able to offer the cheapest labour 
and the lowest cost facilities, so it needs to justify current labour costs so that it remains 
attractive to foreign direct investors.  
Table 3.12 
Labour Cost and Value Added per Worker in Manufacturing (US$ per year) 
Countries  Labour cost (wage)  % 
increase 
Value added  % 
increase  1980- 
1984 
1995- 
1999 
1980-
1984 
1995-
1999 
Malaysia  2,519  3,429  36.1  8,454  12,661  49.8 
Thailand  2,305  2,705  17.4  11,072  19,946  80.1 
Indonesia  898  1,008  12.2  3,807  5,139  35.0 
Philippines  1,240  2,450  97.6  5,266  10,781  104.7 
Singapore  5,576  21,534  286.2  16,442  40,674  147.4 
South 
Korea 
3,153  10,743  240.7  11,617  40,916  252.2 
China  472  729  54.4  3,061  2,885  -5.7 
From World Bank (2000, pp. 58-60).  
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Essentially,  a  knowledge-based  economy  has  five  indicators;  (a)  “the  availability  of 
quality  human  resources,”  (b)  “the  intensity  of  research  and  development,”  (c)  “the 
availability  of  infostructure,”  (d)  “the  provision  of  infrastructure,”  and  (e)  “stunning 
economic growth” (Economic Planning Unit Malaysia, 2002, p. 6). These indicators are 
used to evaluate the performance of a knowledge-based economy, in what is called the 
Knowledge-based Economy Development Index (KDI).  
 
This index is part of the OECD‟s survey of knowledge-based economies. The Malaysian 
Economic  Planning  Unit  (2002,  p.  129)  uses  KDI  to  assess  Malaysia‟s  readiness  to 
become a knowledge-based economy. The Malaysian Economic Planning Unit  (2002, p. 
129) has focussed on selected key factors that were required if Malaysia is to become a 
knowledge-based  economy.  These  include  “computer  infrastructure,”  “infostructure,” 
“education and training,” and “R&D and technology.” “Computer infrastructure” refers 
to  computer  hardware  and  equipment.  “Infostructure”  is  the  telecommunication 
infrastructure that enables computers to be networked. “Education and training” refers to 
the ability to use and apply computers in ones daily life. With the necessary infrastructure 
and  competency,  individuals  and  institutions  can  participate  in  “research  and 
development (R&D)” activities to further improve and introduce technologies that benefit 
the population. 
 
The government attempts to develop economic policies that result in a  “knowledge-
based economy” are found in the Eighth Malaysia Plan (8MP) (2001-2005) (Malaysia, 
2001a), the Third Outline Perspective Plan (3MP) (2001-2010) (Malaysia, 1996b) and the   92 
Ninth Malaysia Plan (9MP) (2006-2010) (Malaysia, 2006). Unfortunately, these attempts 
to promote a Malaysian conception of the “knowledge-based economy” did not change 
the perception of foreign companies that Malaysia maintains an export orientation (Sarif 
& Ismail, 2005, pp. 1-2; Taylor, 2003, pp. 117-118).  
 
In  order  to  develop  a  knowledge-based  economy,  the  government  has  established 
Malaysian technology parks through conventional planning processes. Indeed, the same 
approach had always been applied in the formulation of social and economic policies 
(Economic  Planning  Unit  Malaysia,  2002,  pp.  132-133).  It  was  even  used  by  the 
transitional government that existed before Independence in 1957. There have been nine 
Malaysia plans since then. Table 3.13 identifies various development planning documents 
that were developed since 1950. 
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Table 3.13 
Development Planning Documents 
Plan Title  Duration  Date Tabled 
Draft Development Plan of Malaya   1950 – 1955  June 1950 
Progress Report on Development Plan   1950 – 1952  1953 
General Plan of Development  1956 – 1960  Oct 1956 
Second Five Year Plan  1961 – 1965  1 Sept 1961 
Interim Review of Second Five Year Plan  1961 – 1965  Dec 1963 
First Malaysia Plan  1966 – 1970  25 Nov 1965 
MTR First Malaysia Plan  1966 – 1970  25 Jan 1969 
Second Malaysia Plan  1971 – 1975  25 Jun 1971 
MTR Second Malaysia Plan  1971 – 1975  20 Nov 1973 
Third Malaysia Plan  1976 – 1980  5 Jul 1976 
MTR Third Malaysia Plan  1976 – 1980  3 Sept 1997 
Fourth Malaysia Plan  1981 – 1985  16 Mar 1981 
MTR Fourth Malaysia Plan  1981 – 1985  29 Mar 1984 
Fifth Malaysia Plan  1986 – 1990  21 Mar 1986 
MTR Fifth Malaysia Plan  1986 – 1990  23 Jun 1989 
Outline Perspective Plan (OPP) 2  1991 – 2000  17 Jun 1991 
Sixth Malaysia Plan  1991 – 1995  7 Oct 1991 
MTR Sixth Malaysia Plan  1991 – 1995  16 Dec 1993 
Seventh Malaysia Plan  1996 – 2000  5 Jun 1996 
MTR Seventh Malaysia Plan  1996 – 2000  22 Apr 1999 
Outline Perspective Plan (OPP) 3  2001 – 2010  3 Apr 2001 
Eight Malaysia Plan  2001 – 2005  23 Apr 2001 
MTR Eight Malaysia Plan  2001 – 2005  30 Oct 2003 
Ninth Malaysia Plan  2006 – 2010  31 Mar 2006 
Note: MTR- Mid Term Review 
From  Government  of  Malaysia  (1965, 1971a,  1971b, 1976,  1981,  1986,  1991a,  1991b, 1991c, 1996a, 
1996b, 2001a, 2001b) 
 
This discussion on the background of technology parks policy has been divided into three 
parts. The first part introduced analysed knowledge transfer in terms of the history of 
Malaysia‟s  economic  development.  The  chapter  then  discusses  Malaysia‟s  economic 
development in five periods: agricultural export trade (1786-1949), import substitution 
(1950-1960),  labour  intensive  (1961-1980),  capital  intensive  (1981-1995),  and   94 
knowledge intensive (1996-2007) industrialisation. The final part of the chapter discussed 
the  knowledge-based  economy  in  terms  of:  investment  perspectives,  indicators  of  a 
knowledge-based economy, and the reasons for the move to develop a knowledge-based 
economy. 
 
An  analysis  of  knowledge  transfer  in  the  five  periods  of  Malaysian  economic 
development shows that the Malaysian technology parks policy was formulated on the 
basis  of  achieving  economic  growth  through  the  active  pursuit  of  foreign  direct 
investment. The government continued to use incentives for investment throughout the 
periods  of  economic  development.  These  incentives  were  attractive  in  the  beginning 
because foreign companies could benefit in terms of cost reduction in the presence of 
cheap  labour.  Gradually,  the  cost  of  production  in  Malaysia  increased,  due  to  the 
economic  expansion,  and  this  situation  was  no  longer  favourable  for  attracting 
multinational companies.  
 
In  the  meantime,  several  neighbouring  countries  are  offering  locations  with  cheaper 
labour. Eventually, multinational companies began to shift their plants and factories to 
those  countries.  In  response  to  this  situation,  Malaysia  offers  a  knowledge-based 
economic environment that emphasized innovation and established several technology 
parks that included investment incentives. However, these incentives did not match the 
rise in the cost of production.    95 
 
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
This chapter depicts the methodology for the study and is divided into seven parts. First, 
it introduces the objective of the study, the research question and propositions of the 
study. Second, it describes data collection methods used in previous studies. Third, it 
presents data collection methods used in this study. Fourth, it explains the reasons for 
using quantitative and qualitative methods in this study. Fifth, it narrates the stages of 
data collection in terms of „before, during and after data collection‟. Sixth, it elucidates 
the instruments used to collect data arising from the fieldwork. Finally, it details out the 
data analysis for this study. Figure 4.1 illustrates the contents of Chapter 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
4.2 Methods used 
in previous studies 
4.3 Methods used 
in this study 
4.5 Data collection  
4.4 Justification for 
quantitative and qualitative 
methods 
4.6 Instruments used 
in data collection 
4.7 Data analysis 
  Before data collection 
  During data collection 
Figure 4.1: Contents of Chapter 4 
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4.1 Introduction 
This section explains basic elements of the study: the research question, propositions and 
unit of analysis of this research. The research aims to review stickiness in knowledge 
transfer between ICT firms in selected Malaysian technology parks.  
 
The  research  question  is  “why  is  knowledge  difficult  to  transfer?”  There  are  two 
propositions  underpinning  the  research  question.  The  first  proposition  says  that  the 
government  contributed  to  “macro”  level  stickiness  through  economic  policies  that 
constrained firms by requiring that their decisions reflect the national agenda put forward 
by  those  in  government.  As  for  the  second  position,  it  mentions  that  ICT  firms 
contributed  to  “micro”  level  stickiness  when  they  did  not  want  to  be  involved  in 
knowledge transfer because it was costly in terms of (a) transfer mechanism, (b) types of 
transfer, (c) knowledge barriers, and (d) transfer context. 
 
 
Proposition  1  requires  the  policy  makers,  government  officers,  and  ICT  firm 
representatives to explain the nature of economic policy making, factors that influence on 
economic  policies,  the  role  of  national  agenda  in  economic  policies  and  the  role  of 
technology  infrastructure  (especially  Malaysian  technology  parks)  in  facilitating 
knowledge transfer between ICT firms.  
   97 
Proposition 2 requires ICT firms to describe ICT firms contribution to “micro” level 
stickiness  that  impedes  knowledge  transfer  between  firms.  ICT  firms  were  asked  to 
respond to the costliness of transfer mechanisms (to copy, emulate, model, acquire and 
learn from other firms), types of transfer (such as blueprint, manual, sample), barriers to 
knowledge (ability to acquire and to use), and transfer contexts (single or multiple). 
 
As  for  unit  of  analysis,  in  proposition  1  (“macro”  level  stickiness),  policy  makers, 
government  officers  and  ICT  firms‟  representatives  were  asked  to  respond.  As  for 
proposition  2  (“micro”  level  stickiness),  only  ICT  firms  were  asked  to  respond.  In 
proposition  1,  three  types  of  informants  were  affected  by  economic  policies.  As  for 
proposition 2, ICT firms were asked to respond because knowledge transfer between 
firms is firm specific nature.  
 
Table 4.1 summarizes the research questions, propositions and unit of analysis of this 
research.  
 
Table 4.1 
Summary of Research Question, Propositions and Unit of Analysis 
Research 
question 
Propositions  Unit of Analysis 
Why is 
knowledge 
difficult to 
transfer? 
Proposition 1: The government contributed to 
“macro” level stickiness through economic 
policies that constrained firms by requiring that 
their decisions reflect the national agenda put 
forward by those in government. 
Policy Makers 
Government Officers 
ICT Firms 
Representatives 
Proposition 2: ICT firms contributed to “micro” 
level stickiness when they did not want to be 
involved in knowledge transfer because it was 
costly in terms of (a) transfer mechanism, (b) types 
of transfer, (c) knowledge barriers, and (d) transfer 
context 
ICT firms 
representative 
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4.2 Methods used in previous studies 
The previous research referred to in this study has not focussed on examining „macro‟ 
stickiness.  However these studies examined „micro‟ stickiness which is stickiness at firm 
level in terms of transfer mechanisms, types of transfer, barriers in knowledge transfer, 
and transfer contexts. In fact, the research methodologies used in the previous studies 
were primarily quantitative and examined knowledge transfer among firms. In Arrow‟s 
(1962,  p.  155)  examination  on the  impact  of  costs  of  knowledge  transfer,  he  used  a 
quantitative  method  to  investigate  secondary  data  to  demonstrate  difficulties  in 
knowledge transfer in the form of “learning.” Later, Teece (1977, p. 247) and Galbraith 
(1990, p. 61) also undertook quantitative investigations.  
 
Von Hippel (1994, p. 434) also used a quantitative method when he examined knowledge 
transfer among 103 Danish food firms. Following the quantitative method by Von Hippel 
(1994, p. 434) and the earlier authors, Szulanski (1996, p. 28) examined quantitatively the 
transfer of best practices in multinational enterprises.  In other studies, Szulanski and 
Jensen also used quantitative methods known as an “experimental” technique to examine 
stickiness  of  knowledge  transfer  that  occurred  through  “templates”  between  firms 
(Szulanski & Jensen, 2004, p. 348).  
 
Based on Szulanski‟s (1996, p. 28) work, Kostova (1999, p. 309) also used quantitative 
methods to examine stickiness of knowledge transfer in multinational firms in which the 
transfers took place in multiple contexts. The same quantitative method was used in the   99 
examination of stages in knowledge transfer processes that caused stickiness (Szulanski, 
2000,  pp.  12-13),  and  122  internal  transfers  of  cross-border  transfers  (Jensen  & 
Szulanski, 2004, pp. 508-509). Szulanski and Jensen (2004, p. 350) and Szulanski and 
Jensen (2006, p. 938) also used quantitative methods when they examined the role of the 
“template.”   
Table 4.2 summarises methods used in previous studies on “micro” stickiness. 
 
   Table 4.2 
   Summary of Methods Used in Previous Studies on “Micro” Stickiness 
Micro 
stickiness 
aspects 
Authors  Unit of 
analysis 
Method  Methodology 
Transfer 
mechanisms 
Arrow‟s (1962, p. 155)  firms  Case study  Quantitative 
Nelson and Winter‟s (1982, 
pp. 9-11,99) 
firms  Case study  Quantitative 
Winter and Szulanski (2001, 
p. 731) 
firms  Case study  Quantitative 
Szulanski and Jensen (2004, p. 
348) 
firms  Case study  Quantitative 
Szulanski & Jensen (2006, pp. 
937-939)  
firms  Experiment  Quantitative 
Types of 
transfer 
Arrow (1969, pp. 29-35)  firms  Case study  Quantitative 
Teece (1977, p. 245)  firms  Case study  Quantitative 
Szulanski (1996, p. 28)  firms  Case study  Quantitative 
Szulanski & Jensen (2004, p. 
348) 
firms  Experiment  Quantitative 
Knowledge 
transfer 
barriers 
Szulanski (1995, pp. 438-439)  firms  Case study  Quantitative 
Kostova (1999, p.309)  firms  Case study  Quantitative 
Simonin (1999, pp. 464-465)  firms  Case study  Quantitative 
Transfer 
contexts 
Arrow (1969, pp. 29-35)  firms  Case study  Quantitative 
Szulanski and Jensen (2004, p. 
350) 
firms  Experiment  Quantitative 
Szulanski and Jensen (2006, p. 
938) 
firms  Experiment  Quantitative and 
Qualitative 
Teece (1977, p. 247)  factories  Case study  Quantitative 
Galbraith (1990, p. 61)  factories  Case study  Quantitative 
Von Hippel (1994, p. 434)  firms  Case study  Quantitative 
Szulanski (1996, p. 28)  firms  Case study  Quantitative and 
Qualitative 
Szulanski (2000, pp. 12-13)  firms  Case study  Quantitative and 
Qualitative 
Jensen and Szulanski (2004, 
pp. 508-509) 
firms  Case study  Quantitative and 
Qualitative   100 
4.3 Methods used in this study 
The previous studies reviewed in this thesis did not examine “macro” level stickiness, but 
only  “micro”  level  stickiness  in  which  they  used  quantitative  methods  to  examine 
stickiness at firms‟ level. Since the previous studies used quantitative method, this study 
decided to use qualitative method only; that was personal interview with 50 informants 
who included policy makers, government bureaucrats, and ICT firms‟ representatives in 
selected Malaysian technology parks.  
 
 
 
The results of personal interviews are useful for this study although the responses were 
brief. The researcher was very keen to obtain rich responses, but was unable to examine 
specific knowledge transfer activities between ICT firms interviewed due to individual 
firm‟s  confidential  restrictions.  However,  the  informants  agreed  with  the  interview 
method based on note taking technique. In addition, informants also were located in a few 
technology parks and therefore, this situation has limited the number of informants. The 
changes of location for interview and postponement of interview sessions had reduced the 
chances to get more informants.  
 
4.4 Justification for qualitative method 
The study used qualitative method, interview only for the data collection for three types 
of respondents - policy makers, government officers, and representatives of ICT firms in 
Malaysian technology parks. There were 50 informants in total, who included 14 policy 
makers, 11 government bureaucrats, and 25 executives of ICT firms.  
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The use of qualitative method in this study was to obtain more detailed responses from 
the informants regarding the nature, influencing factors, and incentives on knowledge 
transfer  difficulties  among  ICT  firms  in  Malaysian  technology  parks.  Since  the 
knowledge  transfer  situation  is  very  complex,  the  use  of  qualitative  method  through 
personal interviews was appropriate. Miles and Huberman (1994) argued that qualitative 
method is appropriate to examine complex and difficult contexts of study because they 
can put the situation/s in question into the right perspective. In addition, Marshall and 
Rossman (1989) recommended the use of qualitative methods to enable researchers to ask 
more questions in order to explore the context of the study in greater detail.  
 
The nature of knowledge transfer is dynamic because it involves different perspectives 
and understanding of different individuals. Such situations are best understood utilising 
qualitative method (Ezzy, 2002; Lee, 1999). Further, qualitative method also enables the 
researcher to identify and understand the complex relationships in knowledge transfer 
between firms (Lee, 1999; Rist, 1994). By asking questions in personal interviews, the 
researcher  will  get  varieties  of  answers  that  are  relevant  to  the  interview  questions 
(Patton, 2002; Silverman, 1993).  
 
There are many techniques to get data using qualitative method, such as active or passive 
participation  and  observation,  personal  interviews,  content  analysis  on  various 
documents, and case study (Patton, 2002; Lee, 1999; Creswell, 1998). The researcher 
decided to use qualitative method, personal interviews specifically, for data collection. 
Such method provided greater opportunity for the researcher to understand “macro” and   102 
“micro” stickiness in knowledge transfer between firms. Nevertheless, the researcher was 
aware that the qualitative method used in this study was not easy to use, time consuming, 
and very complicated to answer the research question.  
 
4.5 Data collection 
The discussion of data collection for the study can be divided into two stages: before and 
during data collection. Basically, the stage before data collection was about preparatory 
work  necessary  to  conduct  fieldwork  such  as  research  instruments,  research  permit, 
research grants, and other paper work for fieldwork. The stage during data collection 
discussed what was actually done in the fieldwork such as how long the fieldwork was 
conducted, who was interviewed, and what data was collected. 
 
4.5.1 Before data collection 
Before  data  collection,  there  were  a  few  preparations  made  before  the  fieldwork. 
Basically,  the  preparation  before  the  fieldwork  was  about  getting  a  university  ethics 
research permit, research grant, and related documents required for fieldwork.  
 
Firstly, the researcher obtained an ethics research permit from Murdoch University. To 
get the permit, the researcher prepared a cover letter (Appendix 1) and a list of interview 
questions  (see  Appendix  2).  Secondly,  once  the  research  permit  was  obtained,  the 
researcher contacted twelve (12) informants, which comprised three (3) academics, two 
(2) chief executive officers, three (3) ICT entrepreneurs, two (2) government researchers, 
and two (2) business executives. These informants were chosen from the website of their   103 
organisations and they were selected based on their experience and familiarity with the 
Malaysian ICT industry to comment on the interview questions. This exercise was a pilot 
study to ensure that the questions were relevant and pertinent. Informants in the pilot 
study gave their comments and suggestions to improve the interview questions. Thirdly, 
the  study  contacted  the  Economic  Planning  Unit,  Prime  Minister‟s  Department  in 
Malaysia, to obtain a permit to conduct research in Malaysia. This permit is required for 
any  person  (including  Malaysians)  from  overseas  institutions  to  conduct  research  in 
Malaysia.  Fourthly,  the  study  also  approached  the  International  Islamic  University 
Malaysia to get a research grant to conduct research in Malaysia. Finally, after getting the 
permission  to  conduct  research  and  a  research  grant,  the  study  contacted  potential 
informants to participate in this study. The study identified three types of informants: 
policy  makers,  government  officers,  and  representatives  of  ICT  firms  in  Malaysian 
technology parks.  
 
4.5.2 During data collection 
Data collection with structured interview questions was carried out in two stages. The 
first stage was completed within three months, i.e. from 1 May 2005 through 31 July 
2005; and the second stage, within a month, i.e. in August 2007.  
 
a. First Stage 
This stage explains the actual data collection task conducted in Malaysia. Based on the 
list of informants that the researcher compiled at Murdoch University in Perth, Australia, 
the  researcher  sent  e-mail  and  air  mail  to  all  of  the  potential  informants  for  an   104 
appointment.  The researcher allocated a week for the 104 potential informants to reply to 
the  request.  However,  after  a  week  expired,  the  researcher  managed  to  get  positive 
response  only  from  10  informants.  The  researcher  immediately  contacted  the  non 
responding informants (94 informants) through telephone. The latest method produced 
another 79 informants. In total, 89 informants gave their consent for personal interview. 
Unfortunately, during field work the researcher managed to interview only 47 informants 
due  to  difficulties  such  as  postponements,  cancellations,  recommended  replacement 
informants, and change of venues. 
 
b. Second Stage 
The researcher conducted the second stage interview in August 2007. The researcher 
decided  to  conduct  the  second  stage  personal  interview  (with  the  same  structured 
interview questions) in order to update some of the responses gathered in 2005. The 
researcher used the same list of informants (89 informants who agreed to be interviewed 
in 2005 although only 47 informants were interviewed) to conduct another interview. 
However,  the  researcher  could  not  get  all  of  them  due  to  many  reasons  such  as  the 
informants having already resigned, retired, and/or transferred to other ministries and 
departments. Fortunately, the researcher managed  to  interview the three  persons who 
replaced the previous informants. All three new informants were policy makers. In total, 
the researcher managed to interview 50 informants. 
 
There  are  three  categories  of  informants  interviewed  in  this  study  –  policy  makers, 
government officers, and firms‟ representatives. The selection of the three categories of   105 
the  informants  was  decided  based  on  the  framework  of  the  research.  In  the  first 
proposition,  the  “macro”  stickiness  is  contributed  by  the  government  through  the 
economic policies. Based on this proposition, the researcher decided to interview the 
policy  makers  and  government  officers.  While  the  policy  makers  formulated  the 
economic policies, the government officers implemented the policies. As for the ICT 
firms, the researcher also asked for their feedback about the influence of the nature and 
the elements of the government policies on their businesses. There were three interview 
questions formulated for this proposition. The basis for the first interview question on 
“macro” level stickiness derived from the discussions of Sweeney (1996, pp. 6-19) on the 
government efforts to encourage “learning”, which enabled firms to have the ability to 
improve and innovate products and services. Thus, the interview question for this reason 
says  “What  are  the  factors  that  have  been  considered  by  the  government  when 
formulating economic policies to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms?” The 
researcher  expected  the  informants  to  give  a  few  factors  that  implied  “learning”, 
“improvement”, and “innovation” (Sweeney, 1996, pp. 6-19). As for the second interview 
question, it is based on Mokyr‟s (2002, pp. 77-86) argument that “macro” level stickiness 
was due to the ambition of the government to generate capability through “technology 
development,”  which  is  important  for  economic  development.  Thus,  the  interview 
question  was  “Why  does  the  government  include  the  national  agenda  in  economic 
policies which are supposed to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms?” For the 
third  interview  question,  the  basis  is  derived  from  Sweeney‟s  (1996,  pp.6-19)  to 
encourage firms to experience “learning,” “improvement,” and “innovation;” and from 
the argument of Macdonald (1998, p.162) that governments built technology parks to   106 
encourage firms to engage in knowledge transfer among firms. Thus, the third question 
says “How do Malaysian technology parks assist knowledge transfer among ICT firms 
that operate in Malaysian technology parks?” Table 4.3 summarizes the basis for the 
three interview questions on “macro” level stickiness in knowledge transfer among firms. 
   Table 4.3 
   The Basis for the Interview Questions on “Macro” Level Stickiness 
Authors  Literature  Interview Questions  Informants 
Sweeney (1996, 
pp. 6-19) 
government effort to 
encourage “learning”; to 
encourage “improvement” 
and “innovation”; socio-
economic factors 
embedded in government 
economic policies 
 
1. What are the factors that 
have been considered by 
the government when 
formulating economic 
policies to encourage 
knowledge transfer among 
ICT firms? 
 
1.Policy Makers 
2.Government Officers 
3. Firms‟ 
Representatives 
Mokyr (2002, 
pp.77-86) 
To generate capability 
through “technological 
development”; essential for 
economic development 
2. Why does the 
government include the 
national agenda in 
economic policies which 
are supposed to encourage 
knowledge transfer among 
ICT firms? 
 
Sweeney  (1996, 
pp. 6-19) 
to  convince  firms  to  use 
“learning”  outcomes  for 
“improvement”  and 
“innovation.” 
3. How do Malaysian 
technology parks assist 
knowledge transfer among 
ICT firms that operate in 
Malaysian technology 
parks? 
Macdonald 
(1998, p. 162) 
to convince firms to be in 
high  technology    in 
technology parks 
 
For  the  “micro”  level  stickiness,  four  interview  questions  were  asked  to  ICT  firms‟ 
representatives. The basis for the interview questions were based on the four aspects of 
“micro” stickiness – transfer mechanisms, types of transfer, knowledge transfer barriers, 
and transfer contexts. The operative term to reflect “micro” stickiness is high cost, which 
means very expensive to implement. 
 
The interview question for (a) transfer mechanism was derived from the literature on 
Arrow‟s (1962, p.155) “learning by doing,” Nelson and Winter‟s (1982, pp.9-11, 99)   107 
“replication,”  and  Winter  and  Szulanski‟s  (2001,  p.731)  “replication.”  From  the 
literature, a few mechanisms of knowledge transfer were identified, namely learn (both 
face to face and off-the-job), emulate, acquire, modify, and update. Thus, the interview 
question  was  “How  does  your  firm  respond  to  high  cost  transfer  mechanisms  in 
knowledge transfer with other ICT firms?” 
 
The interview question for (b) types of transfer was based on the literature of Arrow‟s 
(1969, pp. 29-35) technical type of transfer, Teece‟s (1977, p. 245) technology transfer, 
Szulanski‟s  (1996,  p.28)  “best  practice,”  and  Szulanski  and  Jensen‟s  (2004,  p.  348) 
“template” and “working example.” Types of transfer include technical manual, technical 
blueprint, on-the-job as well as off-the-job training. Thus, the interview question was 
“How does your firm respond to high cost types of transfer in knowledge transfer with 
other ICT firms?” 
 
The interview question for (c) knowledge transfer barriers came from the literature of 
was  based  Szulanski‟s  (1995,  pp.  438-439)  nature  of  knowledge  and  support,  and 
Simonin‟s (1999, pp. 464-465) medium use to share and transfer knowledge. Barriers 
came from organisational routines, initiatives, ability, situation, culture, personality of 
employees. Thus, the interview question was “How does your firm respond to high cost 
knowledge barriers in knowledge transfer with other ICT firms?” 
 
Lastly, the interview question for (d) transfer contexts came from the literature of Arrow 
(1969, pp. 29-35), Szulanski and Jensen (2004, p. 350), Szulanski and Jensen (2006, p.   108 
938) on single context; and Teece (1977, p. 247), Galbraith (1990, p. 61), Von Hippel 
(1994, p. 434), Szulanski (1996, p. 28), Szulanski (2000, pp. 12-13), and Jensen and 
Szulanski (2004, pp. 508-509) on multiple contexts. The interview question was “How 
does your firm respond to high cost transfer contexts in knowledge transfer with other 
ICT firms?” Table 4.4 summarizes the basis for the interview questions on “micro” level 
stickiness in knowledge transfer among ICT firms.  
 
 
 
   Table 4.4 
   The Basis for the Interview Questions on “Micro” Level Stickiness 
Aspects  Authors  Literature  Methods  Interview Questions 
Transfer 
mechanisms 
Arrow‟s (1962, 
p. 155) 
Costly “learning by 
doing” 
Learn – face to 
face, 
How does your firm 
respond to high cost 
transfer mechanisms 
(learn, copy, emulate, 
acquire, and modify) 
in knowledge transfer 
with other ICT firms? 
Nelson and 
Winter‟s (1982, 
pp. 9-11,99) 
Costly 
“replication” 
Learn and emulate 
Winter and 
Szulanski (2001, 
p. 731) 
Costly “doing” is 
replicable 
Acquire, learn, 
and modify 
Szulanski and 
Jensen (2004, p. 
348) 
Costly 
“replication” 
Learn and emulate 
Szulanski & 
Jensen (2006, pp. 
937-939)  
Costly “adapt”  
“template” 
Acquire, learn, 
modify, and 
update 
Types of transfer  Arrow (1969, pp. 
29-35) 
technical type  Technical manual  How does your firm 
respond to high cost 
types of transfer in 
knowledge transfer 
with other ICT firms?  
 
Teece (1977, p. 
245) 
technology transfer  Technical 
blueprint, 
workshops, 
seminars 
Szulanski (1996, 
p. 28) 
“best practice” 
Szulanski & 
Jensen (2004, p. 
348) 
“template” or 
“working example” 
Knowledge 
transfer barriers 
Szulanski (1995, 
pp. 438-439) 
nature of the 
knowledge and the 
context of 
knowledge 
Routines, 
initiatives, ability 
of employees, 
situation, culture, 
personality 
How does your firm 
respond to high cost 
knowledge barriers in 
knowledge transfer 
with other ICT firms?  
 
Simonin (1999, 
pp. 464-465) 
knowledge, 
medium, and use 
Transfer contexts  Arrow (1969, pp. 
29-35) 
Single context  firm-specific 
context – people, 
context, and 
How does your firm 
respond to high cost 
transfer contexts in  Szulanski and  Single context    109 
Jensen (2004, p. 
350) 
preference  knowledge transfer 
with other ICT firms?  
  Szulanski and 
Jensen (2006, p. 
938) 
Single context  
Teece (1977, p. 
247) 
Multiple context   specific 
technology 
transfer among 
factories of 
different contexts 
Galbraith (1990, 
p. 61) 
Multiple context  
Von Hippel 
(1994, p. 434) 
Multiple context   multiple contexts 
impede 
knowledge 
transfer between 
firms 
Szulanski (1996, 
p. 28) 
Multiple context  
Szulanski (2000, 
pp. 12-13) 
Multiple context  
Jensen and 
Szulanski (2004, 
pp. 508-509) 
Multiple context  
 
4.6 Instruments used in data collection 
The second data collection instrument of the study was the personal interview. The study 
prepared 94 interview questions; however, due to time and cost constraints, the study 
condensed  the  interview  questions  into  three  questions  for  the  policy  makers  and 
government officers informants, and four questions for informants from the ICT firms 
(please refer to Appendix 3). These interview questions asked the informants to respond 
to the research question of the study “Why is knowledge transfer difficult between ICT 
firms in selected Malaysian technology parks?”  
 
Out of 74 interviews conducted (71 interviews in 2005 and three interviews in 2007); the 
study  could  only  use  feedback  from  50  interviews  (47  informants  in  2005  and  three 
informants in 2007). The remaining 24 interviewed informants had decided to withdraw 
from the interview. When the informants withdrawn their consent, the researcher had to   110 
return the notes to the informants, which was mentioned in the ethics research permit 
produced by Murdoch University. 
 
The informants of the study comprised 14 policy makers (PM), 11 government officers 
(GO),  and  25  representatives  of  ICT  firms  (FR)  from  selected  Malaysian technology 
parks. All three informant types were coded to represent the details of the informants. 
Table 4.5 highlights the informants‟ codes and profiles. 
  Table 4.5 
  Informants‟ Codes and Profiles 
Code  Title  Organisation  Date of interviewed 
PM1  Federal Minister  Kuala Lumpur  13 August 2007 
PM2  Federal Minister  Putrajaya  17 July 2005 
PM3  Federal Deputy Minister  Kuala Lumpur  9 August 2007 
PM4  Federal Minister  Putrajaya  10 June 2005 
PM5  Chief Minister  Kuala Lumpur  22 August 2007 
PM6  Senator  Kuala Lumpur  18 July 2007 
PM7  State Minister  Kuala Lumpur  9 June 2005 
PM8  State Minister  Kuala Lumpur  14 May 2005 
PM9  Federal Deputy Minister  Kuala Lumpur  17 July 2005 
PM10  Federal Minister  Putrajaya  18 July 2005 
PM11  Federal Minister  Putrajaya  18 July 2005 
PM12  Federal Minister  Putrajaya  17 July 2005 
PM13  Federal Minister  Putrajaya  17 July 2005 
PM14  Federal Minister  Kuala Lumpur  9 August 2007 
GO1  Assistant Director  Economic Planning Unit  14 May 2005 
GO2  Principal Assistant Director  Economic Planning Unit  14 May 2005 
GO3  Assistant Director  Economic Planning Unit  11 May 2005 
GO4  Assistant Director  Implementation and 
Coordination Unit 
7 August 2007 
GO5  Assistant Director  Implementation and 
Coordination Unit 
7 August 2007 
GO6  Deputy Director  Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Innovations 
11 May 2005 
GO7  Assistant Director  Ministry of Finance  11 May 2005 
GO8  Senior Research Officer  Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment 
26 May 2005 
GO9  Executive Officer  Small and Medium 
Industries Development 
Corporation 
18 May 2005 
GO10  Senior Research Officer  Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Innovations 
19 May 2005 
GO11  Assistant Director  Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment 
8 June 2005 
FR1  Business Manager  Multimedia Super Corridor  14 May 2005 
FR2  Business Development 
Manager 
Technology Park Malaysia  14 May 2005   111 
FR3  Manager  Cyberjaya  12 May 2005 
FR4  Manager  Multimedia Super Corridor  13 June 2005 
FR5  Vice President  Cyberjaya  17 July 2005 
FR6  Senior Manager  Cyberjaya  19 May 2005 
FR7  Managing Director  Cyberjaya  22 June 2005 
FR8  Chief Executive Officer  Subang Jaya  19 May 2005 
FR9  Senior Manager  Shah Alam  19 May 2005 
FR10  Senior Executive  Kulim Hi Tech Park  6 June 2005 
FR11  Senior Manager  Technology Park Malaysia  12 May 2005 
FR12  Chief Executive Officer  Cyberjaya  14 May 2005 
FR13  Manager  Cyberjaya  12 May 2005 
FR14  Senior Engineer  Technology Park Malaysia  13 June 2005 
FR15  Executive  Technology Park Malaysia  10 June 2005 
FR16  Business Manager  Cyberjaya  14 May 2005 
FR17  Vice President  Cyberjaya  14 May 2005 
FR18  Senior Executive  Technology Park Malaysia  14 May 2005 
FR19  Senior Executive  Technology Park Malaysia  14 May 2005 
FR20  Engineer  Technology Park Malaysia  14 May 2005 
FR21  Vice President  Subang Jaya  19 May 2005 
FR22  Senior Manager  Shah Alam  19 May 2005 
FR23  Senior Executive  Shah Alam  12 June 2005 
FR24  Executive  Sri Iskandar Park  5 May 2005 
FR25  Senior Manager  Johor Tech Park  31 May 2005 
4.7 Data analysis 
 
This  study  used  a  note  taking  approach  in  all  the  personal  interviews  conducted. 
Feedback  from  all  of  the  informants  was  recorded  verbatim  (word  by  word).  The 
researcher  had  no  choice  due  to  restrictions  required  by  the  informants.  More 
importantly, the ethics permit of research that the researcher obtained from Murdoch 
University has clearly specified that the consent of the informants is very crucial. The 
informants  could  also  withdraw  the  interviews  that  have  taken  place.  Table  4.6 
summarizes the interview questions together with the research question, propositions, and 
unit of analysis. 
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Table 4.6 
Summary of Research Question, Propositions, Unit of Analysis, and Interview Questions 
Research question  Propositions  Unit of Analysis  Interview Questions 
Why is knowledge 
difficult to transfer? 
Proposition 1: The government 
contributed to “macro” level 
stickiness through economic policies 
that constrained firms by requiring 
that their decisions reflect the 
national agenda put forward by those 
in government. 
14 Policy Makers 
11 Government  Officers 
25 ICT Firms Representatives 
1. What are the factors that have been considered by 
the government when formulating economic policies to 
encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
 
2. Why does the government include the national 
agenda in economic policies which are supposed to 
encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
 
3. How do Malaysian technology parks assist 
knowledge transfer among ICT firms that operate in 
Malaysian technology parks? 
 
Proposition 2: ICT firms contributed 
to “micro” level stickiness when they 
did not want to be involved in 
knowledge transfer because it was 
costly in terms of (a) transfer 
mechanism, (b) types of transfer, (c) 
knowledge barriers, and (d) transfer 
context 
25 ICT firms representative  1. How does your firm respond to high cost transfer 
mechanisms (learn, copy, emulate, acquire, and 
modify) in knowledge transfer with other ICT firms? 
 
2. How does your firm respond to high cost types of 
transfer in knowledge transfer with other ICT firms?  
 
3. How does your firm respond to high cost knowledge 
barriers in knowledge transfer with other ICT firms?  
 
4. How does your firm respond to high cost transfer 
contexts in knowledge transfer with other ICT firms?  
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The researcher was aware that the note taking approach was time consuming, manually 
done,  and  inclined  to  omit  some  information.  However,  potential  weaknesses  were 
overcome by sending the full transcript to the informants for confirmation. The verified 
interview transcripts were then content analysed manually to extract sub-themes. The 
researcher requested two researchers to verify the sub-themes.  
 
The  researcher  himself  identified  a  list  of  sub-themes  by  reviewing  the  interview 
transcripts. Next, he extracted a dominant sub-theme (keyword) from the list of sub-
themes. Then, he connected all the sub-themes to match the objective of the study. To 
ensure  the  accuracy  of  the  data  analysis,  the  researcher  employed  an  independent 
researcher to verify a few selected interview transcripts so that they matched the sub-
themes.  
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CHAPTER 5: MACRO LEVEL STICKINESS AND MALAYSIAN 
TECHNOLOGY PARKS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the interview results with policy makers, government officers, and 
ICT firms‟  representatives  to  explain  “macro”  level stickiness and  its contribution to 
knowledge transfer between ICT firms in Malaysian technology parks. There are four 
sections in this chapter. The first section summarises the feedback from all informants 
according to three interview questions. The second section presents the feedback from 
policy makers. The third second section presents the feedback of government officers, 
and the fourth section presents the feedback of firms‟ representatives on “macro” level 
stickiness.  
 
The feedback given by policy makers, government officers, and firms‟ representatives is 
presented separately. The first part presents the feedback from policy makers, the second 
part produces the feedback from government officers, and the third part discusses the 
responses from firms‟ representatives. 
 
The following tables (Table 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3) summarise the responses of 14 policy 
makers, 11 government officers, and 25 firms‟ representatives on the “macro” stickiness 
interview questions. The three questions were:   115 
1. What are the factors that have been considered by the government when formulating 
economic policies to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
2. Why does the government include the national agenda in economic policies which are 
supposed to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
3. How do Malaysian technology parks assist knowledge transfer among ICT firms that 
operate in Malaysian technology parks? 
 
Table 5.1 
Summary of Responses from 14 Policy Makers (PM), 11 Government Officers (GO) and 25 Firms‟ 
Representatives (FR) on “Macro” Stickiness Interview Questions 
Code  Question 1 (What factors?)  Question 2 (Why national 
agenda?) 
Question 3 (How tech parks?) 
PM1  Political stability, racial unity, 
eradication of poverty 
National background, unity 
basis 
Infrastructure and incentives 
(foreign investment 
attraction) 
PM2  Economic advantages, 
political stability, unity, 
foreign investment friendly 
Bases for unity, stability and 
harmony 
No answers given 
PM3  Economic growth, wealth 
creation, skill enhancement, 
foreign investment friendly 
Multiracial society, political 
stability, good relationships 
Infrastructure, networking, 
and incentives 
PM4  Capacity enhancement, 
attractive investment 
destination, political stability 
Social fabric, stability, 
harmony, unity 
Incentives and stimulus for 
global networking 
PM5  Political stability, national 
unity, foster good racial 
interactions 
Unity, peace and stability  Value-added infrastructure 
and incentives, new stimulus 
PM6  Economic directions, national 
unity, employment, skill 
enhancement 
National unity for multi races, 
political stability 
No answers given 
PM7  Economic vast opportunities, 
employment in skill, best 
brain development 
Nation‟s direction, political 
and economic stability 
Opportunities for networking, 
knowledge enhancement; 
incubation facilities 
PM8  Foreign investment attraction, 
employment, unity 
Directions for economic 
stability and opportunities 
No answers given 
PM9  National interests and 
infrastructure development 
No answers given  No answers given 
PM10  Provide business 
opportunities, employment, 
and skill enhancement  
National unity and political 
stability 
Business incentives 
PM11  Political stability, 
employment, skill 
enhancement 
Nation building  Infrastructure and incentives 
PM12  Poverty eradication, unity, 
employment, business 
opportunities 
Maintain political stability, 
national unity 
Infrastructure, incentives, and 
opportunities for networking 
PM13  National interests, racial  National interests  No answers given   116 
harmony, good jobs for 
people 
PM14  National unity, good 
economic growth 
Racial harmony, stability and 
unity 
infrastructure 
GO1  Employment, growth, unity  National aspiration  Incubation facilities, 
incentives, property 
development 
GO2  Employment, competency, 
stakeholders 
Stakeholders‟ interests  An element of K-economy – 
infrastructure and assistance 
GO3  National unity, employment, 
good economic growth 
Stakeholders‟ interests  Acceleration of township 
development, infrastructure 
for K-economy 
GO4  Prosperity, peaceful, 
harmony, stability, 
employment  
National interests, investment 
friendly 
Facilities, one-stop centre, 
potential networking 
GO5  Wealth creation and 
distribution, national unity 
Stakeholders interests  Widening up span of 
networking 
GO6  Employment, wealth creation, 
development 
Investment friendly, domestic 
stability 
Government initiated project 
– infrastructure, facilities 
GO7  Employment, unity, capability 
building 
Political stability leads to 
good environment for 
investment 
Science and technology 
development 
GO8  Good economic performance, 
maintain prosperity 
National interests, to preserve 
social structure and identity 
Incubation facilities to 
produce value added 
products; infrastructure and 
incentives 
GO9  Employment, peaceful, 
harmony, stability 
National interests, determined 
directions 
Infrastructure in ICT and 
Science Technology 
GO10  Economic advantages, 
efficiency, wealth creation 
Social culture, social 
expectations 
Clustering, zoning systems 
with specific target; 
competency building 
GO11  Economic growth, prosperity, 
competency building 
The uniqueness of multiracial 
with national inspired agenda 
Incentives and infrastructure 
FR1  Good economic prospects, 
opportunities 
Political agenda  Business  park  with 
subsidized rental 
FR2  Growth, jobs, more business 
opportunities 
National interest, very 
political 
Real estate agent 
FR3  More jobs, more business, 
more profit 
Multiracial agenda, 
multiracial interest 
Networking,  access  to  one 
stop centre 
FR4  Jobs, businesses  No idea  One stop centre meeting 
FR5  Prospects, jobs, business  Political interests  Good  rental  rate,  secured 
building 
FR6  Prospects, new opportunities, 
social-economic concerns 
National politics  Business networking 
FR7  More wealth, more 
opportunities 
Pledge to voters (politically 
driven) 
Meeting point for technology 
investors 
FR8  Economic wellness, people in 
good shape (united), harmony 
Working guideline based on 
social nature 
Subsidized  facilities  with 
good image 
FR9  Economic advantage, people 
wellness, stability 
National agenda is irrelevant 
in business 
Physical infrastructure only 
FR10  Jobs, business, growth, wealth  Protection of national 
interests 
Subsidized facilities 
FR11  More money, growth, 
employment security 
Nationalism, political 
interests 
Incubation 
FR12  People welfare, economic 
competitiveness 
Compass/guideline in 
competing 
Networking, collaboration   117 
FR13  People, economy, job, wealth  Political will, mileage, 
national interest 
Facilities, networking 
FR14  Give people jobs, ensure good 
growth 
Political things, no idea  Sharing facilities 
FR15  Economic development, 
prosperity, social welfare 
National interest  Infrastructure for K-economy 
FR16  Job, good economy  Security of the country and 
the people 
Infrastructure  
FR17  More opportunities, more 
welfare, more security 
Politics  Discounted  rental  for  good 
facilities 
FR18  Work, money, growth, 
security 
National interest  facilities 
FR19  Resources, people ability, 
business opportunities, people 
welfare 
Nation building, social 
expectations 
facilities 
FR20  Job security, wealth creation  National interests  Networking, collaboration 
FR21  Job, business, more 
opportunities 
Nation building, social 
interest 
Facilities, networking 
FR22  Wealth creation, job security, 
skill enhancement 
Building the nation  Facilities 
FR23  More jobs available, good 
economic growth 
No idea  Infrastructure 
FR24  Political and economic 
stability 
Political things  Good rental 
FR25  Security  National interests, political  K-economy infrastructure for 
more collaborations 
Note: The coding and the simplified answers/sub themes derived from the actual responses of the informants and had 
been verified by the informants and checked by two independent researchers. 
Macro stickiness interview questions: 
1. What are the factors that have been considered by the government when formulating economic policies 
to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
2. Why does the government include the national agenda in economic policies which are supposed to 
encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
3.  How  do  Malaysian  technology  parks  assist  knowledge  transfer  among  ICT  firms  that  operate  in 
Malaysian technology parks? 
 
 
5.2 Feedback from policy makers 
 
The  following  discussion  presents  the  responses  of  14  policy  makers  on  “macro” 
stickiness interview questions. There were various factors according to the informants 
that  had  been  considered  by  the  government  when  formulating  economic  policies  to 
encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms. Table 5.2 summarises all the responses 
from 14 policy makers on three interview questions. 
 
Table 5.2   118 
Summary of Policy Makers (PM) Responses to “Macro” Stickiness Interview Questions (in various sub 
themes) 
Code  Question 1 (What factors?)  Question 2 (Why national 
agenda?) 
Question 3 (How tech parks?) 
PM1  Political stability, racial 
unity, eradication of poverty 
National background, unity 
basis 
Infrastructure and incentives 
(foreign investment attraction) 
PM2  Economic advantages, 
political stability, unity, 
foreign investment friendly 
Bases for unity, stability and 
harmony 
No answers given 
PM3  Economic growth, wealth 
creation, skill enhancement, 
foreign investment friendly 
Multiracial society, political 
stability, good relationships 
Infrastructure, networking, and 
incentives 
PM4  Capacity enhancement, 
attractive investment 
destination, political 
stability 
Social fabric, stability, 
harmony, unity 
Incentives and stimulus for 
global networking 
PM5  Political stability, national 
unity, foster good racial 
interactions 
Unity, peace and stability  Value-added infrastructure and 
incentives, new stimulus 
PM6  Economic directions, 
national unity, employment, 
skill enhancement 
National unity for multi 
races, political stability 
No answers given 
PM7  Economic vast 
opportunities, employment 
in skill, best brain 
development 
Nation‟s direction, political 
and economic stability 
Opportunities for networking, 
knowledge enhancement; 
incubation facilities 
PM8  Foreign investment 
attraction, employment, 
unity 
Directions for economic 
stability and opportunities 
No answers given 
PM9  National interests and 
infrastructure development 
No answers given  No answers given 
PM10  Provide business 
opportunities, employment, 
and skill enhancement  
National unity and political 
stability 
Business incentives 
PM11  Political stability, 
employment, skill 
enhancement 
Nation building  Infrastructure and incentives 
PM12  Poverty eradication, unity, 
employment, business 
opportunities 
Maintain political stability, 
national unity 
Infrastructure, incentives, and 
opportunities for networking 
PM13  National interests, racial 
harmony, good jobs for 
people 
National interests  No answers given 
PM14  National unity, good 
economic growth 
Racial harmony, stability 
and unity 
infrastructure 
Note: The coding and the simplified answers/sub themes derived from the actual responses of the informants and had 
been verified by the informants and checked by two independent researchers. 
Macro stickiness interview questions: 
1. What are the factors that have been considered by the government when formulating economic policies 
to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
2. Why does the government include the national agenda in economic policies which are supposed to 
encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
3.  How  do  Malaysian  technology  parks  assist  knowledge  transfer  among  ICT  firms  that  operate  in 
Malaysian technology parks? 
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The researcher developed the categorisation based on the responses and then approached 
two independent researchers (one from Universiti Malaysia Sarawak and another one 
from Universiti Utara Malaysia) to verify the coding and categorisation.  
 
5.2.1 Policy makers response to Question 1 
Based on Table 5.2, the responses from 14 policy makers on the first “macro” stickiness 
interview question (What are the factors that have been considered by the government 
when  formulating  economic  policies  to  encourage  knowledge  transfer  among  ICT 
firms?), that can be classified into a few factors, namely (1) national unity, (2) economic 
and  business  advantages,  (3)  employment  opportunities,  (4)  skill  enhancement,  (5) 
political  stability,  (6)  foreign  investment  friendly,  (7)  economic  development,  (8) 
stakeholders interest, (9) poverty eradication, (10) infrastructure development, and (11) 
wealth creation.  
 
According  to  the  policy  makers  informants,  the  most  important  factors  that  the 
government considered when it formulating economic policies were (a) national unity 
(n=8), (b) economic and business advantages (n=7), (c) employment opportunities (n=7), 
and (d) skill enhancement (n=6).  
 
Table 5.2a presents the factors considered for economic policies according to the policy 
makers. 
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              Table 5.2a 
              Factors Considered in the Malaysian Economic Policies according to 14 Policy Makers  
         Factors  Informants   Frequency 
National unity  PM 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 12, 13, 14  8 
Economic and business advantages  PM 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 12, 14  7 
Employment opportunities  PM 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13  7 
Skill enhancement  PM 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11  6 
Political stability  PM 1, 2, 4, 5, 11  5 
Foreign investment friendly  PM 2, 3, 4, 8  4 
Economic development  PM 2, 4  2 
Stakeholders interest  PM 9, 13  2 
Poverty eradication  PM 1, 11  2 
Infrastructure development  PM 9, 10  2 
Wealth creation  PM 3  1 
           Note: Macro Stickiness, Interview Question 1: What are the factors that have been considered by the 
            government when formulating economic policies to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
           [The factors derived from the responses of the informants and verified by independent researchers] 
 
In general, the informants argued that the government considered four main factors –
ensuring  national  unity,  securing  economic  and  business  advantages,  providing 
employment opportunities, and encouraging skill enhancement. The following quotations 
from  the  policy  maker  informants  mentioned  the  four  key  factors  incorporated  into 
Malaysian economic policies. 
 
Most policy makers (PM 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 12, 13, and 14) argued that national unity has been 
considered  the  most  important  factor  incorporated  in  the  economic  policies.  They 
emphasised  that  the  government  included  this  factor  as  top  priority  in  its  agenda  to 
promote political stability in the country so that the economic activities can be carried 
out. The informants argued that the unity factor is the key element to maintain harmony 
in a multi racial society. For example, PM 1 said: 
The government of today is elected by the people through a general election that 
is held every five years. Why [do] people continue to give us [a] mandate to run 
this country? Because we have promised to maintain national unity and promote 
harmony among people from multi races. Without unity, there won‟t be peace 
and political stability [and] people could not do business and generate growth   121 
in the economy. We have learnt in the past about the importance of national 
unity.  The  1969  incident  became  a  reminder  to  us  about  the  importance  of 
national unity. However, the prime minister of that time, the late Tun Abdul 
Razak managed to overcome the incident. He introduced the New Economic 
Policy  to  promote  unity  through  poverty  eradication  and  restructuring  the 
economy so that every race has equal chance to enjoy the cake of the economy. 
Of course, the policy gave privileges to the Malays, but the government never 
neglects other races to participate in the economy. Leaders from other races 
understood this situation and they gave full support to the government.  
 
Informants stated that there were criticisms on the incorporation of national unity in the 
economic policies, but the government countered such criticisms positively because the 
government believed that the national unity factor has proven it‟s effectiveness to provide 
political stability. The informants further claimed that the criticisms resulted from the 
dissatisfied individuals and institutions that disagreed with the government‟s decision to 
give  special  privilege  to  the  Malay  people.  However,  the  informants  said  that  the 
government had consulted various key stakeholders when such decisions are made. This 
situation has been admitted by PM 2 when he explained: 
The New Economic Policy, the National Development Policy, and the National 
Vision  Policy  …  gave  special  attention  to  the  Malay  and  other  indigenous 
people because they have been neglected for many ages by the colonial masters 
- the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the British. When the government (during the 
leadership  of  second  Malaysian  Prime  Minister,  the  late  Tun  Abdul  Razak 
Hussin) introduced these policies [in 1970], the government has explained in 
detail to non Malay leaders and they were convinced with the explanation. In 
practice, the government gives fair treatment to other races too. Let‟s observe in 
the market, who own high rise buildings, hypermarkets, hotels, and factories? 
The non Malays especially the Chinese can do business and create wealth in this 
country. The Malays and other indigenous people are still behind the target of 
30% equity of the economy. Those who make noise and disagree with these 
policies are actually enjoying most of the cake of the economy. Perhaps they 
want to have all the cake of the economy for themselves?  
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Informants further explained that the national unity factor cannot be compromised to 
please  every  person  in  the  country.  They  said  that  if  the  government  excluded  the 
national factor in the economic policies, then it has to bear the consequences that resulted 
from racial conflict among races. For instance, PM 3 uttered: 
The aim of national economic policies is basically to generate economic growth 
and to create wealth for the nation. In order to generate economic growth, this 
country needs political stability. This factor is very important in a multiracial 
country. We know this fact because we have been managing this country [for] 
almost  half  decade.  Even  my  foreign  counterparts  were  amazed  with  the 
achievement we had so far and they were very interested to learn from us.
  
 
Informants emphasised that the incorporation of the national unity element in economic 
policies  has  not  prevented  Malaysia  from  advancing  its  economy  in  line  with  other 
developed  nations.  They  said  that  the  reason  is  that  the  government  has  been  very 
committed to bringing prosperity to the economy and improving the welfare of the people 
despite so many criticisms. PM 4 argued: 
The government is very serious about vision 2020 mooted by the former Prime 
Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad. Every Malaysian should be proud with this 
vision  and  should  participate  in  whatever  capacity  to  make  this  vision  and 
ambition a reality. When the government targets to become a developed country, 
this is not a baseless ambition, rather we are projecting this based on many 
indicators (social, economic, and political factors as well).
  
 
Since the national unity factor is very important to the political stability of the country, 
the informants said that the government is going to give top priority to this agenda in the 
government policies. PM 5 said: 
The government is not going to reduce the priority of national unity in all public 
policies because it has been trusted through the General Election by the people 
to safeguard political stability and unity among people of multiracial. There are 
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could not neglect this agenda simply to please some groups of people in the 
society.
  
 
Apart from ensuring national unity is a very important factor in the economic policies, 
securing  economic  and  business  advantages  from  foreign  investment  especially  are 
important to provide employment opportunities, and to encourage skill enhancement. PM 
2 explained: 
We need capital to run the economy. When we don‟t have enough capital to run 
the economy, we need to borrow money. This approach is very expensive. As an 
alternative,  we  can  invite  investors  from  overseas  to  bring  capital  into  our 
country  and  do  their  business  here.  The  immediate  benefit  is  that  they  can 
provide jobs to our people. When the businesses are doing good, we can tax 
some  of  the  profits.  Ultimately,  these  economic  activities  contribute  to  the 
economic growth.  
 
In fact, informants believed that securing economic and business advantages is important 
in the economy, especially for a developing country. PM 3 said: 
When our country is politically stable, we can offer this country as a strategic 
destination for investment. Malaysia needs foreign capital in order to further 
progress. The current achievement is not enough to transform Malaysia from 
developing  country  status  to  developed  country  status.  For  this  reason,  our 
economic policies must be investment friendly.
  
 
Based on the economic performance records, informants argued that Malaysia has been 
enjoying economic and business advantages from foreign direct investment. For example, 
policy makers pointed out that the foreign direct investment in the manufacturing sector 
has provided not only national income to the country but also employment opportunities 
to the people. This result is supported by PM 4: 
In the past Malaysia has offered cheap labour and we want to continue it, but 
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countries because they could offer better rate of labour cost to multinational 
companies.  If  this  trend  continues,  Malaysia  will  lose  its  manufacturing 
competitiveness  and  also  the  status  of  main  exporter  for  semi  and  fully 
manufactured  products.  Since  Malaysia  has  a  vast  experience  in  electronics 
manufacturing, the ICT industry offers a wide range of opportunities to foreign 
ICT  companies.  Now,  we  are  offering  intelligent  labour  to  foreign  ICT 
companies so that they can produce quality and cheap ICT products. We have 
the capability to assist them as what we have done in the past.  
 
Informants emphasised that due to rising costs of production, especially the labour cost, 
foreign firms started to search for cheaper locations to run their production. In view of 
that, the informants thought that if the foreign direct investment shifted to other countries, 
then  this  situation  will  put  the  Malaysian  economy  at  risk.    PM  3  supported  this 
viewpoint: 
The government is trying to retain the current investors and also attract new 
investors. The investors complained that our labour cost has increased their 
operation  cost.  They  have  identified  other  countries  that  can  offer  cheaper 
labour.  We  respect  their  concern  about  labour  cost  and  at  the  same  time 
persuade them to continue investing in our country because we promised them 
our skilled labour.
  
 
To counter such a negative situation, the informants said that the government offered 
foreign investors vast opportunity in the ICT industry to benefit from Malaysia‟s   cheap 
labour and other incentives for ICT firms.  PM 6 argued: 
The state government believes in using the ICT to further develop the country. 
ICT  is  one  agenda,  it  does  not  end  yet,  and  there  are  many  agendas  like 
biotechnology, nanotechnology projects to support the state ambition to become 
a  K-state  by  the  year  2020.  The  state  government  is  serious  about  the  ICT 
industry. As a starting point, the state launched the ICT for all projects – we 
gave e-mail account for every new born baby; we are going to use multipurpose 
card in various state government offices for land tax payment and any local 
payment; a frequent ICT week at the state level, district, and even community 
level.
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However, some informants argued that the government should not have given excessive 
incentives to attract foreign direct investment in the ICT industry. They argued that this 
allocated resources in a way that undermined the welfare of the people. PM 7 commented 
on this situation: 
Malaysia should not sacrifice its people, its wealth and its resources for the sake 
of  attracting  foreign  investors.  The  government  should  look  at  the  basic 
foundations of Malaysia, its social contracts, and its local capability to develop 
the  country  in  many  aspects,  not  just  one  aspect  such  as  the  ICT  or 
biotechnology. The government also should allow everyone to get the chance to 
use their brain to bring development to the country. At the moment, not everyone 
gets the opportunity to determine the direction of development for the country.  
 
The  informants  urged  the  government  to  review  the  incentives  for  foreign  direct 
investment in the ICT industry to give technical advantages to the Malaysian people.  
PM 8 said: 
Some  of  Malaysia‟s  technology  parks  are  not  giving  benefit  to  the  public 
although a lot of public money has been used to develop these parks. The MSC 
alone already costed taxpayers more than [Malaysian Ringgit] 40 billion, which 
excluded  tax  cuts.  The  tax  incentive  given  to  foreign  companies  is  actually 
shifting the tax burden to local taxpayers, but the locals do not get the benefit on 
what they have paid.
  
 
Informants  claimed  that  some  state  governments  tried  to  replicate  the  federal 
government‟s approach in using the ICT industry as an instrument to accelerate economic 
growth, but some of them were incompetent to do so due to the status of development 
and the emphasis of the economy. PM 9 said: 
My  state  government  has  attempted  to  develop  the  state  based  on  the 
manufacturing industrialization in 1989 after tin mining became not profitable. 
Moreover the small mining area not only reduced in size but also decreased in 
price. As ex-mining state, the level of development in this state is not at par with 
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facilities and logistics support such as good seaport and airport. The first step to 
introduce our state as ICT state, we will increase the wireless Internet access 
(hot spot) and we aim our capital city to be known as Wireless City.  
 
Some informants said that the ICT industry has been used as an instrument to tell people 
that they will get new jobs with the intention to get support from the people. Policy 
makers  gave  top  priority  in  providing  new  jobs  when  they  formulated  the  economic 
policies. In doing so, they gave less priority to knowledge and innovation which were 
very complex to explain to the people who merely desire decent jobs and a good lifestyle. 
In fact, some informants said some politicians were not conversant with the ICT industry 
and its implications for knowledge and innovation. PM 10 commented: 
It  is  not  easy  to  talk  about  innovation  in  the  Parliament  because  it  is  very 
abstract,  complex  and  uncertain.  I  find  relatively  easier  to  measure  the 
country‟s  performance  using  economic  indicators.  We  have  attempted  to 
deliberate the term innovation in the relation to the knowledge-based economy, 
but some of us were confused. As a result, we decided to focus on economic 
indicators. In election campaign, it is hard to talk about such an abstract term. 
People  don‟t  understand  what  it  is  all  about.  The  word  „innovation‟  is  a 
relatively new jargon. In fact, the notion „innovation‟ at the Ministry of Science, 
Technology  and  Innovations  was used  after  the  recent  general  election.  The 
Prime Minister used the word „innovations‟ to give attention to the innovation 
agenda.
  
 
Informants emphasised that foreign direct investment is very important to the Malaysian 
economy not only to generate good economic growth, but also to enhance the social and 
economic status of the Malaysian people. PM 11 stressed: 
Our country has been an important target for foreign investment because our 
country is politically stable and harmonious. In the past decades, our people 
have  been  very  friendly  to  foreign  investors.  With  these  attributes,  foreign 
investors are going to further invest in our K-economy. In the past, our people 
were  not  very  skilful,  but  nowadays  they  have  been  trained  with  the  latest 
technology and exposed to global environment. This is a strong reason for them 
[foreign firm] to continue investing in our economy.
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Based on the above feedback, policy makers viewed that the government included four 
main  factors,  namely,  (a)  national  unity,  (b)  economic  and  business  advantages,  (c) 
employment opportunities, and (d) skill enhancement in the economic policies to ensure 
the country is politically and economically stable. 
 
5.2.2 Policy makers response to Question 2 
The  responses  from  14  policy  makers  on  the  second  “macro”  stickiness  interview 
question (Why does the government include the national agenda in economic policies 
which are supposed to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms?), that can be 
summarised  into  a  few  reasons,  namely,  national  interest,  political  stability,  national 
unity, multiracial context, protection of the economy, and maintaining harmony.  
 
The main reasons for the national agenda included in economic policies, according to 
policy  makers,  were  for  political  stability  (n=8),  national  unity  (n=8),  and  national 
interest (n=7). Table 5.2b lists  the reasons for national agenda  included  in  economic 
policies. 
              Table 5.2b 
              Reasons for National Agenda in Malaysian Economic Policies according to 14 Policy Makers  
Reasons for national agenda  Informants   Frequency 
Political stability  PM 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14  8 
National unity  PM 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 14  8 
National interest  PM 1, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13  7 
Multiracial context  PM 2, 3, 4, 6, 14  5 
Maintain harmony  PM 2, 3, 4, 5, 6  5 
Protecting economy  PM 6, 7  2 
           Note: Macro Stickiness, Interview Question 2: Why does the government include the national agenda in 
           economic policies which are supposed to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
           [The factors derived from the responses of the informants and verified by independent researchers] 
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Basically, the informants argued that the government incorporated the political stability, 
national unity, and national interest factors in the economic policies to ensure political 
stability in the country so that economic activities can be carried out peacefully. They 
said that the three factors political stability, national unity, and national interest were part 
of the national agenda; the national unity to maintain peace, foreign direct investment to 
accelerate  the  economic  growth,  the  political  and  economic  stability  to  provide 
comfortable standard of living to the people.  In fact, the informants reiterated that the 
incorporation of the national agenda into the economic policies was part of the promise 
made by the government to the people. This idea has been repeatedly emphasised by PM 
1: 
The government of today is elected by the people through a general election that 
is held every five years. Why [do] people continue to give us [a] mandate to run 
this  country?  Because  we  promised  to  maintain  national  unity  and  promote 
harmony among people from multi races.  
 
Policy makers also pointed out that there were criticisms regarding the inclusion of the 
national agenda in the economic policies which was considered a misguided decision in 
the economy. Policy makers were convinced that this aspect cannot be omitted in a multi 
racial country like Malaysia. PM 3 argued: 
The aim of national economic policies is basically to generate economic growth 
and to create wealth for the nation. In order to generate economic growth, this 
country needs political stability. This factor is very important in a multiracial 
country.
  
 
Policy makers argued that the government decision to keep the national agenda in the 
economic policies did not affect knowledge transfer between ICT firms. PM 10 supported 
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What has been promised in the election must be delivered. Otherwise, people 
will  question  the  government  and  will  change  their  mind  when  the  election 
comes. I don‟t think when the government kept the national agenda, our ICT 
firms became static and unable to exchange information between them because 
that business  is their „bread and butter.‟ They  should do their  business and 
should not be stranded with the government decisions.
  
 
Based  on  the  above  feedback,  policy  makers  postulated  that  they  viewed  three  main 
reasons,  namely  political  stability,  national  unity,  and  national  interest,  justified  the 
emphasis of the national agenda in the economic policies as pre-requisites to maintain 
stability in the country in order to secure economic and business advantages. 
5.2.3 Policy makers response to Question 3 
The responses from 14 policy makers on the third “macro” stickiness interview question 
(How do Malaysian technology parks assist knowledge transfer among ICT firms that 
operate  in  Malaysian  technology  parks?),  presented  six  ways  Malaysian  technology 
parks assist in knowledge transfer among ICT firms, namely, incentives, infrastructure, 
networking, stimulus, incubation, and knowledge.  
 
The most important roles for Malaysian technology parks are to provide incentives (n=8), 
infrastructure (n=6) and networking (n=5) for knowledge transfer. Table 5.2c summarises 
the responses of policy makers on the third interview question. 
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Table 5.2c 
The Roles of Malaysian Technology Parks assist Knowledge Transfer among ICT firms according 
 to 14 Policy Makers 
Roles of Malaysian Technology Parks  Informants   Frequency 
Incentives  PM 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12  8 
Infrastructure  PM 1, 3, 5, 11, 12, 14  6 
Networking  PM 3, 4, 7, 10, 12  5 
Stimulus  PM 4, 5  2 
Incubation  PM 7  1 
Knowledge  PM 7  1 
           Note: Macro Stickiness, Interview Question 3: How do Malaysian technology parks assist knowledge 
            transfer among ICT firms that operate in Malaysian technology parks? 
           [The factors derived from the responses of the informants and verified by independent researchers] 
 
Policy makers believed that there are three key roles in terms of incentives, infrastructure, 
and  networking  for  Malaysian  technology  parks  to  promote  knowledge  transfer.  The 
main reason the government established Malaysian technology parks was to attract ICT 
firms to venture into the Malaysian ICT industry, which is part of the policy to attract 
foreign  direct  investment.  Additionally,  the  informants  said  that  the  government 
established technology parks not only as infrastructure for the ICT industry, but also to 
provide financial and technical assistance. PM 13 said: 
We  encouraged  local  firms  to  be  part  of  the  ICT  industry  because  the 
government  believed  that  the  ICT  industry  can  offer  wider  and  better 
opportunity to make profit and to build ICT competency. This is in line with the 
K-economy concept propagated by the government. Our local firms have been 
with the ICT industry but they have not gone deeply such as how to develop 
softwares that are very close [relevant] to the local context. The government 
would like to see our local firms produce not only ICT hardware but also ICT 
software. Through this approach, they can make more profit and that means 
they can pay more tax to the government.  
 
Policy makers further said that the Malaysian technology parks are located close to some 
established firms, major ICT industrial players, universities, research institutions and so 
forth  in  order  to  convince  the  ICT  industry  that  Malaysia  is  the  right  investment 
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The government has decided to develop the country through the ICT industry. In 
fact, the government has emphasised this industry since the seventh Malaysia 
Plan. This ICT industry is not new to our country because we have been in the 
manufacturing sector for many years. What we are going to do is to upgrade our 
work  force  from  low  skill  to  high  skill.  We  can‟t  continue  with  low  end 
technology. Similarly, we want our local firms to venture into the ICT industry 
because this industry promises good profit.  
 
The feedback of the third interview question suggests that policy makers confirmed that 
the government established technology parks as a mean to develop the ICT industry in 
Malaysia.  Beyond  that,  the  government  has  limited  ability  to  assist  ICT  firms  to 
participate  in  knowledge  transfer.  The  informants  asserted  that  Malaysian  technology 
parks  could  only  offer  basic  facilities  to  enable  ICT  firms  to  penetrate  into  the  ICT 
industry. Hence, ICT firms have to work harder in order to exchange knowledge in the 
ICT industry. 
 
In a summary, policy makers included four main factors into economic policies: national 
unity,  economic  and  business  advantages,  employment  opportunities,  and  skill 
enhancement  (Interview  Question  1).  The  main  reasons  for  national  agenda  in  the 
economic  policies:  political  stability,  national  unity,  national  interest,  and  multiracial 
context  (Interview  Question  2).  The  main  roles  of  Malaysian  technology  parks  in 
promoting knowledge transfer among ICT firms: incentives, infrastructure, networking, 
and stimulus (Interview Question 3). Table 5.2d summarizes the key responses on the 
three interview questions on “macro” stickiness. 
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        Table 5.2d 
        The Responses of 14 Policy Makers on Three Interview Questions of “Macro” Stickiness  
Question 1  Question 2  Question 3 
National 
unity 
PM 1, 2, 5, 
6, 8, 12, 13, 
14 
Political 
stability 
PM 2, 3, 5, 7, 
8, 10, 12, 14 
Incentives  PM 1, 3, 4, 
5, 7, 10, 11, 
12 
Economic 
and business 
advantages 
PM 2, 3, 6, 
7, 10, 12, 14 
National 
unity 
PM 1, 2, 4, 5, 
6, 10, 12, 14 
Infrastructure  PM 1, 3, 5, 
11, 12, 14 
Employment 
opportunities 
PM 6, 7, 8, 
10, 11, 12, 
13 
National 
interest 
PM 1, 4, 7, 8, 
10, 11, 13 
Networking  PM 3, 4, 7, 
10, 12 
Skill 
enhancement 
PM 3, 4, 6, 
7, 9, 11 
Multiracial 
context 
PM 2, 3, 4, 6, 
14 
Stimulus  PM 4, 5 
       Notes: Macro Stickiness 
       Interview Question 1: What are the factors that have been considered by the government when formulating 
       economic policies to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
       Interview Question 2:  Why does the government include the national agenda in economic policies which are 
       supposed to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
       Interview Question 3: How do Malaysian technology parks assist knowledge transfer among ICT firms  
      that operate in Malaysian technology parks? 
       [The factors derived from the responses of the informants and verified by independent researchers] 
 
5.3 Feedback from government officers 
The  feedback  from  government  officers  are  presented  based  on  the  three  interview 
questions. Firstly, government officers were asked to explain the factors that have been 
considered  by  the  government  when  it  formulated  economic  policies  in  general  and 
specific policy for technology parks to encourage knowledge transfer between ICT firms. 
Secondly, the informants were asked to give the reasons for the incorporation of the 
factors mentioned in the first interview question and the national agenda in the economic 
policies  in  general  and  the  policy  for  technology  parks  in  specific  to  encourage 
knowledge transfer between ICT firms. Thirdly, the informants were asked to comment 
on the roles of Malaysian technology parks in assisting knowledge transfer between ICT 
firms located in Malaysian technology parks. 
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Table 5.3 summarizes the responses of 11 government officers on “macro” stickiness on 
the interview questions. 
Table 5.3 
Summary of Government Officers (GO) Responses to “Macro” Stickiness Interview Questions (in various 
sub themes) 
Code  Question 1 (What factors?)  Question 2 (Why national 
agenda?) 
Question 3 (How tech parks?) 
GO1  Employment, growth, unity  National aspiration  Incubation facilities, incentives, 
property development 
GO2  Employment, competency, 
stakeholders 
Stakeholders‟ interests  An element of K-economy – 
infrastructure and assistance 
GO3  National unity, 
employment, good 
economic growth 
Stakeholders‟ interests  Acceleration of township 
development, infrastructure for 
K-economy 
GO4  Prosperity, peaceful, 
harmony, stability, 
employment  
National interests, 
investment friendly 
Facilities, one-stop centre, 
potential networking 
GO5  Wealth creation and 
distribution, national unity 
Stakeholders interests  Widening up span of networking 
GO6  Employment, wealth 
creation, development 
Investment friendly, 
domestic stability 
Government initiated project – 
infrastructure, facilities 
GO7  Employment, unity, 
capability building 
Political stability leads to 
good environment for 
investment 
Science and technology 
development 
GO8  Good economic 
performance, maintain 
prosperity 
National interests, to 
preserve social structure and 
identity 
Incubation facilities to produce 
value added products; 
infrastructure and incentives 
GO9  Employment, peaceful, 
harmony, stability 
National interests, 
determined directions 
Infrastructure in ICT and 
Science Technology 
GO10  Economic advantages, 
efficiency, wealth creation 
Social culture, social 
expectations 
Clustering, zoning systems with 
specific target; competency 
building 
GO11  Economic growth, 
prosperity, competency 
building 
The uniqueness of 
multiracial with national 
inspired agenda 
Incentives and infrastructure 
Notes: Macro Stickiness 
Interview Question 1: What are the factors that have been considered by the government when formulating 
economic policies to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
Interview Question 2:  Why does the government include the national agenda in economic policies which are 
supposed to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
Interview Question 3: How do Malaysian technology parks assist knowledge transfer among ICT firms that operate 
in Malaysian technology parks? 
 [The factors derived from the responses of the informants and verified by independent researchers] 
 
5.3.1 Government officers response to Question 1 
Based on Table 5.3, the responses from 11 government officers on the first “macro” 
stickiness interview question (What are the factors that have been considered by the   134 
government when formulating economic policies to encourage knowledge transfer among 
ICT  firms?),  that  can  be  classified  into  a  few  factors,  namely  (1)  national  unity,  (2) 
economic and business advantages, (3) employment opportunities, (4) skill enhancement, 
(5)  political  stability,  (6)  foreign  investment  friendly,  (7)  economic  development,  (8) 
stakeholders interest, (9) poverty eradication, (10) infrastructure development, and (11) 
wealth  creation.  According  to  the  government  officers  (GO)  informants,  the  most 
important factors that the government considered when it formulated economic policies 
were (in descending order), (a) economic and business advantages (n=7), (b) employment 
opportunities (n=7), (c) national unity (n=6), and (d) wealth (n=6). Table 5.3a presents 
the factors considered for economic policies according to the government officers. 
              Table 5.3a 
              Factors Considered in the Malaysian Economic Policies by 11 Government Officers  
              Factors  Informants   Frequency 
Economic and business advantages  GO 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11  7 
Employment opportunities  GO 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9  7 
National unity  GO 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9  6 
Wealth creation  GO 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9  6 
Skill enhancement  GO 2, 7, 11  3 
Political stability  GO 4, 9  2 
Economic development  GO 6, 8  2 
Stakeholders interest  GO 2  1 
Foreign investment friendly  NIL  NIL 
Poverty eradication  NIL  NIL 
Infrastructure development  NIL  NIL 
             Note: Macro Stickiness, Interview Question 1: What are the factors that have been considered by the 
            government when formulating economic policies to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
 
The analysis also observes differences in terms of the most important factors included in 
economic policies  adopted by policy makers  and  government officers. Policy makers 
emphasized national unity, economic advantages, employment opportunities, and skill 
enhancement;  however,  government  officers  emphasized  economic  advantages, 
employment opportunities, national unity and wealth creation. Table 5.3b provides the   135 
comparison between responses of policy makers and government officers on the factors 
considered in the economic policies. 
Table 5.3b 
The  Most  Important  Factors  Considered  in  the  Malaysian  Economic  Policies:  A  Comparison  between 
Responses from 14 Policy Makers and 11 Government Officers 
Policy Makers  Government Officers 
Main Factors  Informants  Frequency  Main Factors  Informants  Frequency 
National unity  PM 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 
12, 13, 14 
8  Economic and 
business 
advantages 
GO 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 
10, 11 
7 
Economic and 
business 
advantages 
PM 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 
12, 14 
7  Employment 
opportunities 
GO 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 
7, 9 
7 
Employment 
opportunities 
PM 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 
12, 13 
7  National unity  GO 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9  6 
Skill 
enhancement 
PM 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11  6  Wealth creation  GO 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9  6 
Note: Macro Stickiness, Interview Question 1: What are the factors that have been considered by the government when 
formulating economic policies to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
 
Government officers (GO) argued that the government included three important factors 
when  formulating  economic  policies,  namely,  (a)  to  secure  economic  and  business 
advantages, (b) to provide employment opportunities, and (c) to ensure national unity, 
essential for good economic growth. Thus, the three factors are used as guidelines in the 
economic  planning  process.  This  situation  has  been  emphasized  by  the  government 
officers. For example, GO 1 stated: 
In [the] Malaysian economic planning process, the most important aspect is to 
ensure national unity [that is] people are employed and economic growth is in 
good shape. When the government decided to incorporate [a] new agenda, such 
as knowledge-based economy or biotechnology or ICT, it has to incorporate 
some ideas of the previous policies. Three things must be included – to restore 
national unity, to provide job, and to achieve good economic growth. 
 
The government officers also argued that the economic policy formulating process was 
not only confined to the government agencies but also included key stakeholders. With 
this approach, the informants said that the government can share the responsibility of   136 
policy  implementation.  In  addition,  they  asserted  that  the  government  would  not  be 
blamed  if  the  outcome  of  the  policies  were  not  beneficial  to  the  people  because  the 
policies were formulated through consultation with key stakeholders. GO 2 elaborated: 
We  believed  that  policy  making  must  follow  a  systematic  and  structured 
planning process. Everyone has his or her responsibility in making sure the 
[economic] plan is completed. Although it is structured, it still uses consultative 
approach  such  as  having  dialogue  with  private  companies,  government 
agencies, NGOs (non governmental organizations), and individuals. 
 
Nevertheless, informants acknowledged that individuals and institutions that were not 
included in the consultations criticised the use of the consultative approach in the policy 
making  process.  Additionally,  those  individuals  argued  that  the  government  used  the 
„critical‟ group as a tool to endorse the economic policies.  In response, GO 3 explained: 
We still have strong faith in the system such as the consultative approach in 
policy making process. If you point out such system has shortcomings, it is true. 
But this does not mean we have to abandon it. 
 
More  importantly,  government  officers  argued  that  the  economic  policies  were  not 
formulated by the government alone. The informants emphasised that the government 
used the consultation group to assist the government in formulating the economic policies 
that were practical. GO 4 said: 
The leadership of the country has practiced „people friendly‟ government so that 
people will share the responsibility of the government in ensuring prosperity, 
peace and harmony. The motto of the government is to serve the people and 
work together with the people.  
 
Government officers also believed that the national unity factor was the key to stabilize a 
country politically and economically. With regard to the implementation of the pro Malay   137 
agenda in the economic policies, government officials said that such an agenda was to 
encourage the participation of the Malays in the economy and, as a consequence, was 
intended to discriminate against non Malays. In response, GO 5 said: 
Many people blamed the New Economic Policy (NEP) was biased to the Malays 
when the government gave priority to the Malays when distributing the wealth of 
the  country.  That  was  not  true  because  the  aim  of  NEP  was  to  bring  back 
national unity when there was big income gap among three different races. It 
happened that the Malay people were very poor and jobless at that time and that 
has motivated the government to consider this issue in the economic policies at 
that time. In the meantime, non Malay people were not left out where they were 
also given the right to participate in the economy.  
 
The informants said that when the government applied the knowledge-based economy 
concept, it still emphasised the three factors to be included in the economic policies, 
namely  national  unity,  employment  opportunity,  and  good  economic  growth.  GO  6 
explained: 
When  the  government  formulated  the  knowledge-based  economy,  it  has 
considered human capital factor. Every individual in the society has a role to 
ensure the success of the knowledge-based economy.  
 
The informants also pointed out that the changes in the global economic orientation have 
motivated the government to align the direction of the economic policies with the current 
trend. However, the informants said that the government did not neglect the national 
agenda in the economic policies. GO 7 said: 
In the Seventh Malaysian Plan (1996-2000), the government took an initiative to 
have Malaysian knowledge-based economy. At that time, the government used 
the existing economic model in order to make it workable. We had our Free 
Trade Zones for our semiconductor industry. So, we used that model for the ICT 
industry which we did it with the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC). Then, in 
the  Eight  Malaysia  Plan  (2001-2005),  we  further  improved  the  MSC  to 
emphasise on clusters such as biotechnology and nanotechnology. In fact, some   138 
state governments follow this idea too. At this time, we are in the process of 
formulating the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-2010) and the government aims to 
be  market  leader  in  the  ICT  industry  and  other  related  industries  such  as 
biotechnology and nanotechnology. 
 
Based on the responses to the first interview, three important factors emerge, namely (a) 
to secure economic and business advantages, (b) to provide employment opportunities, 
and (c) to ensure national unity, when formulating the economic policies. 
 
5.3.2 Government officers response to Question 2 
The second interview question asked the government officers to provide the reasons for 
the incorporation of the three factors mentioned in the first interview question (to secure 
economic and business advantages, to provide employment opportunities, and to ensure 
national unity) in the economic policies in general and the policy for technology parks in 
specific to encourage knowledge transfer between ICT firms.  
 
In  the  analysis  of  the  responses  of  11  government  officers  on  the  second  “macro” 
stickiness interview question (Why does the government include the national agenda in 
economic  policies  which  are  supposed  to  encourage  knowledge  transfer  among  ICT 
firms?), these can be summarised into a few reasons, namely national interest, political 
stability, national unity, multiracial context, protection of the economy, and maintaining 
harmony.  
 
The most important reasons for the national agenda being included in economic policies, 
according to government officers, were for (a) national interest (n=11, all government   139 
officers  mentioned  this  reason),  (b)  political  stability  (n=7),  and  (c)  protecting  the 
economy  (n=4).  Table  5.3c  summarises  the  reasons  for  national  agenda  included  in 
economic policies. 
              Table 5.3c 
              Reasons for National Agenda in Malaysian Economic Policies according to  
             11 Government Officers 
Reasons for national agenda  Informants   Frequency 
National interest  GO 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11  11 
Political stability  GO 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11  7 
Protecting economy  GO 1, 4, 7, 9  4 
Multiracial context  GO 8, 10  2 
Maintain harmony  GO 8  1 
National unity  GO 11  1 
            Interview Question 2:  Why does the government include the national agenda in economic policies which are 
            supposed to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
 
These factors played an important role to attract foreign direct investment. GO 4 said: 
These factors cannot be excluded in the economic policies because there are the 
main foundations of Malaysian economy. With these factors, the government can 
maintain political stability that is very important to attract foreign investors to 
invest  in  Malaysia.  Malaysia  welcomes  foreign  investment  into  various 
productive sectors in the economy. 
 
Informants are convinced of the important role of foreign direct investment in the making 
of the Malaysian economy. However, they argued that the government had to make the 
country  a  more  attractive  destination  for  foreign  direct  investment.  Additionally,  the 
informants  also  said  that  the  government  employed  foreign  experts  to  assist  in 
formulating  economic  policies  that  can  develop  Malaysia  technologically  in  the  ICT 
industry. GO 7 explained: 
The employment of foreign consultants could easily convince foreign investors 
to patronise Malaysia as an investment destination. The main reason for the 
government  to  engage  some  foreign  consultants  was  because  they  have 
remarkable expertise in the ICT industry in which the local might not have one 
For instance, in Malaysia‟s Multimedia Super Corridor, the government formed   140 
an international advisory panel and sought influential ICT world leaders to sit 
in the panel.
   
 
According to the government officers, they received complaints from individuals and 
institutions that  were  disappointed over the government‟s decision  to employ  foreign 
experts  in  the  economic  policy  making  process.  However,  the  government  officers 
emphasised that the government employed foreign personnel as a mechanism to convince 
foreign investors. GO 7 commented: 
The local consultants may be expert in the ICT industry, but they may not able to 
respond quickly due to the nature of work and environment of the workplace. 
More  importantly,  the  government  needs  the  advice  quickly  to  grab  the 
opportunities in the ICT industry.
  
 
Furthermore, the informants claimed that the ICT industry has a very short life cycle 
compared to other industries. They argued that the government had to ensure the ICT 
industry is well placed in Malaysia because the world is expecting Malaysia to lead the 
ICT industry. GO 8 expressed the following view: 
The government appreciates the advice of the local experts, but it needs [a] 
second opinion from external consultants, especially those who are familiar with 
the  model  they  are  operating  on.  Our  local  researchers  might  have  some 
exposures  overseas,  but  that  is  not  enough  for  us  to  follow  a  foreign 
development model, like the Silicon Valley model. I myself feel comfortable if my 
research output is checked by the experts for a second opinion. I don‟t see any 
problem for the government to do that.   
 
The government officers also said that the government provided some incentives and 
facilities not only for foreign firms, but also for local firms to encourage them to play an 
active role in the ICT industry. They argued that such incentives have been extended to   141 
conventional  manufacturers  too,  even  though  they  might  not  able  to  participate  in 
knowledge transfer and innovation activities. GO 9 said: 
Due to encouragement from the government to engage in the ICT industry, some 
traditional manufacturers came to us to ask for ICT grants although some of 
them  are  still  using  old  machines.  Based  on  the  achievement  records,  we 
observed that they could not survive with the old techniques, which explain why 
they came to us to apply for ICT grants. These grants allow us to monitor their 
performance. 
 
While the ICT industry is relatively new to the Malaysian economy, informants argued 
that the ICT development was always hampered by the local culture. For instance, they 
observed  that  the  government  had  overemphasised  on  the  importance  of  “opening 
ceremony” events in many government projects instead of the viability of these projects. 
GO 10 said: 
Our  culture  is  more  of  ribbon  cutting  and  launching  of  anything  without 
conducting  any  thorough  study  on  them.  Some  research  projects  have  been 
launched several years, but there are yet to take off. When we approach the 
higher authority, they said the budget has depleted. Our leaders are not sincere 
in  doing  things.  At  this  institution,  our  bosses  sometimes  appointed 
inexperienced  people  to  lead  a  critical  project.  As  a  result,  those  who  are 
experienced in such project feel very disappointed and work half-heartedly. 
 
In addition, the informants also said that the government did not do a careful study to 
develop  the  country  technologically.  As  a  result,  this  has  brought  some  negative 
consequences when the country was not prepared with adequate technology and capacity. 
GO 11 said: 
I  have  been  invited  to  attend  a  meeting  to  draft  the  Industrial  Master  Plan 
(IMP). Before the meeting, a US consultant gave a presentation on how the IMP 
can be drafted based on a study that he conducted. My colleague and I felt 
something was inaccurate in his study. During tea break, we approached him 
and asked him whether the US government is willing to develop a particular   142 
technology indigenously that has strategic importance to the US government 
and its people although it is expensive and it is wiser to purchase it elsewhere. 
The consultant admitted that the US government is willing to do so for the sake 
of its strategic interest although it is very costly. We were shocked because he 
did not incorporate this into the IMP draft. When we asked for explanation, he 
was indifferent. We were very disappointed.  
 
The incident observed by the government officers can give a direct insight into the status 
of technology development. Notwithstanding such an incident, the overemphasis on the 
opening ceremony occurred not only at the federal government agencies, but also the 
agencies under each of the state governments in Malaysia. GO 11 criticised this: 
Almost  in  every  monthly  assembly  for  all  government  agencies  at  the  state 
secretary‟s office, we heard nothing new except the repetition of what the Prime 
Minister  has  said  in  the  media.  When  the  PM  talked  about  the  ICT  and 
biotechnology, the state secretary also talked about the same thing. We expect 
him to highlight the implementation agenda by the state government and what 
should the role be for each [of the] state government agencies and some federal 
agencies located there. There is no specific road map how the state government 
and its agencies can assist the government to achieve the federal government‟s 
ambition.  For  instance,  in  what  way  my  organization  can  assist  the  ICT 
industry? There is no specific road map for this. As researcher, I have no choice 
but to search from the Internet. This has become my road map for my research, 
which contributes indirectly to the ICT industry. 
 
The informants argued that such a situation can thwart the initiative of the government to 
develop  human  capital  and  capacity  building  in  the  ICT  industry  and  other  high 
technology areas. GO 3 argued: 
The government is very concerned about human capital development for any 
industry. There have been frequent dialogues with employers to find the best 
solutions to develop Malaysia‟s best brain needed by modern industry such as 
ICT  or  biotechnology.  The  results  from  the  dialogues  are  presented  to  the 
federal committee on economic affairs to be incorporated in national policy. 
This method is very consultative to formulate a policy suitable for every one.  
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Based  on  the  results  of  second  interview,  clearly  the  informants  argued  that  the 
government incorporated the national agenda (a) to protect national interest,  (b) to ensure 
political stability, and (c) to protect the economy. 
 
In comparison, the responses from government officers on the top reasons for the national 
agenda being included in Malaysian economic policies were different from the policy 
makers. While policy makers emphasised political stability, national unity, and national 
interest  as  the  top  reasons,  government  officers  mentioned  national  interest,  political 
stability and protecting economy. Table 5.3d condenses the comparison of the responses 
of 14 policy makers and 11 government officers. 
Table 5.3d 
The  Most  Important  Reasons  for  National  Agenda  in  Malaysian  Economic  Policies:  A  Comparison 
between Responses from 14 Policy Makers and 11 Government Officers 
Policy Makers  Government Officers 
Main Reasons  Informants  Frequency  Main Factors  Informants  Frequency 
Political 
stability 
PM 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 
10, 12, 14 
8  National interest  GO 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 
11 
National unity  PM 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 
10, 12, 14 
8  Political stability  GO 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 
10, 11 
7 
National 
interest 
PM 1, 4, 7, 8, 10, 
11, 13 
7  Protecting 
economy 
GO 1, 4, 7, 9  4 
Multiracial 
context 
PM 2, 3, 4, 6, 14  5  Multiracial 
context 
GO 8, 10  2 
Maintain 
harmony 
PM 2, 3, 4, 5, 6  5  Maintain 
harmony 
GO 8  1 
Protecting 
economy 
PM 6, 7  2  National unity  GO 11  1 
Note: Macro Stickiness. Interview Question 2:  Why does the government include the national agenda in economic 
policies which are supposed to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
 
5.3.3 Government officers response to Question 3 
In the third interview question, government officers were asked to explain the roles of 
Malaysian technology parks in assisting knowledge transfer between ICT firms located in 
Malaysian technology parks. The responses from 14 government officers on the third   144 
“macro”  stickiness  interview  question  (How  do  Malaysian  technology  parks  assist 
knowledge  transfer  among  ICT  firms  that  operate  in  Malaysian  technology  parks?) 
indicated  nine  roles  of  Malaysian  technology  parks  in  assisting  knowledge  transfer 
among ICT firms, namely, incentives, infrastructure, networking, stimulus, incubation, 
knowledge, real estate, image, and subsidy. An additional three roles were mentioned by 
the government officers, which were not mentioned by the policy makers. 
 
The  most  important  roles  for  Malaysian  technology  parks  according  to  government 
officers are to provide infrastructure (n=9), incentives (n=7), real estate (n=7), incubation 
(n=6),  image  (n=6),  and  networking  (n=5).  Table  5.3e  sums  up  the  responses  of  11 
government officers on the third interview question. 
Table 5.3e 
The Roles of Malaysian Technology Parks assist Knowledge Transfer among ICT firms according 
to 11 Government Officers 
Roles of Malaysian Technology Parks  Informants   Frequency 
Infrastructure  GO 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11  9 
Incentives  GO 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9  7 
Real estate  GO 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10  7 
Incubation  GO 1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10  6 
Image  GO 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10  6 
Networking  GO 4, 5, 8, 9, 10  5 
Knowledge  GO 2, 3, 7, 9  4 
Stimulus  GO 2, 3, 4  3 
Subsidy  GO 8, 9  2 
            Note: Macro Stickiness. Interview Question 3: How do Malaysian technology parks assist knowledge transfer 
            among ICT firms that operate in Malaysian technology parks? 
 
 
Informants argued the government established Malaysian technology parks to provide 
basic infrastructure for the development of the ICT industry. GO 3 said: 
Infrastructure is very important to spark regional economic growth. At the same 
time,  every  economic  activity  needs  to  be  in  line  with  the  knowledge-based 
economy  agenda  in  which  knowledge  has  crucial  role  in  the  economy.  The 
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Tech  areas  are  new  „township‟  areas;  therefore,  they  need  superb 
infrastructure. In terms of regional development project, they create massive 
entrepreneurial opportunities. 
 
The  informants  argued  the  ICT  industry  has  good  potential  to  develop  the  country 
technologically and also to increase economic growth. GO 11 emphasised: 
When  Malaysia  aims  to  use  the  ICT  and  other  technology  to  elevate  its 
competitiveness globally, we already had the basic capacity to respond to that. 
Our economic development model is very flexible to subscribe to any industry 
because of our past industrialization experience. Some Third World countries 
are now coming to learn from us the way we develop our country in line with 
advanced countries despite the fact our ICT industry still at infant stage. 
 
Government officers claimed that the government combined the Silicon Valley model 
and the Malaysian Free Trade Zones for their technology parks. GO 11 said: 
Malaysia has long experience in the manufacturing industrialisation for many 
years. The idea mooted by the government to build Malaysian economy with the 
ICT industry is timely. Many advanced countries already moved fast forward 
with the ICT and high technology.
  
 
The informants also argued that the government „copied‟ some features of the Silicon 
Valley model and then „integrated‟ them with concepts such as the Malaysian Free Trade 
Zone  model  and  the  OECD‟s  knowledge-based  economy  to  generate  a  case  for  new 
economic  growth  in  the  ICT  industry.  Additionally,  some  informants  said  that  the 
government had to play an active role to develop the country technologically due to the 
slow response from the private sector.  GO 6 said: 
Some  quarters  argue  why  the  government  took  the  initiative  to  develop 
Malaysian economy with the ICT industry? We have to relate this to Malaysian 
history. It has been a „tradition‟ for the private sector to wait for the government 
to start any shift in the economy. The knowledge-based economy also needs the 
government to start.
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Based on the views obtained toward the third interview question, the government officers 
argued that the government was interested in developing the ICT industry in Malaysia. In 
order  to  encourage  active  participation  from  the  private  sector  in  the  country,  the 
government  had  established  Malaysian  technology  parks.  Comparatively,  14  policy 
makers and 11 government officers had different attitudes about the roles of Malaysian 
technology parks. In terms of the most important roles, nine (9) government officers 
mentioned  technology  parks  as  infrastructure  provision.  However,  eight  (8)  policy 
makers viewed incentives as the top role of Malaysian technology parks.  Table 5.3f 
provides the comparison between the two groups of informants‟ responses. 
 
Table 5.3f 
The Most Important Roles of Malaysian Technology Parks in Knowledge Transfer among ICT firms: A 
Comparison between Responses from 14 Policy Makers and 11 Government Officers 
Policy Makers  Government Officers 
Main Reasons  Informants  Frequency  Main Factors  Informants  Frequency 
Incentives  PM 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 
11, 12 
8  Infrastructure  GO 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10, 11 
9 
Infrastructure  PM 1, 3, 5, 11, 12, 14  6  Incentives  GO 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 
8, 9 
7 
Networking  PM 3, 4, 7, 10, 12  5  Real estate  GO 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 
9, 10 
7 
Stimulus  PM 4, 5  2  Incubation  GO 1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 
10 
6 
Incubation  PM 7  1  Image  GO 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 
10 
6 
Knowledge  PM 7  1  Networking  GO 4, 5, 8, 9, 10  5 
      Knowledge  GO 2, 3, 7, 9  4 
      Stimulus  GO 2, 3, 4  3 
      Subsidy  GO 8, 9  2 
Note: Macro Stickiness. Interview Question 3: How do Malaysian technology parks assist knowledge transfer among 
ICT firms that operate in Malaysian technology parks? 
 
 
The following discussion abridges all the answers given by government officers on the 
three  interview  questions.  The  feedback  for  interview  question  1  highlights  four 
important  factors  for  economic  policies:  national  unity,  economic  and  business 
advantages, employment opportunities, and skill enhancement. For interview question 2,   147 
there  are  four  reasons  for  the  inclusion  of  national  agenda  into  economic  policies: 
political stability, national unity, national interest and multiracial context. The feedback 
for the third interview question provides four roles for Malaysian technology parks to 
facilitate  knowledge  transfer  among ICT firms:  incentives, infrastructure,  networking, 
and stimulus. Table 5.3g presents the feedback from government officers based on three 
interview questions of “macro” stickiness. 
 
        Table 5.3g 
        The Key Responses of 11 Government Officers on Three Interview Questions of “Macro” Stickiness  
Question 1  Question 2  Question 3 
Economic 
and business 
advantages 
GO 1, 3, 4, 
5, 8, 10, 11 
National 
interest 
GO 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10, 11 
Infrastructure  GO 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10, 11 
Employment 
opportunities 
GO 1, 2, 3, 
4, 6, 7, 9 
Political 
stability 
GO 2, 3, 5, 6, 
7, 10, 11 
Incentives  GO 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 
8, 9 
National 
unity 
GO 1, 3, 4, 
5, 7, 9 
Protecting 
economy 
GO 1, 4, 7, 9  Real estate  GO 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 
9, 10 
Wealth 
creation 
GO 1, 3, 4, 
5, 7, 9 
Multiracial 
context 
GO 8, 10  Incubation  GO 1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 
10 
       Notes:  Macro Stickiness. 
       Interview Question 1: What are the factors that have been considered by the government when formulating 
       economic policies to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
       Interview Question 2:  Why does the government include the national agenda in economic policies which are 
       supposed to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
       Interview Question 3: How do Malaysian technology parks assist knowledge transfer among ICT firms that 
      operate in Malaysian technology parks? 
 
 
5.4 Feedback from firms‟ representatives 
The  feedback  from  firms‟  representatives  is  presented  based  on  the  three  interview 
questions. Firstly, firms‟ representatives were asked to explain the factors that have been 
or should be considered by the government when it formulated economic  policies in 
general  and  specific  policy  for  technology  parks  to  encourage  knowledge  transfer 
between  ICT  firms.  Secondly,  the  informants  were  asked  to  give  the  reasons  the 
government inserted the factors mentioned in the first interview question and the national 
agenda in the economic policies in general and the policy for technology parks in specific   148 
to encourage knowledge transfer between ICT firms. Thirdly, the informants were asked 
to comment on the roles of Malaysian technology parks in assisting knowledge transfer 
between ICT firms located in Malaysian technology parks. 
 
This section provides the analysis of responses from firms representatives on “macro” 
stickiness.  There  were  25  representatives  from  ICT  firms‟  who  participated  in  the 
personal interview. Table 5.4 summarises all the responses from firms‟ representatives. 
Table 5.4 
Summary of Firms Representatives (FR) Responses to “Macro” Stickiness Interview Questions (in various 
sub themes) 
Code  Question 1 (What factors?)  Question 2 (Why national 
agenda?) 
Question 3 (How tech parks?) 
FR1  Good economic prospects, 
opportunities 
Political agenda  Business park with subsidized 
rental 
FR2  Growth, jobs, more business 
opportunities 
National interest, very 
political 
Real estate agent 
FR3  More jobs, more business, 
more profit 
Multiracial agenda, 
multiracial interest 
Networking, access to one stop 
centre 
FR4  Jobs, businesses  No idea  One stop centre meeting 
FR5  Prospects, jobs, business  Political interests  Good rental rate, secured 
building 
FR6  Prospects, new 
opportunities, social-
economic concerns 
National politics  Business networking 
FR7  More wealth, more 
opportunities 
Pledge to voters (politically 
driven) 
Meeting point for technology 
investors 
FR8  Economic wellness, people 
in good shape (united), 
harmony 
Working guideline based on 
social nature 
Subsidized facilities with good 
image 
FR9  Economic advantage, 
people wellness, stability 
National agenda is 
irrelevant in business 
Physical infrastructure only 
FR10  Jobs, business, growth, 
wealth 
Protection of national 
interests 
Subsidized facilities 
FR11  More money, growth, 
employment security 
Nationalism, political 
interests 
Incubation 
FR12  People welfare, economic 
competitiveness 
Compass/guideline in 
competing 
Networking, collaboration 
FR13  People, economy, job, 
wealth 
Political will, mileage, 
national interest 
Facilities, networking 
FR14  Give people jobs, ensure 
good growth 
Political things, no idea  Sharing facilities 
FR15  Economic development, 
prosperity, social welfare 
National interest  Infrastructure for K-economy 
FR16  Job, good economy  Security of the country and 
the people 
Infrastructure  
FR17  More opportunities, more  Politics  Discounted rental for good   149 
welfare, more security  facilities 
FR18  Work, money, growth, 
security 
National interest  facilities 
FR19  Resources, people ability, 
business opportunities, 
people welfare 
Nation building, social 
expectations 
facilities 
FR20  Job security, wealth creation  National interests  Networking, collaboration 
FR21  Job, business, more 
opportunities 
Nation building, social 
interest 
Facilities, networking 
FR22  Wealth creation, job 
security, skill enhancement 
Building the nation  Facilities 
FR23  More jobs available, good 
economic growth 
No idea  Infrastructure 
FR24  Political and economic 
stability 
Political things  Good rental 
FR25  Security  National interests, political  K-economy infrastructure for 
more collaborations 
Notes:  Macro Stickiness. 
Interview Question 1: What are the factors that have been considered by the government when formulating 
economic policies to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
Interview Question 2:  Why does the government include the national agenda in economic policies which are 
supposed to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
Interview Question 3: How do Malaysian technology parks assist knowledge transfer among ICT firms that 
operate in Malaysian technology parks? 
 
5.4.1 Firms‟ representatives response to Question 1 
The first interview question asked the firms‟ representatives to explain the factors that 
have been considered by the government when it formulated economic policies in general 
and specific policy for technology parks to encourage knowledge transfer between ICT 
firms.  Based  on  Table  5.4,  25  firms‟  representatives  (FR)  responses  to  the  “macro” 
stickiness interview question (What are the factors that have been considered by the 
government when formulating economic policies to encourage knowledge transfer among 
ICT firms?), can be classified into a few factors, namely (1) national unity, (2) economic 
and  business  advantages,  (3)  employment  opportunities,  (4)  skill  enhancement,  (5) 
political  stability,  (6)  foreign  investment  friendly,  (7)  economic  development,  (8) 
stakeholders interest, (9) poverty eradication, (10) infrastructure development, and (11) 
wealth creation.    150 
 
According to the firms‟ representatives (FR) informants, the most important factors that 
the government considered when it formulated economic policies were (in descending 
order),  (a)  economic  and  business  advantages  (n=23),  (b)  employment  opportunities 
(n=17), (c) wealth creation (n=16), and  (d) economic development (n=7). Table 5.4a 
presents  the  factors  considered  for  economic  policies  according  to  the  firms‟ 
representatives. 
              Table 5.4a 
              Factors Considered in the Malaysian Economic Policies by 25 Firms‟ Representatives (FR) 
            Factors  Informants   Frequency 
Economic and business advantages  FR 1-21, 23, 25  23 
Employment opportunities  FR 1-5, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16-23  17 
Wealth creation  FR 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 13, 18-25  16 
Economic development  FR 2, 5, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17  7 
Political stability  FR 1, 9, 11, 17, 24, 25  6 
National unity  FR 8, 9, 12, 13, 17  5 
Stakeholders interest  FR 6, 8, 12, 15, 19  5 
Skill enhancement  FR 19, 22  2 
Poverty eradication  FR 17  1 
Infrastructure development  FR 17  1 
Foreign investment friendly  NIL  0 
            Note: Macro Stickiness, Interview Question 1: What are the factors that have been considered by the 
            government when formulating economic policies to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
 
In comparison, the analysis also observed  differences in terms of the most important 
factors included in economic policies by policy makers, government officers and firms‟ 
representatives.  Policy  makers  emphasized  national  unity,  economic  advantages, 
employment  opportunities,  and  skill  enhancement;  however,  government  officers 
emphasized economic advantages, employment opportunities, national unity and wealth 
creation. When it comes to firms, they were inclined to give top priority in economic 
policies  on  (a)  securing  economic  advantages,  (b)  to  provide  more  employment   151 
opportunities, (c) opportunities to create more wealth, and (d) to sustain the national 
economic development. 
 
Table 5.4b provides the comparison between responses of policy makers, government 
officers, and firms‟ representatives on the factors considered in the economic policies. All 
three  types  of  informants  have  agreed  on  two  common  factors  considered  in  the 
economic policies, namely, (1) the ability to give economic and business advantages and 
(2) to provide employment opportunities.  
 
In situations when two parties agreed on certain factors, these were (a) policy makers and 
government  officers  on  understanding  in  preserving  national  unity  in  the  economic 
policies and (b) common views of government officers and firms‟ representatives on 
wealth creation. 
Table 5.4b 
The  Most  Important  Factors  Considered  in  the  Malaysian  Economic  Policies:  A  Comparison  between 
Responses from Policy Makers, Government Officers and Firms‟ Representatives 
Policy Makers (n=14)  Government Officers (n=11)  Firms‟ Representatives (n=25) 
Main Factors  Frequency  Main Factors  Frequency  Main Factors  Frequency 
National unity  8 
(PM 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 
12, 13, 14) 
Economic and 
business 
advantages 
7  
(GO 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 
10, 11) 
Economic and 
business 
advantages 
23 
(FR 1-21, 23, 25) 
 
Economic and 
business 
advantages 
7  
(PM 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 
12, 14) 
Employment 
opportunities 
7  
(GO 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 
9) 
Employment 
opportunities 
17  
(FR 1-5, 10, 11, 13, 
14, 16-23) 
 
Employment 
opportunities 
7  
(PM 6, 7, 8, 10, 
11, 12, 13) 
National unity  6  
(GO 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9) 
Wealth 
creation 
16  
(FR 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 10, 
11, 13, 18-25) 
 
Skill 
enhancement 
6  
(PM 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 
11) 
Wealth 
creation 
6  
(GO 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9) 
Economic 
development 
7 (FR 2, 5, 10, 11, 
14, 15, 17) 
 
Note: Macro Stickiness, Interview Question 1: What are the factors that have been considered by the government when 
formulating economic policies to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
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5.4.2 Firms‟ representatives response to Question 2 
The second interview question asked the firms‟ representatives to provide the reasons for 
the incorporation of the three factors mentioned in the first interview question (economic 
and  business  advantages,  employment  opportunities,  and  wealth  creation)  in  the 
economic policies in general 
 
 
In the second interview question, 25 firms‟ representatives were asked “Why does the 
government include the national agenda in economic policies which are supposed to 
encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? They said that the national agenda was 
included due to national interest, political stability, national unity, multiracial context, 
protection  of  the  economy,  and  maintaining  harmony.  However,  the  most  important 
reasons were to protect national interest (n=17), to maintain political stability (n=16), to 
ensure good relationships in the multiracial context (n=6) and to maintain national unity 
(n=4). Table 5.4c summarizes the reasons for national agenda in the economic policies 
according to 25 firms‟ representatives. 
              Table 5.4c 
              Reasons for National Agenda in Malaysian Economic Policies according to  
             25 Firms‟ Representatives 
Reasons for national agenda  Informants   Frequency 
National interest  FR 2, 6-13, 15-16, 18-22, 25  17 
Political stability  FR 1, 5-17, 24-25  16 
Multiracial context  FR 3, 8, 13, 16, 19, 21  6 
National unity  FR 8, 9, 10, 13  4 
Maintain harmony  FR 3, 7, 16  3 
Protecting economy  FR 3, 12  2 
         Notes: Interview Question 2:  Why does the government include the national agenda in economic policies 
           which are supposed to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
 
In  comparison,  the  ICT  firm  representatives  top  reasons  for  the  national  agenda‟s 
inclusion  in  Malaysian  economic  policies  were  different.  While  14  policy  makers   153 
emphasised political stability, national unity, and national interest as the top reasons, 11 
government  officers  mentioned  national  interest,  political  stability  and  protecting  the 
economy; coincidently, the views of 25 firms‟ representatives are very similar to the 
views of 11 government officers, in terms of national interest and political stability. Table 
5.4d provides the details. 
Table 5.4d 
The  Most  Important  Reasons  for  National  Agenda  in  Malaysian  Economic  Policies:  A  Comparison 
between Responses from 14 Policy Makers, 11 Government Officers and 25 Firms‟ Representatives 
Policy Makers  Government Officers  Firms‟ Representatives 
Main 
Reasons 
Frequency  Main 
Factors 
Frequency  Main 
Factors 
Frequency 
Political 
stability 
8 
(PM 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 
12, 14) 
National 
interest 
11 
(GO 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10, 11) 
National 
interest 
17 
(FR 2, 6-13, 15-16, 
18-22, 25) 
National 
unity 
8 
(PM 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 
12, 14) 
Political 
stability 
7 
(GO 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 
11) 
Political 
stability 
16 
(FR 1, 5-17, 24-25) 
National 
interest 
7 
(PM 1, 4, 7, 8, 10, 
11, 13) 
Protecting 
economy 
4 
(GO 1, 4, 7, 9) 
Multiracial 
context 
6 
(FR 3, 8, 13, 16, 19, 
21) 
Multiracial 
context 
5 
(PM 2, 3, 4, 6, 14) 
Multiracial 
context 
2 
(GO 8, 10) 
National 
unity 
4 
(FR 8, 9, 10, 13) 
Maintain 
harmony 
5 
(PM 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) 
Maintain 
harmony 
1 
(GO 8) 
Maintain 
harmony 
3 
(FR 3, 7, 16) 
Protecting 
economy 
2 
(PM 6, 7) 
National 
unity 
1 
(GO 11) 
Protecting 
economy 
2 
(FR 3, 12) 
Notes: Macro Stickiness.  
Interview Question 2:  Why does the government include the national agenda in economic policies 
which are supposed to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
5.4.3 Firms‟ representatives response to Question 3 
In the third interview question, firms‟ representatives were asked to explain the roles of 
Malaysian technology parks in assisting knowledge transfer between ICT firms located in 
Malaysian technology parks.  
 
The responses from 25 firms‟ representatives on the third “macro” stickiness interview 
question  (How  do  Malaysian  technology  parks  assist  knowledge  transfer  among  ICT 
firms that operate in Malaysian technology parks?), mentioned nine roles of Malaysian 
technology parks in assisting knowledge transfer among ICT firms, namely, incentives,   154 
infrastructure,  networking,  stimulus,  incubation,  knowledge,  real  estate,  image,  and 
subsidy. Additional three roles were mentioned by the government officers, which were 
not mentioned by the policy makers. 
 
The  most  important  roles  for  Malaysian  technology  parks  according  to  25  firms‟ 
representatives  are  to  provide  infrastructure  (n=17),  networking  (n=12),  incentives 
(n=10), image (n=8), and subsidy (n=8). Table 5.4e summarises the responses of firms‟ 
representatives on the third interview question. 
Table 5.4e 
The  Roles  of  Malaysian  Technology  Parks  assisting  Knowledge  Transfer  among  ICT  firms 
  according to 25 firms‟ representatives 
Roles of Malaysian Technology Parks  Informants   Frequency 
Infrastructure  FR 1-3,6,8,13-18,19,21-23,25  17 
Networking  FR 3-5, 7-8, 12-15, 20-21, 25  12 
Incentives  FR 1-3, 6, 8, 13-16, 18, 23  10 
Image  FR 2, 6-8, 17, 24, 25  8 
Subsidy  FR 2, 6, 8-10, 13, 17, 24  8 
Real estate  FR 1, 2, 4, 13, 17, 25  6 
Stimulus  FR 6, 7, 15, 20, 25  5 
Incubation  FR 3, 7, 11  3 
Knowledge  FR 6, 15, 25  3 
            Note: Macro Stickiness, Interview Question No. 3: How do Malaysian technology parks assist knowledge 
             transfer among ICT firms that operate in Malaysian technology parks? 
 
 
All informants – 14 policy makers, 11 government officers, and 25 firms‟ representatives, 
reached  a  common  opinion  that  there  are  two  most  important  roles  of  Malaysian 
technology  parks,  namely  incentives  and  infrastructure.  Table  5.4f  provides  the 
comparison between the three groups of informants‟ responses. 
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Table 5.4f 
The Key Roles of Malaysian Technology Parks in Knowledge Transfer among ICT firms: A Comparison 
between Responses from 14 Policy Makers, 11 Government Officers and 25 Firms‟ Representatives 
Policy Makers  Government Officers  Firms‟ Representatives 
Roles  Frequency  Roles  Frequency  Roles  Frequency 
Incentives  8 
(PM 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 
11, 12) 
Infrastructure  9 
(GO 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 
9, 10, 11) 
Infrastructure  17 
(FR 1-3,6,8,13-
18,19,21-23,25) 
Infrastructure  6 
(PM 1, 3, 5, 11, 12, 
14) 
Incentives  7 
(GO 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 
9) 
Networking  12 
(FR 3-5, 7-8, 12-15, 
20-21, 25) 
Networking  5 
(PM 3, 4, 7, 10, 12) 
Real estate  7 
(GO 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 
10) 
Incentives  10 
(FR 1-3, 6, 8, 13-16, 
18, 23) 
Stimulus  2 
(PM 4, 5) 
Incubation  6 
(GO 1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10) 
Image  8 
(FR 2, 6-8, 17, 24, 25) 
Incubation  1 
(PM 7) 
Image  6 
(GO 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10) 
Subsidy  8 
(FR 2, 6, 8-10, 13, 17, 
24) 
Knowledge  1 
(PM 7) 
Networking  5 
(GO 4, 5, 8, 9, 10) 
Real estate  6 
(FR 1, 2, 4, 13, 17, 25) 
Note: Macro Stickiness, Interview Question No. 3: How do Malaysian technology parks assist knowledge transfer 
among ICT firms that operate in Malaysian technology parks? 
 
 
The following discussion summarises key answers given by 25 firms‟ representatives on 
the three interview questions. For the first interview question, 25 firms‟ representatives 
provided key factors that should be considered in economic policies: (a) economic and 
business  advantages,  (b)  employment  opportunities,  (c)  wealth  creation,  and  (d) 
economic development. In the second interview question, the ICT firms‟ representatives 
concluded  that  key  reasons  for  the  government  to  include  national  agenda  in  the 
economic policies are (a) national interest, (b) political stability, (c) multiracial context, 
and (d) national unity. Finally, in the third interview question, 25 firms‟ representatives 
summed  up  four  main  roles  for  Malaysian  technology  parks  to  support  knowledge 
transfer  among  ICT  firms.  The  summary  of  all  the  key  answers  for  three  interview 
questions by firms representatives are presented in Table 5.4g. 
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        Table 5.4g 
        The Key Responses of 25 Firms Representatives on Three Interview Questions of “Macro” Stickiness  
Question 1  Question 2  Question 3 
Economic 
and business 
advantages 
FR 1-21, 23, 25  National 
interest 
FR 2, 6-13, 
15-16, 18-
22, 25 
Infrastructure  FR 1-3,6,8,13-
18,19,21-23,25 
Employment 
opportunities 
FR 1-5, 10, 11, 
13, 14, 16-23 
Political 
stability 
FR 1, 5-17, 
24-25 
Networking  FR 3-5, 7-8, 12-15, 
20-21, 25 
Wealth 
creation 
FR 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 
10, 11, 13, 18-25 
Multiracial 
context 
FR 3, 8, 13, 
16, 19, 21 
Incentives  FR 1-3, 6, 8, 13-16, 
18, 23 
Economic 
development 
FR 2, 5, 10, 11, 
14, 15, 17 
National 
unity 
FR 8, 9, 10, 
13 
Image  FR 2, 6-8, 17, 24, 
25 
       Notes: Macro Stickiness. 
       Interview Question 1: What are the factors that have been considered by the government when formulating 
       economic policies to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
       Interview Question 2:  Why does the government include the national agenda in economic policies which are 
       supposed to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
       Interview Question 3: How do Malaysian technology parks assist knowledge transfer among ICT firms that 
       operate in Malaysian technology parks? 
 
5.5 Summary of Findings 
This  part  summarizes  the  key  ideas  stated  by  all  the  informants  on  three  interview 
questions for “macro” stickiness in knowledge transfer among ICT firms in Malaysia. 
Table 5.5 presents the key results.  
 
Table 5.5 
Summary of Key Findings 
Informants  Question 1  Question 2  Question 3 
14 policy makers  1. National unity  
2. Economic and 
business advantages  
3. Employment 
opportunities  
4. Skill enhancement 
1. Political stability 
2. National unity 
3. National interest 
4. Multiracial context 
5. Maintain harmony 
6. Protecting economy 
1. Incentives 
2. Infrastructure 
3. Networking 
4. Stimulus 
5. Incubation 
6. Knowledge 
11 government 
officers 
1. Economic and 
business advantages 
2. Employment 
opportunities  
3. National unity  
4. Wealth creation 
1. National interest 
2. Political stability 
3. Protecting economy 
4. Multiracial context 
5. Maintain harmony 
6. National unity 
1. Infrastructure 
2. Incentives 
3. Real estate 
4. Incubation 
5. Image 
6. Networking 
7. Knowledge 
8. Stimulus 
25 ICT firms‟ 
representatives 
1. Economic and 
business advantages 
2. Employment 
opportunities 
3. Wealth creation 
1. National interest 
2. Political stability 
3. Multiracial context 
4. National unity  
5. Maintain harmony 
1. Infrastructure 
2. Networking 
3. Incentives 
4. Image 
5. Subsidy   157 
 4. Economic 
development 
6. Protecting economy  6. Real estate 
7. Stimulus 
8. Incubation 
9. Knowledge 
       Notes: Macro Stickiness 
       Interview Question 1: What are the factors that have been considered by the government when formulating 
       economic policies to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
       Interview Question 2:  Why does the government include the national agenda in economic policies which are 
       supposed to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
       Interview Question 3: How do Malaysian technology parks assist knowledge transfer among ICT firms that operate 
        in Malaysian technology parks? 
 
 
A  cross  analysis  on  the  key  findings  on  Table  5.5a,  is  that  “macro”  stickiness  in 
knowledge transfer is due to the government emphasis on making the country attractive. 
However, knowledge transfer is difficult when economic policies emphasize   
a.  economic and business advantages  
b.  employment opportunities 
c.  national unity  
d.  wealth creation 
 
In the meantime, the inclusion of national agenda is unavoidable to  
a.  protect the economy 
b.  to maintain unity and harmony in multiracial context, and 
c.  to safeguard the national interest 
 
Informants  argued  that  the  main  roles  of  Malaysian  technology  parks  can  encourage 
knowledge transfer among ICT firms when they can provide: 
a.  stimulus 
b.  networking 
c.  knowledge   158 
d.  incubation 
e.  incentives 
f.  image 
Table 5.5a 
Research Question, Propositions and Key Findings for  “Macro” Stickiness on Knowledge Transfer among 
ICT firms  
Research 
Question 
Proposition  Interview 
Questions 
Answers  Key points 
Why 
knowledge 
is difficult to 
transfer? 
The government 
contributed to 
“macro” level 
stickiness 
through 
economic 
policies that 
constrained firms 
by requiring that 
their decisions 
reflect the 
national agenda 
put forward by 
those in 
government. 
 
From the 
literature: 
Sweeney (1996) 
and Mokyr 
(2002) argue that 
economic growth 
requires 
promotion of 
learning and turn 
application into 
economic 
advantages  
 
National agenda 
is important to 
stabilize the 
country 
politically and 
economically, 
and offer various 
means to pursue 
opportunities for 
the industry 
 
 
 
Technology 
parks are mainly 
1. What are the 
factors that have 
been considered 
by the 
government when 
formulating 
economic policies 
to encourage 
knowledge 
transfer among 
ICT firms?  
 
 
14 Policy makers 
1. National unity  
2. Economic and business 
advantages  
3. Employment 
opportunities  
4. Skill enhancement 
 
11 Government 
Officers 
1. Economic and business 
advantages 
2. Employment 
opportunities  
3. National unity  
4. Wealth creation 
 
25 Firms 
Representatives 
1. Economic and business 
advantages 
2. Employment 
opportunities 
3. Wealth creation 
 4. Economic 
development 
Government to 
influence learning  
Progress Economic 
Development 
 
However, knowledge 
transfer is difficult 
when economic policies 
emphasized   
(a) economic and 
business advantages  
(b) employment 
opportunities 
(c) national unity  
(d) wealth creation 
 
2. Why does the 
government 
include the 
national agenda 
in economic 
policies which are 
supposed to 
encourage 
knowledge 
transfer among 
ICT firms?  
 
14 Policy makers 
1. Political stability 
2. National unity 
3. National interest 
4. Multiracial context 
 
11 Government 
Officers 
1. National interest 
2. Political stability 
3. Protecting economy 
4. Multiracial context 
 
25 Firms 
Representatives 
1. National interest 
2. Political stability 
3. Multiracial context 
4. National unity 
 
National agenda is 
important in order to  
(a) protect the economy 
(b) to maintain unity 
and harmony in 
multiracial context 
(c) to safeguard the 
national interest 
 
3. How do  14 Policy makers  The main roles of   159 
physical 
environment to 
encourage firms 
to collaborate 
due to the 
facilitating role. 
Malaysian 
technology parks 
assist knowledge 
transfer among 
ICT firms that 
operate in 
Malaysian 
technology 
parks? 
1. Incentives 
2. Infrastructure 
3. Networking 
4. Stimulus 
5. Incubation 
6. Knowledge 
 
11 Government 
Officers 
1. Infrastructure 
2. Incentives 
3. Real estate 
4. Incubation 
5. Image 
6. Networking 
7. Knowledge 
8. Stimulus 
 
25 Firms 
Representatives 
1. Infrastructure 
2. Networking 
3. Incentives 
4. Image 
5. Subsidy 
6. Real estate 
7. Stimulus 
8. Incubation 
9. Knowledge 
 
Malaysian technology 
parks to provide: 
1. stimulus 
2. networking 
3. knowledge 
4. incubation 
5. incentives 
6. image 
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CHAPTER 6: MICRO LEVEL STICKINESS AND MALAYSIAN 
TECHNOLOGY PARKS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the interview results with representatives of ICT firms in seven 
Malaysian  technology  parks.  It  explains  “micro”  level  stickiness  and  the  latter‟s 
contribution to knowledge transfer between ICT firms in Malaysian technology parks.  
 
 
The study approached ICT firms in seven Malaysian technology parks. Three of them 
were managed by the federal government, namely, Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), 
Technology  Park  Malaysia  (TPM),  and  Cyberjaya  (CB).  The  remaining  four  were 
managed  by  state  governments:  Selangor  Science  Park  (SSP)  (Selangor  state 
government),  Seri  Iskandar  Technology  Park  (SITP)  (Perak  state  government),  Johor 
Technology  Park  (JTP)  (Johor  state  government),  and  Kulim  High  Technology  Park 
(KHTP) (Kedah state government).   
 
Table 6.1 highlights the background of seven Malaysian technology parks. 
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Table 6.1 
Background of  Seven Malaysian Technology Parks 
Technology 
Parks 
Location  Date 
established 
Concept/Purpose of Establishment 
Multimedia 
Super 
Corridor 
(MSC) 
Cyberjaya, 
Selangor 
 
1996  Property development based on the knowledge-based 
concept with an aim to promote knowledge-based activities 
in the economy and in the social context. Also, to enhance 
ICT industry through research and development as well as 
capacity building and socio-economic development. 
(Multimedia Development Corporation Malaysia, 2004b) 
 
Technology 
Park 
Malaysia 
(TPM) 
Bukit Jalil, Kuala 
Lumpur 
 
1996  Another cluster in MSC, also based on property 
development to prepare Malaysia for the knowledge-based 
economy. TPM‟s Vision: “To be the premier technology 
park with advanced infrastructure and services to accelerate 
the development of science, technology and innovation that 
will facilitate knowledge-based enterprises to grow and 
compete in the global marketplace.” (Technology Park 
Malaysia, 2005) 
 
Cyberjaya 
(CB) 
Cyberjaya, 
Selangor 
 
1997  Another cluster in MSC, to turn barren land into an 
“intelligent city with world-class standards and facilities,” 
to support ICT industry and to promote knowledge-based 
economy (Cyberjaya-MSC, 2005). 
 
Selangor 
Science 
Park (SSP) 
Subang Jaya, 
Selangor 
 
2003  Knowledge-based industrial development uses “four I‟s: 
industrialism, investment, information and intelligence.”   
Aim at developing indigenous technologies and 
commercialization of R&D (Selangor Science Park, 2005). 
  
Seri 
Iskandar 
Technology 
Park (SITP) 
Seri Iskandar, 
Perak 
 
1998  Property development using intelligent concept that links 
university (UTP) to industry, research-based institutions, 
and government (Seri Iskandar Technology Park, 2005). 
 
 
Johor 
Technology 
Park (JTP) 
Johor Baru, Johor 
 
1994  A centre that links University Technology Malaysia (UTM) 
and other Higher Education Institutions, together with 
research-based institutions to develop industrial 
technological know-how (Johor Technology Park, 2005). 
 
Kulim High 
Technology 
Park 
(KHTP) 
Kulim, Kedah 
 
1996  “an integrated science park targeting technology-related 
industries primarily in the fields of advanced electronics, 
mechanical electronics, telecommunications, 
semiconductors, optoelectronics, biotechnology, advanced 
materials, research and development and emerging 
technologies.” (Kulim Hi Tech Park, 2005) 
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6.1.1 Background of Malaysian Technology Parks 
The Government of Malaysia established technology parks as a means to intensify the 
growth of the ICT industry. This idea was mooted by the nation‟s leadership who were  
amazed with the Silicon Valley success (Economic Planning Unit, 2002, pp. 117-143). 
Likewise, during the manufacturing industrialisation era, the government had established 
Free  Trade  Zones  (FTZ‟s)  to  assist  multinational  companies  to  intensify  the 
manufacturing sector of the Malaysian economy. The one stop facility at FTZ‟s allowed 
the multinational companies to operate in one area which provided all facilities (Drabble, 
2000, p. 202; Jomo, 1990, pp. 128-134). The government applied a similar concept in the 
development of Malaysian technology parks. The focus on knowledge-based economy 
started with the introduction of the Second Outline Perspective Plan (OPP 2) in 1991 
(Malaysia, 2006). This OPP 2 (from 1991 until 2000) was divided into a few plans to 
encourage  knowledge  sharing  among  the  knowledge-based  institutions.  The  first 
Malaysian technology park that focused on the ICT industry was started in 1996 under 
the  Seventh  Malaysia  Plan  (1996-2000).  Table  6.2  shows  the  contribution  of  major 
economic policies that promote Malaysian Technology Parks. 
 
Table 6.2 
Major Economic Policies that Promoted Malaysian Technology Parks 
Major policies  Duration  Date launched 
Outline Perspective Plan (OPP) 2  1991 – 2000  17 Jun 1991 
Sixth Malaysia Plan  1991 – 1995  7 Oct 1991 
MTR Sixth Malaysia Plan  1991 – 1995  16 Dec 1993 
Seventh Malaysia Plan  1996 – 2000  5 Jun 1996 
MTR Seventh Malaysia Plan  1996 – 2000  22 Apr 1999 
Outline Perspective Plan (OPP) 3  2001 – 2010  3 Apr 2001 
Eight Malaysia Plan  2001 – 2005  23 Apr 2001 
Note: MTR- Mid Term Review 
From Government of Malaysia (1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 1996a, 1996b, 2001a, 2001b) 
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6.1.2 Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) 
Multimedia Super Corridor is Malaysia‟s eminent technology park, which is also the 
landmark of the Malaysian Governments serious engagement in the knowledge-based 
economy.  The Corridor is situated on a piece of land measuring 15 x 50 km between the 
Petronas Twin Towers in the north and the Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) 
in  the  south.  Two  places  are  included  in  this  Corridor,  Cyberjaya  (another  ICT 
technology park) and Putrajaya (the administrative capital of Malaysia). The Malaysian 
Government established the MSC with modern capability to attract ICT investors, both 
domestic  and  global  (Mohan,  Omar,  &  Aziz,  2002,  pp.  265-271;  Ramasamy, 
Chakrabarty, & Cheah, 2004, pp. 871-883). As such, the MSC is supported by secured 
cyber laws, strategic policies, and a range of financial and non-financial incentives for 
investors (Multimedia Development Corporation Malaysia, 2004a, 2004b). 
 
6.1.3 Technology Park Malaysia (TPM) 
Technology Park Malaysia (TPM) was established by the Malaysian Government as part 
of  its  effort  to  intensify  technology  intensive  and  knowledge-based  industrial 
development as set out in the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000). As a government 
initiated  project,  TPM  is  a  wholly-owned  enterprise  by  the  Ministry  of  Finance 
Incorporated that was established in 1988 as an agency under the Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Innovation (formerly known as the Ministry of Science, Technology and 
the Environment) (Technology Park Malaysia, 2005).  
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6.1.4 Cyberjaya (CB) 
Cyberjaya  is  also  another  national  technology  park,  as  part  of  the  Multimedia  Super 
Corridor  (MSC)  zone.  It  was  established  in  1997  to  encourage  the  development  of 
technology through strategic collaboration among ICT firms. As a national icon in the 
ICT  industry,  it  bears  high  expectation  from  the  government  to  ensure  that  the  ICT 
industry plays a vital role for the growth of the future economy (Cyberjaya-MSC, 2005). 
 
The Government identified the development of a zone within Cyberjaya, known as the 
Cyberjaya Flagship Zone (CFZ). Cyberjaya being the nucleus of the MSC agenda, has a 
larger than normal share of the CFZ area designated for commercial activities related to 
the MSC (Multimedia Development Corporation, 2004b). 
 
6.1.5 Selangor Science Park (SSP) 
The Selangor state government through its state-owned enterprise, known as Selangor 
State Development Corporation or Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor (PKNS), has 
made strategic collaborations with Malaysian Technology Development Corporation Sdn 
Bhd (MTDC) and Standards and Industrial Research Institute of Malaysia (SIRIM) to 
embark  on  developing a  unique  and  prestigious  technology  park,  known  as  Selangor 
Science Park (Selangor Science Park, 2005). 
  
6.1.6 Seri Iskandar Technology Park (SITP) 
The state government of Perak established Seri Iskandar Technology Park (SITP) in the 
late 1990s to create a means for state economic growth by taking the advantage of the   165 
ICT industry. Historically, Perak was known for its tin mining industry. This industry 
was attractive as it brought the British to colonise Perak. However, today the tin mining 
industry  is  no  longer  the  mainstay  of  the  Perak  economy.  Accordingly,  the  state 
government  of  Perak  has  decided  to  use  more  sustainable  economic  instruments  to 
improve its economic prosperity (Seri Iskandar Technology Park, 2005). 
 
6.1.7 Johor Technology Park (JTP) 
Johor Technology Park (JTP) is the product of an initiative of a public university in 
southern peninsular Malaysia, i.e., University of Technology Malaysia (UTM) and the 
state government of Johor. One of the objectives of JTP is to foster a close relationship 
between the university and the industry in order to expedite commercialization process of 
its R&D outputs (Johor Technology Park, 2005). This project is essential specifically to 
expedite the commercialisation effort of engineering and technical faculties of UTM.  
 
6.1.8 Kulim High Technology Park (KHTP) 
The state government of Kedah initiated the Kulim High Technology Park (KHTP) in 
1996 for high technology companies. The creation of this site constituted one of the first 
attempts to create high technology-based industrial parks in Malaysia. Prior to this, the 
federal government has established Free Trade Zones in several states, including Penang, 
a  close  neighbouring  state  of  Kedah.  Accordingly,  KHTP  offers  alternative  sites  for 
electronic companies in Penang to have their R&D centres outside the congested Penang 
area. The Park is situated in Kulim, Kedah, the north-west of Peninsular Malaysia and 
comprises a total land area of approximately 1,450 hectares (approximately 3,600 acres).   166 
There are 48 companies that occupy KHTP (as of June 2005) (Kulim Hi Tech Park, 
2005). 
 
As Malaysia's first and fully integrated high-tech park, KHTP provides a few zones to 
tenant firms such as industrial zone, recreational  zone, commercial zone, R&D zone, 
urban zone and institutional zone.  
 
The  selected  seven  technology  parks  play  vital  roles  and  are  catalysts  in  promoting 
technological  development  and  innovation.  This  is  essential  for  a  nation  to  sustain 
economic growth. However, the essential feature of the technology park is based on a 
campus-like infrastructure, a modern feature of these industrial sites.  
 
The  study  used  four  factors  to  examine  “micro”  level  stickiness,  namely,  transfer 
mechanisms,  types  of  transfer,  knowledge  barriers,  and  transfer  contexts.  The  study 
argued that ICT firms contributed to “micro” level stickiness in knowledge transfer when 
they decided not to pursue knowledge transfer due to costliness of the four factors of 
knowledge transfer. The results are presented according to the four factors of knowledge 
transfer, namely, (a) transfer mechanism, (b) types of transfer, (c) knowledge barriers, 
and  (d)  transfer  contexts.  Table  6.4  provides  the  codified  responses  of  25  firms‟ 
representatives. All the responses were codified into several sub themes by the researcher 
and  verified  by  another  two  researchers.  Table  6.3a  presents  the  background  of  ICT 
firms‟ representatives who participated in the study. 
 
   167 
       Table 6.3a 
         The Background of ICT Firms‟ Representatives 
Code  Title  Location  Date of interviewed 
FR1  Business Manager  Multimedia Super Corridor  14 May 2005 
FR2  Business Development Manager  Technology Park Malaysia  14 May 2005 
FR3  Manager  Cyberjaya  12 May 2005 
FR4  Manager  Multimedia Super Corridor  13 June 2005 
FR5  Vice President  Cyberjaya  17 July 2005 
FR6  Senior Manager  Cyberjaya  19 May 2005 
FR7  Managing Director  Cyberjaya  22 June 2005 
FR8  Chief Executive Officer  Subang Jaya  19 May 2005 
FR9  Senior Manager  Shah Alam  19 May 2005 
FR10  Senior Executive  Kulim Hi Tech Park  6 June 2005 
FR11  Senior Manager  Technology Park Malaysia  12 May 2005 
FR12  Chief Executive Officer  Cyberjaya  14 May 2005 
FR13  Manager  Cyberjaya  12 May 2005 
FR14  Senior Engineer  Technology Park Malaysia  13 June 2005 
FR15  Executive  Technology Park Malaysia  10 June 2005 
FR16  Business Manager  Cyberjaya  14 May 2005 
FR17  Vice President  Cyberjaya  14 May 2005 
FR18  Senior Executive  Technology Park Malaysia  14 May 2005 
FR19  Senior Executive  Technology Park Malaysia  14 May 2005 
FR20  Engineer  Technology Park Malaysia  14 May 2005 
FR21  Vice President  Subang Jaya  19 May 2005 
FR22  Senior Manager  Shah Alam  19 May 2005 
FR23  Senior Executive  Shah Alam  12 June 2005 
FR24  Executive  Sri Iskandar Park  5 May 2005 
FR25  Senior Manager  Johor Tech Park  31 May 2005 
 
 
Most  of  the  ICT  informants  who  participated  in  the  study  came  from  Cyberjaya, 
Technology Park Malaysia and Selangor Science Park. The highest number of informants 
operate from Cyberjaya with eight participants, Technology Park Malaysia with seven 
persons and Selangor Science Park with five informants.  Table 6.3b summarizes the 
distribution of the informants from seven technology parks. 
        Table 6.3b 
        The Distribution of Firms‟ Representatives from Seven Malaysian Technology Parks 
Technology Parks  Informants Code  No of ICT firms participated in this 
study 
Cyberjaya  FR 3, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 16, 17  8 
Technology Park Malaysia  FR 2, 11, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20  7 
Selangor Science Park  FR 8, 9, 21, 22, 23  5 
Multimedia Super Corridor  FR 1, 4  2 
Kulim Hi Tech Park  FR 10  1 
Sri Iskandar Park  FR 24  1 
Johor Tech Park  FR 25  1 
   168 
 
6.2 Responses of ICT firms on “micro” stickiness 
Twenty five ICT firms responded to the interview questions on “micro” stickiness. The 
following discussion describes the responses from each ICT firm. 
 
6.2.1 ICT Firm 1 
ICT Firm 1 is located in the Multimedia Super Corridor area. Its main activity is to 
provide office solutions to both public and private sectors. It started the business when 
the government launched the Corridor in 1996. The personnel of this firm specialised 
mostly in the technical area, particularly ICT.  This firm provides electronic-based office 
solutions to a few government agencies in Putrajaya. Instead of developing a very costly 
software (electronic office solution), this firm buys it from other countries. FR 1 said: 
Our firm does not invent our own technology because it is costly. We contacted 
other firms, normally overseas firms and enquired about the technology. Then 
we will send our technical staff to study the technology under the guidance of 
those firms. 
 
Since the software is acquired from overseas, this firm also sends some of its technicians 
to undergo training on the installation procedures. In this way, the firm does not have to 
hire overseas technicians. Upon return, these technicians will coach their colleagues. FR 
1 said: 
… we will send our technical staff to study the technology under the guidance of 
those [overseas] firms. Of course, we have to pay fees and other costs in order 
to get the technology. This arrangement is not so expensive if we were to invent 
the technology by our own staff although we do not have the ability to do so. If 
that arrangement is very expensive, we have to find ways to get them. 
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Since these employees are already trained to handle the software, they received special 
attention  from  the  firm.  The  firm  will  not  put  on  too  much  pressure  on  the  trained 
employees in order not to risk losing them to other firms.  
 
According to FR 1, his ICT Firm 1 uses acquisition mechanism to obtain know-how 
knowledge from overseas firms in terms of technology (software) and guidelines. The 
firm acquires  knowledge  through  its  own technical personnel. This  exercise is  costly 
because the firm not only has to purchase foreign technology but also send technical 
personnel for training. In this regard, the technology park, Multimedia Super Corridor did 
not  provide any  help to  the company,  except  provide  ordinary  business  premises  for 
rental.  Table  6.4a  summarizes  the  practices  of  knowledge  transfer  and  the  role  of  a 
technology park at ICT Firm 1. 
Table 6.4a 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 1 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Acquire 
Types  Technology 
Barriers  Cost, people 
Contexts  Multiple 
Tech park function  Business 
      Note: Description by FR 1. Multimedia Super Corridor 
 
 
6.2.2 ICT Firm 2 
This company is located in Technology Park Malaysia, another important technology 
cluster within the Multimedia Super Corridor. Its main activity is to provide ICT services, 
particularly  the  use  of  electronic  means  for  conducting  public  transactions.  Its  main 
customer is federal government offices. The firm has been in the ICT industry for some 
years before the establishment of Technology Park Malaysia, particularly in the personal   170 
computer hardware business. Since ICT Firm 2 secured some government projects, it 
decided to stay in TPM.  FR 2 said: 
This arrangement is not so expensive if we were to invent the technology by our 
own staff. Yet, we do not have the ability to do so. If that arrangement is very 
expensive, we have to find ways to get them. 
 
 
ICT Firm 2 has experienced technical staff, ready to face any hardship. The firm also 
acquires  knowledge  of  technology  from  overseas,  through  qualified  personnel.  These 
personnel will undergo training to learn how to use the technology. Table 6.4b highlights 
the practices of knowledge transfer and perceived role of a technology park at ICT Firm 
2. 
 
Table 6.4b 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 2 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Acquire 
Types  Technology 
Barriers  Cost, people 
Contexts  Single 
Tech park function  Real estate 
      Note: Description by FR 2. Technology Park Malaysia 
 
6.2.3 ICT Firm 3 
ICT Firm 3 is located in Cyberjaya, also known as ICT City. Its main activity is to 
commission and implement electronic applications under the MSC seven flagship. This 
firm is directly involved through smart partnership with the government. FR 3 explained: 
The  MSC  comprises  seven  flagship  applications,  designed  to  facilitate  the 
development of the country towards becoming a key player in the Information 
Age:  electronic  government,  smart  schools,  tele-health,  R&D  clusters,  multi 
purpose card, e-business, and technopreneur programmes. 
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The  firm  could  go  into  these  applications  through  research  and  development.  Smart 
partnership allows both companies to emulate each other and foster learning to happen. 
FR 3 said: 
...  in  e-business  project,  MSC  companies  collaborate  among  them  to  create 
more  advanced  and  responsive  methods  to  deliver  more  effective  customer 
service.  
 
 
The facilities at the MSC technology park are useful to encourage smart partnership, 
sharing of resources, and synergy building among the participants. FR 3 said: 
They will make full use of the MSC infrastructure and multimedia applications. 
These companies will eventually have real-time operational control of the entire 
production process, from product development, manufacturing and marketing to 
distribution. 
 
The  main  barrier  to  knowledge  transfer  is  the  readiness  and  willingness  of  technical 
personnel to go overseas to acquire foreign technology, emulate them, and redevelop 
local models. At the same time, the firm is also aware of the increasing cost in learning 
and re-development of the ICT products and services. 
 
From the discussion, ICT Firm 3 uses emulation to acquire technology. The management 
support is essential to allow people to learn at his/her will. The MSC can only provide the 
facilities, but not to bring in ICT firms to start on collaboration work. Table 6.4c show 
the incidents of knowledge transfer and how a technology park functions at ICT Firm 3. 
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 Table 6.4c 
 Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 3 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Emulate, learn  
Types  People 
Barriers  Cost, people, management 
Contexts  Single 
Tech park function  Real estate 
       Note: Description by FR 3. Cyberjaya 
 
 
6.2.4 ICT Firm 4 
This company is located in Multimedia Super Corridor. Its main activity is to provide 
electronic  government  applications  to  government  agencies.  It  has  been  in  the  ICT 
business for more than ten years. The firm participated in the electronic government 
application through smart partnership program initiated by the government. The project 
has several components, but this firm is concentrating only on providing digital signature 
for every document used by a particular government office. FR 4 explained: 
Our  company  provides  digital  certification  to  our  customers  and  we  use 
microchip imported from overseas. We do have technical people, but not for 
R&D.  Our  parent  company  is  doing  the  R&D.  We  have  not  expanded 
worldwide, just to support Malaysia‟s electronic services. 
 
 
ICT Firm 4 has decided to purchase the material from overseas due to the cost factor. 
Cost  consists  of  the  purchase  of  foreign  technology  as  well  as  training  to  apply  the 
technology. The process of acquiring technology can take place in the MSC, but the MSC 
did not facilitate the transfer of knowledge. This firm performs better than its rivals due 
to  its  experienced  technical  personnel.  However,  the  existing  operation  at  the  MSC 
technology park is only focusing on implementing the electronic government application.   
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Based on the feedback from ICT Firm 4, it shows that “micro” stickiness of knowledge 
transfer occurs when the firm acquires technology from overseas through its personnel. 
The MSC did not provide sufficient support for the knowledge transfer process. Table 
6.4d condenses the occurrences of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 4 in relation to the 
role of a technology park. 
 
Table 6.4d 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 4 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Acquire  
Types  Technology 
Barriers  Cost, people 
Contexts  Single and multiple 
Tech park function  Business 
      Note: Description by FR 4. Multimedia Super Corridor 
 
 
 
6.2.5 ICT Firm 5 
ICT Firm 5 is located in Cyberjaya. Its main activity is to provide ICT services to both 
private and public sectors. The main reason for this firm to operate at Cyberjaya is due to 
business opportunities in the ICT sector.  FR 5 articulated: 
Our company operates in Cyberjaya not because we want to learn from other 
tenant  firms.  Actually,  we  don‟t  need  face-to-face  to  learn  from  others.  ICT 
technologies can help us to do so. We have many partners from all over the 
world. Imagine if we have to meet face-to-face to learn about ICT. We are here 
because we have good relationships with the government and we support its 
project. Knowledge transfer is important, but Cyberjaya is not the place yet. 
 
 
Based  on  the  brief  statement  from  this  firm,  clearly  knowledge  transfer  can  happen 
without having to locate in close proximity. ICT technologies can enable the interaction, 
sharing and exchanging of ideas among ICT firms. It seems that this firm is practicing an 
emulation technique to obtain knowledge from other firms through ICT technologies.   174 
Technical  personnel  play  an  essential  role  to  capture,  store  and  use  the  knowledge 
obtained from other firms. However cost remains an important factor for participating in 
knowledge transfer. In this case, the presence of technology parks does not help much in 
facilitating  knowledge  transfer.  Table  6.4e  sums  up  the  observations  of  knowledge 
transfer and the perceived role of a technology park for ICT Firm 5. 
 
Table 6.4e 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 5 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Emulate, learn 
Types  People 
Barriers  Cost, people, management 
Contexts  Single and multiple 
Tech park function  Real estate 
      Note: Description by FR 5. Cyberjaya 
 
6.2.6 ICT Firm 6 
This firm is located in Cyberjaya. Its main activity is to provide ICT software solutions 
for various electronic applications, for both the government as well the private sector. 
This firm used to operate in Kuala Lumpur, a very busy and congested capital city. It 
decided to move to Cyberjaya to take advantage of the fiscal advantages. FR 6 said:  
Previously, our main office was in Kuala Lumpur. We moved here [Cyberjaya] 
because we can get more advantages and [it is] relevant to our ICT business 
activities. MSC Bill is good for tax exemption, but more important is to get 
partners from overseas. There are a few reasons for ICT tenant firms to set up 
their firms in Cyberjaya. 
 
 
This firm needs to customise its services to meet the expectation of the customers. Thus, 
it needs to learn the users‟ needs before it can modify the software. Technical personnel 
are  very  important  due  to  customisation  of  the  software.  Table  6.4f  compresses  the   175 
essential aspects of knowledge transfer and the perceived role of a technology park at 
ICT Firm 6. 
 
Table 6.4f 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 6 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Emulate, learn 
Types  People 
Barriers  Cost, people, management 
Contexts  Single and multiple 
Tech park function  Business 
      Note: Description by FR 6. Cyberjaya 
 
6.2.7 ICT Firm 7 
This company is located in Cyberjaya. Its main activity is to provide ICT-based education 
and training centres with customised software solutions as well as learning solutions for 
the private sector and the government smart school application. The nature of the job at 
this firm is knowledge intensified, but this firm is interested with the image of Cyberjaya 
and its MSC-status. FR 7 mentioned: 
We  need  to  build  our  image  in  the  ICT  industry.  The  MSC  status  gives  us 
marketability. Normally the MSC status will tell people that we are in the ICT 
business. Since we are new player, it is important to have a good image. 
 
Since the firm is  in  the knowledge  intensified business, it needs to  offer customised 
software for the customers. As such, it needs to emulate existing models and learn from 
the customers to meet the expectation. This kind of job requires qualified and competent 
personnel to carry out the task. FR 7 explained: 
… we need to ensure our workers are competent enough to perform the job. Our 
customers are very fussy and we need to follow their demands. The standard 
software is available, but our customers wanted it to be in their own way. 
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The  main  problem  is  to  retain  the  personnel  by  offering  adequate  incentives.  If  the 
compensation system follows the expectation of the personnel then this firm will have to 
bear a high cost of operations. This is not favourable to the management of the company. 
Table 6.4g summarizes the practices of knowledge transfer and the business role of a 
technology park with ICT Firm 7. 
 
Table 6.4g 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 7 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Emulate, learn 
Types  People 
Barriers  Cost, people, management 
Contexts  Single and multiple 
Tech park function  Business 
      Note: Description by FR 7. Cyberjaya 
 
 
6.2.8 ICT Firm 8 
ICT Firm 8 is located in Subang Jaya, Selangor Science Park (SSP). Its main activity is to 
provide  customisation  and  application  of  IT-based  diagnostic  tools  and  project 
management. FR 8 argued: 
SSP follows the footstep of the MSC, which was first introduced in 1996 by the 
then Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad, which is an attempt to create a 
high-technology area similar to Silicon Valley, by using tax breaks and other 
incentives to encourage companies to set up R&D and other operations. It aims 
to attract overseas and local technology companies to develop new products and 
services. 
 
 
The firm requires its personnel to be flexible, knowledgeable and fast learners in order to 
provide customisation of IT products and services to the customers. FR 8 said: 
We hope to gain expertise from other firms in this park because our business is 
highly customer oriented. We assume that our staff can mix around with staff   177 
from other companies at this park. After a few months here, this park is just like 
Glenmarie Commercial Centre of Shah Alam. 
 
The main problem with this type of task is to meet the requirements of the customers. 
The Selangor Science Park does not provide any special facility for this firm to enable its 
staff to emulate and learn from other firms in the same area. Every firm is on its own. 
Table  6.4h  highlights  the  practices  of  knowledge  transfer  and  the  business  role  of  a 
technology park at ICT Firm 8. 
 
Table 6.4h 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 8 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Emulate, learn 
Types  People 
Barriers  Cost, people, management 
Contexts  Single 
Tech park function  Business 
      Note: Description by FR 8. Selangor Science Park 
 
 
6.2.9 ICT Firm 9 
ICT Firm 9 is located in Shah Alam, Selangor Science Park (SSP). Its main activity is to 
provide software platform tools for telecom network management. FR 9 argued: 
SSP is good to attract more hi-tech companies. Malaysia itself [is] already an 
investment  destination  because  of  its  resilient  and  diversified  economy, 
underscored by its political stability. For the K-economy and quality technology 
and knowledge transfer, the Federal  and Selangor  state governments should 
encourage  more  investment  in  research  and  development  and  hire  foreign 
scientists to boost the ranks of the country's researchers. 
 
 
This firm supports the idea of the knowledge-based economy (K-economy) introduced by 
the government. The reason it decided to operate in the park is to get the benefit of 
sharing  expertise  and  experience  with  high technology  companies  that operate in the   178 
same  park.  This  is  in  line  with  its  main  business  activity  in  the  telecommunication 
industry. However, FR 9 realized that the firm did not get the benefit that they expected. 
One of the reasons is because the park did not organize any meetings with all tenants. 
Table  6.4i  recaps  the  observations  of  knowledge  transfer  and  the  business  role  of  a 
technology park at ICT Firm 9. 
 
  Table 6.4i 
  Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 9 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Emulate, learn 
Types  People 
Barriers  Cost, people, management 
Contexts  Single 
Tech park function  Business 
        Note: Description by FR 9. Selangor Science Park 
 
6.2.10 ICT Firm 10 
ICT Firm 10 is situated at Kulim High Technology Park (KHTP) since its inception. Its 
main activity is to provide electronic business solutions, to develop Malaysia‟s Intra- and 
Internets, and to design customer relationship management networks. As a pioneer tenant 
of KHTP, this firm is convinced of the government‟s ambition to bring into the country 
high technology in the manufacturing as well as in the ICT industry. FR 10 uttered: 
Former Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir due to his strong interest in advanced 
manufacturing and heavy industry mooted the idea about Kulim Hi-Tech Park. 
If you can recall, he was strong about heavy industry even before becoming 
Malaysia‟s fourth prime minister. This project is part of his „Look East Policy‟ 
when he encouraged Malaysians to learn and replicate successful stories from 
Japan.  Japan  International  Corporation  Agency  (JICA)  has  helped  the 
government in the setting up of Kulim Hi-Tech Park. The details can be found in 
the Kulim Hi-Tech Park Master Plan. 
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According to FR 10, the main feature of the survivability of an ICT firm is its ability to 
be  adaptable  to  changes,  flexible  to  meet  all  requirements,  and  able  to  learn  fast.  
However, FR 10 dismissed the utopian idea of wanting a technology park to play beyond 
the role of a landlord. It is reasonable for KHTP to function as landlord in providing 
business  facilities  for  its  tenants.  Table  6.4j  summarizes  the  practices  of  knowledge 
transfer and the role of a technology park at ICT Firm 10. 
 
Table 6.4j 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 10 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Emulate, learn 
Types  People 
Barriers  Cost, people, management 
Contexts  Single 
Tech park function  Business 
      Note: Description by FR 10. Kulim Hi Tech Park 
 
6.2.11 ICT Firm 11 
This firm arrived in Technology Park Malaysia a few years after its inception. Its main 
activity is to provide content development, electronic commerce and kiosk development. 
FR 11 concurred: 
This park [TPM] provides us with modern and sophisticated facilities and also it 
is  near  to Putrajaya, Cyberjaya  and the MSC headquarters. The location  is 
strategic to allow us to access to government tenders. Close to universities may 
be good, but not sure how we can get benefit from their R&D projects. I think 
universities have their own objectives, and the industry has its own way of doing 
things.
  
 
 
This firm is interested in the location due to its image as one of the MSC clusters. It 
needs this kind of stimulating environment to enable its staff to be more knowledgeable, 
creative and innovative. According to FR 11, this firm needs to introduce new products   180 
and services to meet the expectation of the customers. The main problem is that this 
company does not change its corporate culture. Table 6.4k lists down the practices of 
knowledge transfer and the real estate (landlord-tenant) role of a technology park at ICT 
Firm 11. 
 
Table 6.4k 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 11 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Emulate, learn, R&D 
Types  People 
Barriers  Cost, people, management 
Contexts  Single and multiple 
Tech park function  Real estate 
      Note: Description by FR 11. Technology Park Malaysia 
 
 
6.2.12 ICT Firm 12 
ICT Firm 12 has been operating in Cyberjaya for more than three years. Its main activity 
is to provide, develop, customise, and commercialise network management and storage 
software for both private and public sectors. Since the nature of its business is software 
development, it needs a reputable business location such as in Cyberjaya.  This firm is 
aware that operating at a reputable location alone is inadequate; therefore it needs to be 
present at the park to collaborate with foreign companies. The Cyberjaya management 
can assist this collaboration however such an event has yet to happen. FR 12 explained: 
MSC gives us good image, but beyond that it cannot make us innovative or 
attractive to potential partners from overseas. There are foreign companies in 
the MSC zone, but they are doing their own business. Local companies need 
more  than  facilities.  The  incentives  are  useful  if  these  companies  can  make 
profit. How long we can survive in the ICT industry when we are not innovative. 
In order to be innovative, we need experienced partners so that we can learn 
from them. However, we are fortunate because we can have business with the 
government,  especially  its  electronic  business.  So,  we  need  to  have  our 
operations in the MSC zone so that we can [gain] access to the government 
projects.   
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The nature of the company requires it to acquire technology from other companies before 
it can provide to its customers. The purchasing part is not challenging, but to modify the 
technology for customers, the company needs qualified employees to do the task. Table 
6.4l summarizes the practices of knowledge transfer and the business role of a technology 
park at ICT Firm 12. 
 
Table 6.4l 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 12 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Acquire 
Types  Technology 
Barriers  Cost, management 
Contexts  Single 
Tech park function  Business 
      Note: Description by FR 12. Cyberjaya 
 
 
6.2.13 ICT Firm 13 
This  firm  is  a  tenant  and  important  partner  of  Cyberjaya  Technology  Park.  Its  main 
business activity is to develop, integrate and configure software systems such as financial 
reporting, billing and payroll systems, cash flow system, and artificial intelligent system. 
The business falls under software development. Thus, this firm needs to make full use of 
the facilities at this park for its business. FR 13 uttered: 
We will make full use of the MSC infrastructure and multimedia applications. 
We and other companies will eventually have real-time operational control of 
the entire production process, from product development, manufacturing and 
marketing to distribution. 
 
 
Based  on  the  nature  of  its  business,  the  firm  needs  to  develop  the  software,  before 
customising it for customers. However, the firm can acquire software from other firms.   182 
Since the technology is owned by other firms, this firm has to purchase it from them even 
though is costly. Table 6.4m recaps the practices of knowledge transfer and the business 
role of a technology park at ICT Firm 13. 
 
Table 6.4m 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 13 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Acquire 
Types  Technology 
Barriers  Cost, management 
Contexts  Single 
Tech park function  Business 
      Note: Description by FR 13. Cyberjaya 
 
 
6.2.14 ICT Firm 14 
ICT Firm 14 is located in Technology Park Malaysia. Its main activity is to develop and 
commercialise ICT products and services based on electronic government application. Its 
main customer is the government. Thus, it is essential for this firm to retain its operations 
at TPM, one of the MSC clusters, to maintain its MSC firm status. FR 14 argued: 
In the past we used to locate ourselves at Cyberjaya, though it is too far from 
Kuala Lumpur and Shah Alam. Then we decided to relocate in TPM without 
losing the MSC-status. The MSC-status is very important to us because we want 
to get more government tenders on the e-government application.  
 
 
This firm acquires its ICT products from other firms, local as well as abroad. Based on its 
nature  of  business,  its  main  concern  is  to  minimise  the  cost  of  operations  in  the 
purchasing  and  delivery  to  the  customers.  Table  6.4n  highlights  the  practices  of 
knowledge transfer and the real estate role of Technology Park Malaysia at ICT Firm 14. 
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Table 6.4n 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 14 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Acquire 
Types  Technology 
Barriers  Cost, management 
Contexts  Single 
Tech park function  Real estate 
      Note: Description by FR 14. Technology Park Malaysia 
 
 
6.2.15 ICT Firm 15 
This  firm  is  located  in  Technology  Park  Malaysia.  Its  main  activity  is  to  provide 
electronic smart card systems to government departments, schools, learning institutions, 
and commercial offices. The firm did not develop the smart card itself, rather purchased it 
from overseas. FR 15 mentioned: 
We  have  been  in  TPM  recently  just  to  get  the  MSC  status.  We  have  been 
searching around five centres of MSC order to get MSC status. KLCC is too 
expensive,  while  Cyberjaya  is  too  far.  Finally  we  choose  TPM  due  to  its 
strategic  location,  close  to  public  transportation  and  also  other  amenities. 
Moreover the rental is cheaper. Our main activity is to provide smart card for 
banks, universities, schools, and offices. The chip technology is from France. It 
is better to purchase foreign technology rather than developed your own. 
 
 
Since the firm acquired the smart card from overseas, its job is to customise the smart 
card to meet the needs of the customers. Table 6.4o sums up the practices of knowledge 
transfer and the business role of Technology Park Malaysia at ICT Firm 15. 
Table 6.4o 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 15 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Acquire 
Types  Technology 
Barriers  Cost, management 
Contexts  Single 
Tech park function  Business 
      Note: Description by FR 15. Technology Park Malaysia 
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6.2.16 ICT Firm 16 
ICT Firm 16 is located in Cyberjaya. Its main activity is to develop software for school 
administration  and  library  management.  This  firm  acquired  the  software  from  other 
companies before it modifies the programme to meet the requirement of schools and 
libraries, both public and private sectors.  The main reason to operate in Cyberjaya is to 
be known as one of the MSC status companies. In addition, this firm also can establish 
networking with other firms. FR 16 said: 
This MSC is helpful to make our company known to other ICT companies. At 
this park, we can have regular face-to-face meeting with our counterparts from 
other companies. Our employees also can make more contact. They exchange 
ideas  when  they  have  lunch  together.  This  is  good  opportunity  to  learn  the 
experience of other companies. I am personally grateful to the government to 
have this project established just like in the Silicon Valley in the US. 
 
 
This firm did not involve itself in research and development for its products because it 
obtained  them  from  overseas.  However,  it  is  aware  of  the  need  to  develop  its  own 
products. Table 6.4p summarizes the practices of knowledge transfer and the business 
function of a technology park at ICT Firm 16. 
 
Table 6.4p 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 16 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Acquire 
Types  Technology 
Barriers  Cost, management 
Contexts  Single and multiple 
Tech park function  Business 
      Note: Description by FR 16. Cyberjaya 
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6.2.17 ICT Firm 17 
This  firm  is  located  in  Cyberjaya.  Its  main  activity  is  to  develop  and  commercialise 
interactive media solutions. Its customers are mainly from the private sector although it 
used to get some government tenders. Since its nature of business is in the software 
development,  it  needs  qualified  and  creative  personnel  to  have  the  passion  to  learn, 
modify and develop interactive media solutions according to customers‟ need. This firm 
supported the government technology park because it believes such initiative signals the 
serious commitment of the government in the ICT industry. FR 17 postulated: 
The Multimedia Super Corridor project is a bold initiative aimed at attracting 
high tech companies using or developing multimedia technologies to accelerate 
Malaysia's progress toward the information-age leadership.
  
 
 
Based on the nature of the firm‟s business and its expectation, this firm is needful of the 
technology park. Table 6.4q condenses the observations of knowledge transfer and the 
real estate role of Cyberjaya Technology Park at ICT Firm 17. 
Table 6.4q 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 17 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Emulate, learn 
Types  People 
Barriers  Cost, people 
Contexts  Single and multiple 
Tech park function  Real estate 
      Note: Description by FR 17. Cyberjaya 
 
 
6.2.18 ICT Firm 18 
ICT Firm 18 is located in Technology Park Malaysia. Its main activity is to provide 
software  for  education,  collaboration  and  transactional  business  via  the  Internet.  The 
firm‟s nature of business requires competent ICT personnel that can provide personalised   186 
ICT solution for its customers from various places, local as well as global. The firm‟s 
representative acknowledged the importance of a technology park in assisting ICT firms 
to allow knowledge sharing and transfer between employees from different ICT firms. 
FR 18 said: 
TPM  also  provides  facilities  such  as  recreational  and  sport  complex  for 
employees  to  have  their  recreational  activities  after  office  hours.  This  is  an 
avenue for employees to interact with employees from other tenant firms. Of 
course, this event is an informal event.
  
 
 
As a knowledge-intensified firm, ICT Firm 18 needs to be knowledgeable, flexible, and 
dynamic in meeting all kinds of demands from the customers. Table 6.4r abridges the 
routine  of  knowledge  transfer  and  the  landlord  role  (real  estate  management)  of 
Technology Park Malaysia at ICT Firm 18. 
 
Table 6.4r 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 18 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Emulate, learn 
Types  People 
Barriers  Cost, people 
Contexts  Single and multiple 
Tech park function  Real estate 
      Note: Description by FR 18. Technology Park Malaysia 
 
 
6.2.19 ICT Firm 19 
ICT Firm 19 is located in Technology Park Malaysia. Its main activities are to design, 
develop,  implement,  and  to  support  the  electronic  government  human  resource 
management  system.  Based  on  this  firm‟s  nature  of  business,  it  needs  to  provide 
consistent service to its customers, particularly on system maintenance. Such a situation 
demands its employees to have strong commitment and passion for the services provided   187 
to  customers.  According  to  this  firm‟s  representative,  such  situations  demand  its 
employees be interactive with employees from other firms. FR 19 articulated: 
Employees work on the assignment similar to companies elsewhere. However, 
when they are given assignment on project basis, they have to interact with 
other  people.  Sometimes,  our  employees  have  to  work  with  employees  from 
other companies when we have collaboration with outside companies. 
  
 
 
Table 6.4s summarizes the occurrences of knowledge transfer and the role of business 
(consultant/partner) for Technology Park Malaysia at ICT Firm 19. 
 
Table 6.4s 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 19 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Emulate, learn 
Types  People 
Barriers  Cost, people 
Contexts  Single and multiple 
Tech park function  Business 
      Note: Description by FR 19. Technology Park Malaysia 
 
 
6.2.20 ICT Firm 20 
This firm is located at Technology Park Malaysia. Its main activity is to develop wireless 
mobile and multimedia solutions. The firm can acquire the technology from other firms 
although it can develop itself. Such roles will happen when TPM can function beyond 
merely a property agent. The role of a property agent is just to ensure the tenant adheres 
to the all the terms and conditions, pay rental on time, and maintain good condition of the 
property.  The agent does not have to know the well being, the fate and the condition of 
the tenant. This is unfortunate, if TPM only plays a role of property agent.  FR 20 said: 
TPM is just like property agent to the government. The company just collect 
rental  from  the  tenant  companies.  Once  a  while,  the  company  organised  a 
meeting to hear any complaints. The company also has many subsidiaries like   188 
TPM Academy, TPM Engineering … they just like us. I don‟t see any effort from 
TPM to conduct any collaboration among tenant firms.
  
 
 
Knowledge intensity is a must for ICT Firm 20 due to its principal business in software 
development. It needs creative and qualified personnel to deliver its businesses. Table 
6.4t summarizes the practices of knowledge transfer and the business role of Technology 
Park Malaysia at ICT Firm 20. 
 
Table 6.4t 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 20 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Acquire 
Types  Technology 
Barriers  Cost, management 
Contexts  Single 
Tech park function  Business 
      Note: Description by FR 20. Technology Park Malaysia 
 
6.2.21 ICT Firm 21 
ICT Firm 21 is operated in Subang Jaya, under the territory of Selangor Science Park 
(SSP). Its main activity is to develop and commercialise web-based application for the 
travel industry. Initially this firm was amazed when the state government established SSP 
as its instrument to promote technology development in both the high technology as well 
as the ICT industries. FR 21 expressed: 
SSP is just an industrial site for companies to purchase and lease the land.  
Furthermore,  SSP  is  Selangor  state  government‟s  company  in  property 
development business. I think the government needs to do more to make the 
atmosphere in SSP more technology and knowledge friendly.
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ICT Firm 21 has potential to participate in technology development at its own effort. 
Table 6.4u recaps the routine of knowledge transfer and the business role of Selangor 
Science Park at ICT Firm 21. 
 
Table 6.4u 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 21. 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  R&D 
Types  People 
Barriers  Cost, people, management 
Contexts  Single and multiple 
Tech park function  Business 
      Note: Description by FR 21. Selangor Science Park 
 
 
6.2.22 ICT Firm 22 
ICT Firm 22 is located in Shah Alam, under the area of Selangor Science Park (SSP). Its 
main activity is to develop and commercialise software for payment kiosk. This firm 
believes  in  the  potential  of  the  SSP  in  getting  technology  and  knowledge-based 
companies to invest in SSP. This effort is in line with the plan of the Malaysian federal 
government to create new wealth and economic growth through the knowledge-based 
economy (K-economy). FR 22 argued: 
SSP is good to attract more hi-tech companies. Malaysia itself [is] already an 
investment  destination  because  of  its  resilient  and  diversified  economy, 
underscored by its political stability. For the K-economy and quality technology 
and knowledge transfer, the Federal  and Selangor  state governments should 
encourage  more  investment  in  research  and  development  and  hire  foreign 
scientists to boost the ranks of the country's researchers. 
 
 
ICT  Firm  22  is  impressed  with  the  economic  advantages  from  the  knowledge-based 
economy agenda (K-economy) propagated by the government. Thus, it demonstrated its   190 
readiness to be part of the K-economy. Table 6.4v highlights the routine of knowledge 
transfer and the landlord (real estate) function of Selangor Science Park at ICT Firm 22. 
 
Table 6.4v 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 22 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Acquire  
Types  Technology 
Barriers  Cost, management 
Contexts  Single 
Tech park function  Real estate 
      Note: Description by FR 22. Selangor Science Park 
 
6.2.23 ICT Firm 23 
ICT Firm 23 is located in Shah Alam, under the Selangor Science Park (SSP). Its main 
activity is to develop and commercialise business management solution software. This 
kind of business requires ICT Firm 23 to be proactive in searching for potential partners 
in developing software for local as well as global markets. Since its customers can come 
from many places, it also hopes for ideas, creativity, and talent from many places too.  
ICT  Firm  23‟s  decision  to  operate  in  SSP  was  to  gain  networking  advantages  for 
technology development. FR 23 argued: 
Selangor state government needs to play a very key role in developing R&D 
ability; otherwise this park will be a failure. To my mind it needs to be placed in 
the right perspective - a learning experience. MSC is the federal government‟s 
project  and  SSP  is  the  state‟s  project  for  ICT,  biotechnology  and 
nanotechnology sectors. They are all about the Internet, all basic drug research, 
the computers, and a lot of other fundamental research. 
 
 
Based on the FR 23‟s feedback, ICT Firm 23 is hopeful about the advantages of Selangor 
Science Park in terms of attracting high technology firms to be operated at SSP. Table   191 
6.4w highlights the occurrences of knowledge transfer and the business role of SSP at 
ICT Firm 23. 
 
Table 6.4w 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 23 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  R&D 
Types  People 
Barriers  Cost, people, management 
Contexts  Single and multiple 
Tech park function  Business 
      Note: Description by FR 23. Selangor Science Park 
 
 
6.2.24 ICT Firm 24 
ICT Firm 24 is located in Tronoh, Seri Iskandar Technology Park (SITP), Perak. Its main 
activity is to provide IT-based manufacturing, production and engineering solutions. This 
firm provides functional support to the semiconductor companies. The establishment of 
SITP is commendable for providing employment to the local community. Since the SITP 
has real estate development features, it helps to generate local economic activities as 
well. FR 24 postulated: 
My company is in semiconductor business. Since I work here, this company has 
been doing well because it can hire people in this area. Some of my friends who 
lost their job after the closure of semiconductor companies in Ipoh are now 
working with this company. In fact our boss also was a former manager of a 
semiconductor company in Ipoh. He has been here far more than 10 years and 
we are happy with him because he understands our culture and our problem. I 
think this company has more than 100 employees. 
 
 
FR 24 is ambitious about the role of SITP in the high technology as well as the ICT 
industry. Table 6.4x highlights the practices of knowledge transfer and the real estate 
function of Seri Iskandar Technology Park at ICT Firm 24. 
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Table 6.4x 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 24 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  Acquire 
Types  Technology 
Barriers  Cost, people, management 
Contexts  Single 
Tech park function  Real estate 
      Note: Description by FR 24. Perak‟s Seri Iskandar Technology Park 
 
 
6.2.25 ICT Firm 25 
ICT Firm 25 is located in Johor Bahru, Johor Technology Park. This park is located 
between University of Technology Malaysia and several industrial estates.  Initially the 
project was mooted by University of Technology Malaysia to bridge the gap between the 
industry and the university. FR 25 said: 
Initially  we  do  it  [JTP]  quietly  because  the  government  [both  state  and  the 
federal] prohibited us to do so. The chief reason for this is that university cannot 
form any company and it must concentrate on R&D. The idea behind this effort 
is to foster [a] close relationship between the university and the industry. 
 
However, FR 25 believed that the establishment of JTP is good for both the industry and 
the university to intensify the research and development as well as commercialisation. 
Table  6.4y  recaps  the  routine  of  knowledge  transfer  and  the  business  role  of  Johor 
Technology Park at ICT Firm 25. 
 
Table 6.4y 
Practices of knowledge transfer at ICT Firm 25 
Micro stickiness aspects  Practices 
Mechanisms  R&D 
Types  People 
Barriers  Cost, people, management 
Contexts  Single and multiple 
Tech park function  Business 
      Note: Description by FR 25. Johor Technology Park 
 
The responses from 25 ICT firms are summarised in Table 6.5. The responses provide 
answers for “micro” stickiness in terms of cost in knowledge transfer among ICT firms.    193 
 
Table 6.5 
Summary of Firms Representatives Responses to “Micro” Stickiness Questions (in various sub themes) 
Code  Location  Mechanisms  Types  Barriers  Contexts  Function 
FR1  Multimedia Super Corridor  Acquire  Technology  Cost, people  Multiple  Business  
FR2  Technology Park Malaysia  Acquire  Technology  Cost, people  Single  Real estate  
FR3  Cyberjaya  Emulate, learn  People  Cost, people, management  Single  Real estate  
FR4  Multimedia Super Corridor  Acquire  Technology  Cost, people  Single and multiple  Business  
FR5  Cyberjaya  Emulate, learn  People  Cost, people, management  Single  Real estate  
FR6  Cyberjaya  Emulate, learn  People  Cost,  management  Single and multiple  Business  
FR7  Cyberjaya  Emulate, learn  People  Cost, people  Single and multiple  Business  
FR8  Selangor Science Park  Emulate, learn, R&D  People  Cost, people, management  Single  Business  
FR9  Selangor Science Park  Emulate, learn, R&D  People  Cost, people, management  Single  Business  
FR10  Kulim Hi Tech Park  Emulate, learn, R&D  People  Cost, people, management  Single  Business  
FR11  Technology Park Malaysia  Emulate, learn, R&D  People  Cost, people, management  Single and multiple  Real estate  
FR12  Cyberjaya  Acquire  Technology  Cost, management  Single  Business  
FR13  Cyberjaya  Acquire  Technology  Cost, management  Single  Business  
FR14  Technology Park Malaysia  Acquire  Technology  Cost, management  Single  Real estate  
FR15  Technology Park Malaysia  Acquire  Technology  Cost, management  Single  Business  
FR16  Cyberjaya  Emulate, learn  People  Cost, people  Single and multiple  Business  
FR17  Cyberjaya  Emulate, learn  People  Cost, people  Single and multiple  Real estate  
FR18  Technology Park Malaysia  Emulate, learn  People  Cost, people  Single and multiple  Real estate  
FR19  Technology Park Malaysia  Emulate, learn  People  Cost, people  Single  Business  
FR20  Technology Park Malaysia  Acquire  Technology  Cost, management  Single  Business  
FR21  Selangor Science Park  R&D  People  Cost, people, management  Single and multiple  Business  
FR22  Selangor Science Park  Acquire  Technology  Cost, management  Single  Real estate  
FR23  Selangor Science Park  R&D  People  Cost, people, management  Single and multiple  Business  
FR24  Seri Iskandar Park  Acquire  Technology  Cost, people, management  Single  Real estate  
FR25  Johor Tech Park  R&D  People  Cost, people, management  Single and multiple  Business  
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Table 6.5a 
Summary of Firms Representatives Respond to All Aspects of  “Micro” Stickiness 
Micro  stickiness 
aspects 
Components  Informants  Frequency 
Transfer 
mechanism 
Acquire  FR 1,2, 4,  12, 13, 14, 15, 20, 22, 24  10 
Emulate, learn  FR 3, 5, 6, 7, 16, 17, 18, 19  8 
Emulate, learn, R&D  FR 8, 9, 10, 11  4 
R&D only  Fr 21, 23, 25  3 
Types of transfer  People  FR 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 
23, 25 
15 
Technology  FR 1, 2, 4, 12, 13, 14, 15, 20, 22, 24  10 
Knowledge 
barriers 
Cost, people, 
management 
FR 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 21, 23, 24, 25  10 
Cost, people  FR 1, 2, 4, 7, 16, 17, 18, 19  8 
Cost, management  FR 6, 12, 13, 14, 15, 20, 22  7 
Transfer context  Business parks  FR 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19, 20, 
21, 23, 25 
16 
Real estate premises  FR 2, 3, 5, 11, 14, 17, 18, 22, 24  9 
Note: Micro Stickiness, Interview Question:  
1. How does your firm respond to high cost transfer mechanisms when it is involved in knowledge transfer 
with other ICT firms? 
2. How does your firm respond to high cost types of transfer when it is involved in knowledge transfer with 
other ICT firms?” 
3. How does your firm respond to high cost knowledge transfer barriers when it is involved in knowledge 
transfer with other ICT firms?” 
4. How does your firm respond to high cost transfer context when it is involved in knowledge transfer with 
other ICT firms?” 
 
 
Table 6.6 presents the cross analysis of responses of firms‟ representatives to “micro” 
stickiness interview questions. 
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Table 6.6 
Cross Analysis on Firms Representatives Responses to “Micro” Stickiness Aspects 
Technology 
Parks 
Informants  No   Transfer 
Mechanisms 
Types of Transfer  Knowledge Barriers  Transfer Contexts  Tech Park 
Function 
Routine  No  Routine  No  Routine  No  Routine  No  Routine  No 
Cyberjaya  FR 3, 5, 6, 7, 
12, 13, 16, 17 
8  Acquire  2  People  6  Cost & People  3  Single  4  Business  5 
Emulate & 
Learn 
6  Technology  2  Cost & 
Management 
3  Multiple  0  Real estate  3 
Emulate, 
Learn & 
R&D 
0  People and 
Technology 
0  Cost, People 
& 
Management 
2  Single and 
Multiple 
4  Business 
& Real 
Estate 
0 
R&D only  0                 
Technology 
Park Malaysia 
FR 2, 11, 14, 
15, 18, 19, 20 
7  Acquire  4  People  4  Cost & People  3  Single  5  Business  3 
Emulate & 
Learn 
2  Technology  3  Cost & 
Management 
2  Multiple  0  Real estate  4 
Emulate, 
Learn & 
R&D 
1  People and 
Technology 
0  Cost, People 
& 
Management 
2  Single and 
Multiple 
2  Business 
& Real 
Estate 
0 
R&D only  0                 
Selangor 
Science Park 
FR 8, 9, 21, 
22, 23 
5  Acquire  1  People  4  Cost & People  0  Single  3  Business  4 
Emulate & 
Learn 
0  Technology  1  Cost & 
Management 
1  Multiple  0  Real estate  1 
Emulate, 
Learn & 
R&D 
2  People and 
Technology 
0  Cost, People 
& 
Management 
4  Single and 
Multiple 
2  Business 
& Real 
Estate 
0 
R&D only  2                 
Multimedia 
Super Corridor 
FR 1, 4  2  Acquire  2  People  0  Cost & People  2  Single  0  Business  2 
Emulate & 
Learn 
0  Technology  2  Cost & 
Management 
0  Multiple  1  Real estate  0 
Emulate, 
Learn & 
R&D 
0  People and 
Technology 
0  Cost, People 
& 
Management 
0  Single and 
Multiple 
1  Business 
& Real 
Estate 
0 
R&D only  0                 
                         
Kulim Hi 
Tech Park 
FR 10  1  Acquire  0  People  1  Cost & People  0  Single  1  Business  1 
Emulate &  0  Technology  0  Cost &  0  Multiple  0  Real estate  0   196 
Learn  Management 
Emulate, 
Learn & 
R&D 
1  People and 
Technology 
0  Cost, People 
& 
Management 
1  Single and 
Multiple 
0     
R&D only  0                 
Sri Iskandar 
Park 
FR 24  1  Acquire  1  People    Cost & People  0  Single  1  Business  0 
Emulate & 
Learn 
0  Technology  1  Cost & 
Management 
0  Multiple  0  Real estate  1 
Emulate, 
Learn & 
R&D 
0  People and 
Technology 
0  Cost, People 
& 
Management 
1  Single and 
Multiple 
0     
R&D only  0                 
Johor Tech 
Park 
FR 25  1  Acquire  0  People  1  Cost & People  0  Single  0  Business  1 
Emulate & 
Learn 
0  Technology  0  Cost & 
Management 
0  Multiple  0  Real estate  0 
Emulate, 
Learn & 
R&D 
0  People and 
Technology 
0  Cost, People 
& 
Management 
1  Single and 
Multiple 
1     
R&D only  1                 
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6.3 Cross analysis on “Micro” level stickiness 
Based  on  the  analysis  on  Table  6.6,  the  researcher  further  analysed  the  findings  to 
discover  the  important  aspects  of  “micro”  stickiness  of  knowledge  transfer  at  seven 
Malaysian technology parks.   At Cyberjaya, “micro” stickiness of transfer mechanism is 
at  “emulate  and  learn”  (n=6  out  of  8),  types  of  transfer  is  at  “people”  (n=6  out  8), 
knowledge  barriers  is  at  “cost,  people  and  management”  (all  Cyberjaya  informants), 
transfer context is at “single and multiple” (all Cyberjaya informants), and technology 
park‟s  function  is  at  “business”  role  (n=5  out  of  8).  Table  6.6a  highlights  “micro” 
stickiness trend at Cyberjaya Technology Park. 
Table 6.6a 
“Micro” Stickiness Trend at Cyberjaya 
“Micro” Stickiness Aspects  Routines  Frequency 
Transfer Mechanisms 
  
Emulate & Learn  6 
Acquire  2 
Types of Transfer 
  
People  6 
Technology  2 
Knowledge Barriers 
  
  
Cost & People  3 
Cost & Management  3 
Cost, People & Management  2 
Transfer Context 
  
Single  4 
Single and Multiple  4 
Tech Park Function 
  
Business  5 
Real estate  3 
Note: Response from FR 3, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 16, 17 (n=8). 
 
At Technology Park Malaysia (TPM), “micro” stickiness of transfer mechanism is at 
“acquire” (n=4 out of 7), types of transfer is at “people” (n=4 out 7), knowledge barriers 
is at “cost, people and management” (all TPM informants), transfer context is at “single” 
(n=5 out of 7), and technology park‟s function is “real estate” role (n=4 out of 7). Table 
6.6b highlights “micro” stickiness trend at Technology Park Malaysia. 
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Table 6.6b 
“Micro” Stickiness Trend at Technology Park Malaysia (TPM) 
"Micro" Stickiness Aspects  Routines  Frequency 
Transfer Mechanisms 
  
  
Acquire  4 
Emulate & Learn  2 
Emulate, Learn & R&D  1 
Types of Transfer 
  
People  4 
Technology  3 
Knowledge Barriers 
  
  
Cost & People  3 
Cost & Management  2 
Cost, People & Management  2 
Transfer Context 
  
Single  5 
Single and Multiple  2 
Tech Park Function 
  
Real estate    4 
Business  3 
Note: Response from FR 2, 11, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20 (n=7). 
 
Both Cyberjaya and TPM are in the same vicinity, but they exhibit different patterns on 
three “micro” stickiness aspects. Table 6.6c highlights the differences. Firstly, while ICT 
firms  at  Cyberjaya  emphasized  “emulate  and  learn,”  ICT  firms  at  TPM  focused  on 
“acquire”  as  a  very  important  transfer  mechanism.  Secondly,  the  transfer  context  at 
Cyberjaya combines both “single and multiple” contexts, whilst the majority of ICT firms 
at TPM used “single” context of transfer. Finally, most ICT firms at Cyberjaya perceived 
that Cyberjaya played a “business” role at Cyberjaya, which is about helping ICT firms to 
facilitate networking with potential partners and investors. However, ICT firms at TPM 
postulated that TPM management just functions as a real estate agent that is to provide 
reasonable facilities for ICT firms. 
Table 6.6c 
Comparison on “Micro” Stickiness Trend at Cyberjaya and Technology Park Malaysia (TPM) 
“Micro” Stickiness Aspects  Cyberjaya  TPM 
Transfer Mechanisms  Emulate & Learn  Acquire 
Types of Transfer  People  People 
Knowledge Barriers  Cost, People & Management  Cost, People & 
Management 
Transfer Context  Single and Multiple  Single 
Tech Park Function  Business  Real estate   
Note: Eight informants from Cyberjaya (FR 3, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 16, 17) 
Seven TPM (FR 2, 11, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20)   199 
 
At Selangor Science Park (SSP), “micro” stickiness of transfer mechanism is at “emulate, 
learn, and R&D” (n=4 out of 5), types of transfer is at “people” (n=4 out 5), knowledge 
barriers is at “cost, people and management” (all SSP informants), transfer context is at 
“single” (n=3 out of 5), and technology park‟s function is “business” role (n=4 out of 5). 
Table 6.6d highlights “micro” stickiness trend at Selangor Science Park. 
 
Table 6.6d 
“Micro” Stickiness Trend at Selangor Science Park (SSP) 
"Micro" Stickiness Aspects  Routines  Frequency 
Transfer Mechanisms  Emulate, Learn & R&D  2 
   R&D only  2 
   Acquire  1 
Types of Transfer  People  4 
   Technology  1 
Knowledge Barriers  Cost, People & Management  4 
   Cost & Management  1 
Transfer Context  Single  3 
   Single and Multiple  2 
Tech Park Function  Business  4 
   Real estate  1 
Note: Responses from FR 8, 9, 21, 22, 23 (n=5) 
 
As a neighbour to both Cyberjaya and TPM, Selangor Science Park (SSP) demonstrates 
two  main  differences  in  terms  of  transfer  mechanisms  and  the  perceived  role  of  a 
technology park. The three have different transfer mechanisms: “emulate and learn” at 
Cyberjaya,  “acquire”  at  TPM,  and  “emulate,  learn  and  R&D”  at  SSP.  However, 
Cyberjaya and SSP are very much close in transfer mechanisms, except that ICT firms at 
Cyberjaya  did  not  include  an  R&D  mechanism.    All  three  technology  parks  share 
common stickiness on “people” at types of transfer and “cost, people and management” 
as knowledge barriers. In other situations, two technology parks, Cyberjaya and Selangor   200 
Science Park agreed on stickiness on “single” transfer context and “business” role of a 
technology park. Table 6.6e highlights the differences. 
      Table 6.6e 
      Comparison on “Micro” Stickiness Trend at Cyberjaya, Technology Park Malaysia (TPM), and 
       Selangor Science Park (SSP) 
“Micro” Stickiness Aspects  Cyberjaya  TPM  SSP 
Transfer Mechanisms  Emulate & Learn  Acquire  Emulate, Learn & 
R&D 
Types of Transfer  People  People  People 
Knowledge Barriers  Cost, People & 
Management 
Cost, People & 
Management 
Cost, People & 
Management 
Transfer Context  Single and Multiple  Single  Single 
Tech Park Function  Business  Real estate    Business 
      Note: Eight Cyberjaya informants (FR 3, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 16, 17)  
      Seven TPM informants (FR 2, 11,14, 15, 18, 19, 20), Five SSP informants (FR 8, 9, 21, 22, 23) 
 
Informants with  Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) provided similar answers. MSC‟s 
“micro”  stickiness  of  transfer  mechanism  is  at  “acquire,”  types  of  transfer  is  at 
“technology,”  knowledge barriers is at “cost and people,” transfer context is at “single 
and multiple,”, and technology park‟s function is “business” role. Table 6.6f highlights 
the “micro” stickiness trend at MSC. 
Table 6.6f 
“Micro” Stickiness Trend at Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) 
"Micro" Stickiness Aspects  Routines  Frequency 
Transfer Mechanisms  Acquire  2 
Types of Transfer  Technology  2 
Knowledge Barriers  Cost & People  2 
Transfer Context  Single and Multiple  2 
Tech Park Function  Business  2 
Note: Responses from FR 1, 4 (n=2) 
 
Based on the findings of three federal government technology parks (Cyberjaya, TPM, 
and MSC), MSC disagreed with stickiness of “people” at types of transfer and “cost, 
people  and  management”  at  knowledge  barriers.  However,  MSC  can  agree  with 
Cyberjaya on “business” role of a technology park. In other situations, MSC agreed with   201 
TPM on “acquire” as stickiness in transfer mechanisms. Table 6.6g compares “micro” 
stickiness at three federal government technology parks. 
 
      Table 6.6g 
      Comparison on “Micro” Stickiness Trend at Federal Government‟s Technology Parks - Cyberjaya, 
     Technology Park Malaysia (TPM), and Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) 
“Micro” Stickiness 
Aspects 
Cyberjaya  TPM  MSC 
Transfer Mechanisms  Emulate & Learn  Acquire  Acquire 
Types of Transfer  People  People  Technology 
Knowledge Barriers  Cost, People & 
Management 
Cost, People & 
Management 
Cost & People 
Transfer Context  Single and Multiple  Single  Single and Multiple 
Tech Park Function  Business  Real estate    Business 
      Note: Eight Cyberjaya informants (FR 3, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 16, 17)  
      Seven TPM informants (FR 2, 11,14, 15, 18, 19, 20), and Two MSC informants (FR 1 and 4) 
 
The researcher managed to interview key staff from each of these firms: one from Kulim 
Hi Tech Park (KHTP), Seri Iskandar Technology Park (SITP), and Johor Technology 
Park (JTP) respectively.  All of the informants agreed that the origin of “micro” stickiness 
is “cost, people and management” as knowledge barriers. In other situations, only two of 
the informants agreed on certain aspects of stickiness. KHTP and JTP agreed on “people” 
at types of transfer and the perceived “business” function of a technology park. Table 
6.6h provides the trend of „micro‟ stickiness. 
Table 6.6h 
“Micro” Stickiness Trend at KHTP, SITP, and JTP 
“Micro” Stickiness 
Aspects 
KHTP (FR 10)  SITP (FR 24)  JTP (FR 25) 
Transfer Mechanisms  Emulate, Learn & R&D  Acquire  R&D only 
Types of Transfer  People  Technology  People 
Knowledge Barriers  Cost, People & 
Management 
Cost, People & 
Management 
Cost, People & 
Management 
Transfer Context  Single  Single  Single and Multiple 
Tech Park Function  Business  Real estate  Business 
Note: KHTP – Kulim Hi Tech Park (Kedah), SITP – Seri Iskandar Technology Park (Perak), and 
JTP – Johor Technology Park (Johor) 
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The following analysis is aimed at seeing trends among four state government technology 
parks,  namely  Kulim  Hi  Tech  Park  (KHTP),  Seri  Iskandar  Technology  Park  (SITP), 
Selangor  Science  Park  (SSP)  and  Johor  Technology  Park  (JTP).  All  four  technology 
parks reached a common answer that is “cost, people and management” caused “micro” 
stickiness on knowledge barriers in knowledge transfer among ICT firms. As for the 
“micro”  stickiness  for  types  of  transfer,  three  technology  parks  except  for  SITP, 
demonstrated the role of “people.” In the aspect of transfer context, all technology parks 
except  for  JTP  pointed  out  “single”  transfer  context  caused  “micro”  stickiness  in 
knowledge transfer. While three technology parks agreed on a perceived “business” role 
of a technology park, SITP argued that a technology park played no more than a mere 
“real estate” role. In transfer mechanism, KHTP and SSP postulated that “emulate, learn 
and R&D” cause the “micro” stickiness.  Table 6.6i shows “micro” stickiness at four state 
government technology parks. 
  Table 6.6i 
  Comparison of “Micro” Stickiness Trends at State Government Technology Parks -  
  KHTP, SITP, SSP and JTP 
“Micro” Stickiness 
Aspects 
KHTP 
(FR 10) 
SITP 
(FR 24) 
SSP 
(FR 8, 9, 21, 22, 23) 
JTP 
(FR 25) 
Transfer 
Mechanisms 
Emulate, Learn 
& R&D 
Acquire  Emulate, Learn & 
R&D 
R&D only 
Types of Transfer  People  Technology  People  People 
Knowledge Barriers  Cost, People & 
Management 
Cost, People & 
Management 
Cost, People & 
Management 
Cost, People & 
Management 
Transfer Context  Single  Single  Single  Single and 
Multiple 
Tech Park Function  Business  Real estate  Business  Business 
  Note: KHTP – Kulim Hi Tech Park (Kedah), SITP – Seri Iskandar Technology Park (Perak),  
 Selangor Science Park (SSP), and JTP – Johor Technology Park (Johor) 
 
Based on the analysis of Table 6.6g (three federal level technology parks - Cyberjaya, 
TPM, and MSC) and Table 6.6i (four state level technology parks – KHTP, SITP, SSP, 
and  JTP),  federal  government  technology  parks  are  inclined  towards  “acquire”  and   203 
“emulate and learn” in terms of transfer mechanisms, “people” more than “technology” 
for types of transfer, “cost, people and management” for knowledge barriers, “single and 
multiple” for transfer context, and “real estate” role for technology parks. However, state 
government technology parks prefer transfer mechanisms beyond “acquire” and “emulate 
and  learning,”  which  also  includes  the  “R&D”  mechanism.  The  state  government 
technology parks agree with the responses from federal government technology parks on 
“people” more than “technology” for stickiness in types of transfer and “cost, people and 
management”  in  knowledge  barriers.  However,  both  types  of  technology  parks  have 
different  views  on  “micro”  stickiness  aspects  of  transfer  context  and  the  function  of 
technology  parks.  State  government  technology  parks  preferred  “single”  for  transfer 
context and “business” role for technology parks. Table 6.6j highlights the similarities 
and differences of “micro” stickiness between two types of technology parks. 
      Table 6.6j 
      Comparison on “Micro” Stickiness between Three Federal Government‟s Technology Parks – 
      Cyberjaya, TPM, MSC and Four State Government‟s Technology Parks - KHTP, SITP, SSP and JTP 
Technology 
Parks 
Transfer 
Mechanisms 
Types of 
Transfer 
Knowledge 
Barriers 
Transfer 
Context 
Tech Park 
Function 
Cyberjaya  Emulate & Learn  People  Cost, People & 
Management 
Single and 
Multiple 
Business 
TPM  Acquire  People  Cost, People & 
Management 
Single  Real estate   
MSC  Acquire  Technology  Cost & People  Single and 
Multiple 
Business 
KHTP  Emulate, Learn & 
R&D 
People  Cost, People & 
Management 
Single  Business 
SITP  Acquire  Technology  Cost, People & 
Management 
Single  Real estate 
SSP  Emulate, Learn & 
R&D 
People  Cost, People & 
Management 
Single  Business 
JTP  R&D only  People  Cost, People & 
Management 
Single and 
Multiple 
Business 
      Note: Cyberjaya,Technology Park Malaysia (TPM), and Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC)  
     KHTP – Kulim Hi Tech Park (Kedah), SITP – Seri Iskandar Technology Park (Perak),  
     Selangor Science Park (SSP), and JTP – Johor Technology Park (Johor) 
 
Table 6.6j is further analysed for the degree of costliness. There are three categories of 
costliness: (a) very costly (VC), (b) quite costly (QC), and (c) reasonable cost (RC).   204 
“Very costly” (VC) denotes more than two routines; “quite costly” (QC) refers to two 
routines,  and “reasonably  costly” (RC) refers to  a single routine  to  allow knowledge 
transfer. Table 6.7 shows the trend. 
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Table 6.7 
Cross Analysis on Firms Representatives Responses to “Micro” Stickiness Aspects for the Degree of Costliness 
Technology 
Parks 
Transfer Mechanisms  Types of Transfer  Knowledge Barriers  Transfer Contexts  Tech Park Function 
Routine  No  SC  Routine  No  SC  Routine  N
o 
SC  Routine  No  SC  Routine  No  SC 
Cyberjaya  Emulate & 
Learn 
6  QC  People  6  QC  Cost & 
People;  Cost 
& 
Management 
3  VC  Single  4  RC  Business  5  QC 
Technology 
Park Malaysia 
Acquire  4  RC  People  4  QC  Cost & People  3  QC  Single  5  RC  Real estate  4  RC 
Selangor 
Science Park 
Emulate, 
Learn & 
R&D 
2  VC  People  4  QC  Cost, People 
& 
Management 
4  VC  Single  3  RC  Business  4  QC 
Multimedia 
Super Corridor 
Acquire  2  RC  Technology  2  RC  Cost & People  2  QC  Single 
and 
Multiple 
2  VC  Business  2  QC 
Kulim Hi 
Tech Park 
Emulate, 
Learn & 
R&D 
1  VC  People  1  QC  Cost, People 
& 
Management 
1  VC  Single  1  RC  Business  1  QC 
Sri Iskandar 
Park 
Acquire  1  RC  Technology  1  RC  Cost, People 
& 
Management 
1  VC  Single  1  RC  Real estate  1  RC 
Johor Tech 
Park 
R&D only  1  QC  People  1  QC  Cost, People 
& 
Management 
1  VC  Single 
and 
Multiple 
1  VC  Business  1  QC 
Note:  Very Costly (VC), Quite Costly (QC), and Reasonable Costly (RC)   206 
 
 
Based on the feedback of ICT firms, the costly nature of knowledge transfer among ICT 
firm can be divided into three levels: (a) very costly (VC), (b) quite costly (QC), and (c) 
reasonably  costly  (RC).  These  codes  represent  the  level  of  “micro”  stickiness  in 
knowledge transfer among ICT firms in seven Malaysian technology parks at Multimedia 
Super  Corridor  (MSC), Technology Park  Malaysia  (TPM),  Cyberjaya  (CB), Selangor 
Science Park (SSP), Perak‟s Seri Iskandar Technology Park (SITP), Johor Technology 
Park (JTP), and Kulim Hi Tech Park (KHTP). All three federal government technology 
parks fall under the QC category. However, for the four state government technology 
parks,  two  of  them  are  under  QC  and  VC  respectively.  While  KHTP  and  SITP  are 
categorised under QC, SSP and JTP fall under VC category. Table 6.8 summarizes the 
degree of costliness of “micro” stickiness at seven technology parks. 
      Table 6.8 
      The Degree of Costliness of “Micro” Stickiness at Three Federal Government‟s Technology Parks – 
      Cyberjaya, TPM, MSC and Four State Government‟s Technology Parks - KHTP, SITP, SSP and JTP 
Technology 
Parks 
Transfer 
Mechanisms 
Types of 
Transfer 
Knowledge 
Barriers 
Transfer 
Context 
Tech Park 
Function 
Overall 
Cyberjaya  QC  QC  VC  RC  QC  QC 
TPM  RC  QC  QC  RC  RC  QC 
MSC  RC  RC  QC  VC  QC  QC 
KHTP  RC  RC  QC  VC  QC  QC 
SITP  RC  RC  VC  RC  RC  QC 
SSP  VC  QC  VC  RC  QC  VC 
JTP  QC  QC  VC  VC  QC  VC 
      Note: Cyberjaya,Technology Park Malaysia (TPM), and Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC)  
     KHTP – Kulim Hi Tech Park (Kedah), SITP – Seri Iskandar Technology Park (Perak),  
     Selangor Science Park (SSP), and JTP – Johor Technology Park (Johor) 
     Key: Very Costly (VC), Quite Costly (QC), and Reasonable Costly (RC) 
 
 
Table 6.9 shows the degree of costliness in “micro” stickiness of knowledge transfer 
among ICT firms is between “very costly” and “quite costly.” In terms of location, while   207 
two technology parks have the average degree of “very costly,” five technology parks 
have  the  average  of  “quite  costly”  of  “micro”  stickiness  in  knowledge  transfer.  The 
answers for Question 1 (How does your firm respond to high cost transfer mechanisms 
(learn, copy, emulate, acquire, and modify) in knowledge transfer with other ICT firms?) 
indicated that the cost of transfer mechanisms is “very costly” for the combination of 
“emulate, learn, research and development.” As for Question 2 (How does your firm 
respond to high cost types of transfer in knowledge transfer with other ICT firms?), the 
cost of types of transfer is also “very costly” when both “people” and “technology” are 
combined.  The  answers  for  Question  3  (How  does  your  firm  respond  to  high  cost 
knowledge barriers in knowledge transfer with other ICT firms?) indicated “quite costly” 
when two out of three elements – “cost,” “people,” and “management” are combined.  
Finally, the answers for Question 4 (How does your firm respond to high cost transfer 
contexts in knowledge transfer with other ICT firms?) mentioned “quite costly” when 
“single” and “multiple” combined. However, transfer contexts can be “very costly” when 
technology  parks  that  are  supposed  to  facilitate  knowledge  transfer  do  not  provide 
adequate support. 
 
In  short,  ICT  firms  contributed  to  “micro”  level  stickiness  in  terms  of  “very  costly” 
routines and practices in (a) transfer mechanism, (b) types of transfer, (c) knowledge 
barriers, and (d) transfer context. 
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Table 6.9 
Research  Question,  Proposition,  “Micro”  Stickiness  Aspects,  Interview  Questions  and  Key  Findings  for  “Micro” 
Stickiness on Knowledge Transfer among ICT firms  
Research 
Question 
Proposition  “Micro” 
Stickiness 
Aspects 
Interview Questions  Key findings on 
“Micro” 
Stickiness 
Overall 
Degree of 
Costliness 
Why is 
knowledge 
difficult to 
transfer? 
ICT firms 
contributed to 
“micro” level 
stickiness when 
they did not 
want to be 
involved in 
knowledge 
transfer because 
it was costly in 
terms of (a) 
transfer 
mechanism, (b) 
types of transfer, 
(c) knowledge 
barriers, and (d) 
transfer context 
Transfer 
mechanisms 
How does your firm 
respond to high cost 
transfer mechanisms 
(learn, copy, emulate, 
acquire, and modify) 
in knowledge transfer 
with other ICT firms? 
VERY COSTLY 
(VC) 
Acquire, Emulate, 
Learn, and R&D 
(A+ELR) 
Acquire, Emulate, 
and Learn (A+EL)  
Acquire, Emulate, 
Learn, and R&D 
(A + ELR) 
QUITE COSTLY 
(QC) 
R&D only (R) 
Emulate, Learn, 
and R&D (ELR) 
REASONABLY 
COSTLY (RC) 
Acquire only (A)  
VERY 
COSTLY 
Types of transfer  How does your firm 
respond to high cost 
types of transfer in 
knowledge transfer 
with other ICT firms?  
 
VERY COSTLY 
Technology and 
People 
 
QUITE COSTLY 
People only 
VERY 
COSTLY 
Knowledge 
transfer barriers 
How does your firm 
respond to high cost 
knowledge barriers in 
knowledge transfer 
with other ICT firms?  
 
VERY COSTLY 
Cost, People and 
Management  
QUITE COSTLY 
Cost and People; 
Cost and 
Management 
REASONABLY 
COSTLY 
Cost only 
QUITE 
COSTLY 
Transfer 
contexts 
How does your firm 
respond to high cost 
transfer contexts in 
knowledge transfer 
with other ICT firms?  
 
VERY COSTLY 
Single and 
multiple 
Business role  
QUITE COSTLY 
Single and 
multiple 
Real estate  
REASONABLY 
COSTLY 
Single 
Real estate 
QUITE 
COSTLY 
Note: The degree of costliness at five technology parks (CB, TPM, MSC, SITP, and KHTP) is categorised 
as “Quite Costly” (QC). Another two technology parks, SSP and JTP are “Very Costly” (VC). 
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Table 6.10 
Proposition, Interview Questions and Key Findings for  “Micro” Stickiness on Knowledge Transfer among ICT firms  
Proposition  Micro Stickiness 
Aspects 
Literature  Methods  Interview Questions  Key findings 
ICT firms 
contributed to 
“micro” level 
stickiness when 
they did not want 
to be involved in 
knowledge transfer 
because it was 
costly in terms of 
(a) transfer 
mechanism, (b) 
types of transfer, 
(c) knowledge 
barriers, and (d) 
transfer context 
Transfer 
mechanisms 
Arrow‟s costly “learning by doing” (1962, p. 
155) 
Learn – face to face,  How does your firm 
respond to high cost 
transfer mechanisms 
(learn, copy, emulate, 
acquire, and modify) in 
knowledge transfer with 
other ICT firms? 
VERY COSTLY 
Acquire, Emulate, Learn, and R&D 
(A+ELR) - TPM 
Acquire, Emulate, and Learn (A+EL) 
- CB 
Acquire, Emulate, Learn, and R&D 
(A + ELR) - SSP 
QUITE COSTLY 
R&D only (R) 
Emulate, Learn, and R&D (ELR) 
REASONABLY COSTLY 
Acquire only (A)  
Nelson and Winter‟s costly “replication” 
(1982, pp. 9-11,99) 
Learn and emulate 
Winter and Szulanski‟s (2001, p. 731) costly 
“doing” is replicable 
Acquire, learn, and 
modify 
Szulanski and Jensen‟s (2004, p. 348) costly 
“replication” 
Learn and emulate 
Szulanski & Jensen‟s (2006, pp. 937-939) 
costly “adapt”  
“template” 
Acquire, learn, modify, 
and update 
Types of transfer  Arrow‟s (1969, pp. 29-35) technical type  Technical manual  How does your firm 
respond to high cost types 
of transfer in knowledge 
transfer with other ICT 
firms?  
 
VERY COSTLY 
Technology and People 
 
QUITE COSTLY 
People only 
Teece‟s (1977, p. 245) technology transfer  Technical blueprint, 
workshops, seminars  Szulanski‟s (1996, p. 28) “best practice” 
Szulanski & Jensen‟s (2004, p. 348) 
“template” or “working example” 
Knowledge 
transfer barriers 
Szulanski‟s (1995, pp. 438-439) nature of the 
knowledge and the context of knowledge 
Routines, initiatives, 
ability of employees, 
situation, culture, 
personality 
How does your firm 
respond to high cost 
knowledge barriers in 
knowledge transfer with 
other ICT firms?  
 
VERY COSTLY 
Cost, People and Management 
(C+P+M) 
 
QUITE COSTLY 
Cost and People (C+P) 
Simonin‟s (1999, pp. 464-465) knowledge, 
medium, and use 
 
Transfer contexts  Arrow‟s (1969, pp. 29-35) Single context  firm-specific context – 
people, context, and 
preference 
How does your firm 
respond to high cost 
transfer contexts in 
knowledge transfer with 
other ICT firms?  
 
VERY COSTLY 
Business Park and Real Estate 
(B+R) 
 
QUITE COSTLY 
Business Park only (B) 
Szulanski and Jensen‟s (2004, p. 350) single 
context  
Szulanski and Jensen‟s (2006, p. 938) single 
context  
Teece‟s (1977, p. 247) multiple context   specific technology 
transfer among factories 
of different contexts 
Galbraith‟s (1990, p. 61) multiple context  
Von Hippe‟sl (1994, p. 434) multiple context  multiple contexts impede 
knowledge transfer 
between firms   210 
CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
The study examined stickiness in knowledge transfer among ICT firms in Malaysian 
technology parks. Stickiness is explained in terms of “macro” and “micro” levels. The 
literature argued that the government contributed to “macro” level stickiness through its 
economic  policies  which  did  not  support  knowledge  transfer  between  firms.  Such  a 
situation  occurs  due  to  the  government‟s  concern  to  fulfil  its  social  and  economic 
obligations. Thus, when the government tries to address both targets, it loses its focus to 
encourage knowledge transfer between ICT firms. As for “micro” level stickiness, the 
scholars  emphasised  that  ICT firms contributed to  this  type  of  stickiness.  Table 7.1 
summarises the feedback from the respondents. 
Table 7.1  
Summary of Feedbacks from the Informants 
Proposition  Interview Questions  Answers to Interview Questions 
MACRO STICKINESS 
 
The government contributed to 
“macro” level stickiness through 
economic policies that 
constrained firms by requiring 
that their decisions reflect the 
national agenda put forward by 
those in government. 
 
 
A. What are the factors that have 
been considered by the 
government when formulating 
economic policies to encourage 
knowledge transfer among ICT 
firms? 
 
B. Why does the government 
include the national agenda in 
economic policies which are 
supposed to encourage 
knowledge transfer among ICT 
firms? 
 
C.  How do Malaysian 
technology parks assist 
knowledge transfer among ICT 
firms that operate in Malaysian 
technology parks? 
 
Informants: 
14 policy makers 
11 government officers 
25 firms‟ representatives 
A. Factors included in Malaysian 
economic policies:  
a. economic and business 
advantages  
b. employment opportunities 
c. national unity  
d. wealth creation 
 
B. Reasons for the national 
agenda in economic policies: 
a. protect the economy 
b. to maintain unity and harmony 
in multiracial context, and 
c. to safeguard the national 
interest 
 
C. Roles of Malaysian technology 
parks: 
a. stimulus 
b. networking 
c. knowledge 
d. incubation 
e. incentives 
f. image 
 
MICRO STICKINESS  Interview questions:  (a) TM: cost of transfer   211 
 
ICT firms contributed to “micro” 
level stickiness when they did not 
want to be involved in knowledge 
transfer because it was costly in 
terms of (a) transfer mechanism, 
(b) types of transfer, (c) 
knowledge barriers, and (d) 
transfer context 
 
1. How does your firm respond to 
high cost transfer mechanisms 
(learn, copy, emulate, acquire, 
and modify) in knowledge 
transfer with other ICT firms? 
 
2. How does your firm respond to 
high cost types of transfer in 
knowledge transfer with other 
ICT firms?  
 
3. How does your firm respond to 
high cost knowledge barriers in 
knowledge transfer with other 
ICT firms?  
 
4. How does your firm respond to 
high cost transfer contexts in 
knowledge transfer with other 
ICT firms?  
 
mechanisms is “very costly” in 
the combination of “emulate, 
learn, research and development.” 
(b) TT: the cost of types of 
transfer is also “very costly” 
when both “people” and 
“technology” combined. 
(c) KB: “quite costly” when two 
out of three elements – “cost,” 
“people,” and “management”, 
combined. 
(d) TC: quite costly” when 
“single” and “multiple” 
combined; plus “business” role of 
technology parks. 
 
7.1 “Macro” level stickiness 
This  section  discusses  “macro”  level  stickiness  based  on  the  feedback  from  policy 
makers, government officers and representatives of ICT firms. These groups were asked 
similar interview questions to explain the contribution of the government to stickiness in 
knowledge  transfer  between  ICT  firms  in  Malaysian  technology  parks.  In  the  first 
interview question, the informants were asked about the factors that have been considered 
by  the  government  when  it  formulated  the  economic  policies.  The  second  interview 
question asked the informants to give reasons why the government incorporated those 
factors in its economic policies. Finally, the study asked the informants to explain the 
roles of Malaysian technology parks in assisting knowledge transfer between ICT firms. 
Table 7.2 postulates key indicators to the feedback from the respondents. 
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Table 7.2 
Key Indicators from the Feedbacks from the Informants 
Proposition  Literature  Interview Questions  Key Answers  Key argument 
The  government 
contributed  to 
“macro”  level 
stickiness through 
economic policies 
that  constrained 
firms by requiring 
that  their 
decisions  reflect 
the  national 
agenda  put 
forward  by  those 
in government. 
government effort to 
encourage “learning”; to 
encourage 
“improvement” and 
“innovation”; socio-
economic factors 
embedded in government 
economic policies 
(Sweeney, 1996, pp. 6-
19) 
 
A.  What  are  the 
factors that have been 
considered  by  the 
government  when 
formulating economic 
policies to encourage 
knowledge  transfer 
among ICT firms? 
 
A. Factors included in 
Malaysian economic 
policies:  
to encourage 
“learning,” 
“improvement,” and 
“innovation.” 
 
a. economic and 
business advantages  
 potential 
“innovation.” 
 
b. employment 
opportunities  
learning “instrument” 
 
c. national unity  
government‟s attitude 
to ensure political 
stability 
 
d. wealth creation  
“improvement” 
 
“learning,” 
“improvement,” and 
innovation confine to 
  “Learning 
instrument, for 
economic advantages 
 
search for “potential” 
in both economic and 
business sectors  
The government‟s 
attitude, to encourage 
economic growth and 
social needs 
 
to encourage 
“learning,” 
“improvement,” and 
“innovation.”  
The free flow of 
knowledge 
 
to encourage 
“learning,” 
“improvement,” and 
“innovation.”  
Nature of technology 
parks 
To  generate  capability 
through  “technological 
development”;  essential 
for  economic 
development  (Mokyr, 
2002, pp.77-86) 
B.  Why  does  the 
government  include 
the  national  agenda 
in  economic  policies 
which are supposed to 
encourage  knowledge 
transfer  among  ICT 
firms? 
 
B. Reasons for the 
national agenda in 
economic policies: 
a.  protect  the 
economy 
b.  to  maintain  unity 
and  harmony  in 
multiracial  context, 
and 
c.  to  safeguard  the 
national interest 
 
to encourage 
“learning,” 
“improvement,” and 
“innovation.”   
employment 
opportunities , and  
Malaysian technology 
parks and the national 
agenda 
 
to encourage 
“learning,” 
“improvement,” and 
“innovation.”  
The free flow of 
knowledge 
to convince firms to use 
“learning” outcomes for 
“improvement” and 
“innovation.” (Sweeney, 
1996, pp. 6-19) 
to convince firms to be in 
high technology  in 
technology parks 
(Macdonald, 1998, p. 
162) 
C.  How do 
Malaysian technology 
parks assist 
knowledge transfer 
among ICT firms that 
operate in  Malaysian 
technology parks? 
C. Roles of Malaysian 
technology parks: 
a. stimulus 
b. networking 
c. knowledge 
d. incubation 
e. incentives 
f. image 
 
use “learning” 
outcomes for 
“improvement” and 
“innovation.”  
high technology  in 
technology parks, 
(Macdonald, 1998, p. 
162) 
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The  researcher  identified  five  key  findings  based  on  the  feedback  of  policy  makers,  
government  officers  and  representatives  of  ICT  firms,  namely  (1)  the  “learning” 
instrument,  (2)  the  government‟s  attitude,  (3)  the  nature  of  technology  parks,  (4) 
Malaysian technology parks and the national agenda, and (5) the free flow of knowledge. 
Table 7.3 shows the basis of the research key findings synthesised from the key answers 
of the three interview questions. 
Table 7.3 
The basis for Key Ideas 
Key Findings  Question 1  Question 2  Question 3 
The “learning” instrument  a. employment opportunities 
b. wealth creation 
 
a. protect the economy 
b. safeguard the national 
interest 
 
a. networking 
b. knowledge 
c. incubation 
 
The government‟s attitude  a.  maintain national unity 
b. economic and business 
advantages  
 
a. maintain unity and 
harmony in multiracial 
context 
b. to safeguard the national 
interest 
 
a. networking 
b. knowledge 
c. incentives 
d. image 
 
Nature of technology 
parks  
a. economic and business 
advantages  
a. safeguard the national 
interest 
 
a. stimulus 
b. networking 
c. knowledge 
d. incubation 
 
Malaysian technology 
parks and the national 
agenda 
a. economic and business 
advantages  
a. protect the economy 
 
a. stimulus 
b. networking 
c. knowledge 
d. incubation 
 
The free flow of 
knowledge 
a.  employment opportunities  a. maintain unity and 
harmony in multiracial 
context 
a. networking 
b. knowledge 
c. incubation 
 
 
1. “Learning” instrument 
Malaysian  technology  parks  have  been  used  as  a  “learning”  instrument  for  the 
development of the ICT industry. The use of technology parks to achieve this economic 
objective  is  in  line  with  many  developed  countries.  These  countries  established   214 
technology  parks  to  develop  technological  competitiveness  in  the  knowledge-based 
economy.  Nevertheless,  the  informants  argued  that  the  Malaysian  government  has 
incorporated the national agenda in terms of providing employment opportunities and 
achieving good economic growth in the policy to support the development of the ICT 
industry. In fact, the informants were of the view that when the government established 
Malaysian technology parks, it could encourage knowledge transfer between ICT firms.   
 
The  situation  explained  by  the  policy  makers,  government  officers,  and  ICT  firms‟ 
representatives  demonstrated  that  the  government  strongly  believed  in  the  role  of 
technology  parks  to  encourage  “learning”  through  knowledge  transfer  between  firms. 
This situation is supported by Sweeney‟s (1996, pp. 6-7) argument that  governments 
have used the “learning” concept as a means to promote  economic growth. With this 
perspective, Sweeney (1996, pp. 6-7) argued that “learning” becomes an important tool to 
encourage technology development.   
 
 
 
2. The government‟s attitude 
The government believed that by using technology parks, it can encourage knowledge 
transfer because other governments have done so. In fact, the attitude demonstrated by 
the  government  is  not  surprising.    Mokyr  (2002,  pp.  77-86)  has  already  argued  that 
governments often emphasised  the use of economic tools such as technology parks to 
achieve good economic performance. In relation to that, Mokyr (2002, pp. 77-86) argued 
that  the  governments  often  lose  focus  on  the  wellness  of  the  society  when  they   215 
concentrate on assisting the economic sector to achieve good economic performance at 
the expense of non-economic sectors. 
 
Essentially, both federal and state governments tried a new tool to promote changes in the 
economy.  This  attempt  included the  use  of  technology  parks  to  attract  foreign  direct 
investment  for  the  development  of  the  ICT  industry  within  the  knowledge-based 
economy.  The  study  observed  that  when  the  Malaysian  government  used  the  Silicon 
Valley model for its technology parks, it applied the “incremental” mode of knowledge 
transfer between ICT firms, that is a flow of knowledge from one institution to another 
(Macdonald,  1998,  p.  51).  Furthermore,  the  informants  argued  that  the  government 
decided  to  use  the  knowledge-based  economy  concept  because  it  believed  that  the 
country could attain good economic performance as demonstrated by those developed 
countries. So, the influence of external forces has motivated the government to subscribe 
to the idea of a knowledge-based economy and use the technology parks as an instrument 
to achieve good economic growth.    
 
 
In Malaysia‟s context, informants claimed that the government incorporated the national 
agenda into the economic policies.  This was evident despite the influence of external 
forces that required them to reform the existing approach to formulate these economic 
policies.  In  fact,  Macdonald  (Macdonald,  1998,  p.45)  argued  that  the  influence  of 
external forces can motivate a government to make changes in the economic policies. 
When  this  situation  occurs,  the  government  will  be  subjected  to  external  change 
(Macdonald, 1998, p. 45).    216 
 
This kind of stance can also be related to many countries that emulated the Silicon Valley 
model because they were told of the success stories  (Cook & Joseph, 2001, pp. 378-379). 
Thus, governments tend to set up technology parks by giving greatest emphasis on good 
physical buildings and sophisticated information technology equipment. This emphasis is 
supported by an argument of a federal minister. 
 
 
3. The nature of technology parks 
Many governments used technology parks as instruments to create new wealth in the 
knowledge-based economy. However, the governments did not  give adequate support to 
technology parks in facilitating knowledge transfer for innovation (Joseph, 1994, pp. 46-
47). Indeed, many governments believed that when they established technology parks, 
they could instantly address the economic and social problems (Joseph, 1994, p. 46). The 
Government of Malaysia drew on  the Silicon Valley model to shape  technology parks 
(Gwynne, 1997, p. 5). Likewise, many developed and developing countries also used the 
Silicon Valley model for their technology parks such as Australia (Joseph, 1989, pp. 353-
356; Macdonald, 1983, p. 330), the United Kingdom (Siegel, Westhead, & Wright, 2003, 
p. 177) , China (Macdonald & Deng, 2003, pp. 1-2), and The Philippines (Macdonald & 
Joseph, 2001, p. 330). The Australian government, for example, was impressed with the 
Silicon  Valley  model  and  used  the  concept  of  technology  parks  to  address    slow 
economic growth (Joseph, 1989, pp. 353-356; Macdonald, 1983, p. 330). Accordingly, 
the Australian Government established their high technology policy based on the Silicon   217 
Valley model to positively impact the economy. However, its technology parks were not 
effective in overcoming  slow economic growth (Joseph, 1997, pp. 289-290).  
 
The government is convinced that the Silicon Valley model is a powerful instrument to 
encourage knowledge transfer due to its proximity to knowledge-based institutions such 
as universities, research centres, and laboratories. Such a situation allows institutions and 
firms in technology parks to work closely with  institutions outside the technology parks 
(Joseph, 1997, pp. 290-291).  However, the Australian government‟s expectation did not 
materialise because both the firms in technology parks and knowledge-based institutions 
that are established next to technology parks were not afforded a free flow of knowledge 
transfer (Phillimore, 1999, p. 673). In relation to this, Joseph (1997, p. 289) argued that 
the governments did not do a careful study before they decided to use technology parks to 
overcome their economic problems.  
 
Another example is in the United Kingdom. The British government used the Silicon 
Valley model to address its slow economic growth. Based on the Silicon Valley model, 
the government established British technology parks that were linked with universities. 
The government was convinced that when it established technology parks, it could attract 
major industry players to participate in knowledge transfer when they were set up next to 
universities. Indeed, Macdonald (1987, pp. 25-27) found out that British technology parks 
were not effective because the government did not fully understand the role of technology 
parks to address economic problems. 
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Knowledge  plays  an  important  role  in  the  economy  to  allow  innovation  to  occur. 
However, it is not easy to transfer knowledge due to the cost of transfer (Von Hippel, 
1994, p. 429). Knowledge is difficult to transfer, but it is still important to the economy. 
When the governments of Australia and Britain  established technology parks, they were 
trying to „control‟ knowledge flow between firms in technology parks with firms and 
institutions outside the parks (Macdonald, 1983, pp. 330-331, 1987, pp. 25-27). Likewise, 
the Chinese government (Macdonald, 2004, pp. 135-137) and the Philippines government 
(Macdonald & Joseph, 2001, pp. 330-331) also used technology parks to promote  their 
economy.  
 
Following the economic models that used technology parks to achieve good economic 
growth  in  the  United  Kingdom,  Australia,  China,  and  the  Philippines,  the  Malaysian 
Government established Malaysian technology parks to address its economic problems 
(Gwynne, 1997, p. 5). In the Malaysian context, the government formulated economic 
policies to give some impact on the economy. Informants stated that such an idea was 
also included in the policy for Malaysian technology parks.  
 
Such feedback emphasised that the government stance towards knowledge transfer lacked 
seriousness due to its interest in attracting foreign direct investment. 
 
4. Malaysian technology parks and the national agenda 
Malaysian technology parks are the instrument used by the government to encourage the 
development of the ICT industry. In fact, informants claimed that the government was   219 
interested in developing the country technologically, but at the same time it tried to keep 
to  its  national  agenda  in  its  economic  policies.  Likewise,  informants  said  that  the 
government also incorporated the national agenda into the technology parks policy.  
 
The  study  argued  that  the  government  promoted  its  national  agenda  through  the 
development of the ICT industry. Informants also argued that they were optimistic that 
the  technology  parks  can  help  tenant  firms  to  be  innovative.  More  importantly,  the 
informants contended that the government established technology parks to provide the 
basic  infrastructure  to  encourage  the  development  of  the  ICT  industry.    Indeed,  the 
growth of the ICT industry is essential to develop the country technologically and to 
accelerate the economic growth in the right decision.  
 
 
Technology parks and high technology were unable to have an immediate impact on the 
economy.  Macdonald (1992, pp. 49-50) argued that the participants in technology parks 
can collaborate with other firms in technology parks to allow free flow of information 
which  is  valuable  to  participants  who  have  high  regards  to  high  technology  and 
innovation.  The  formal  collaboration  is  inadequate  if  it  is  not  supported  by  informal 
relationships (Macdonald, 1992, p. 49). Knowledge or information does not necessarily 
flow through formal relationships due to individual and organisational reasons. Thus, 
firms should apply both formal and informal information networks.  
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5. Knowledge free flow 
Knowledge is essential to the market participants. Informants believed that with superior 
knowledge,  they  can  control  the  market  and  make  a  huge  profit.  Therefore,  they 
attempted to  obtain  information  from other  market participants so  that they can  gain 
superiority.  They  tried  to  unethically  „steal‟  information  from  their  competitors. 
Alternatively,  some  had  tried  a  more  ethical  approach  to  get  knowledge  from  other 
companies such as through technology transfer arrangements. Macdonald (1993, pp. 95-
96) argued that both approaches are not effective when these are related to knowledge. 
Knowledge  is  unlike  other  substances  that  can  be  stolen  and  obtained  through 
conventional ways. However, the informants were convinced that the government still 
can use technology parks for knowledge transfer and innovation among tenant firms. The 
close proximity of Malaysia‟s technology parks to universities, government departments, 
industrial sites, and financial institutions allow them to share and transfer knowledge to 
result in innovation. On the contrary, informants found out that these institutions did not 
have  any  significant  role  for  innovation  despite  the  close  proximity  to  Malaysia‟s 
technology parks. 
 
High technology policy and technology parks are unable to generate a significant effect 
on the economy if the sponsors of technology parks do not understand the essence of 
knowledge.  Macdonald  (1998,  pp.  47-48)  argued  that  knowledge  is  essential  for 
innovation. Accordingly, innovation allows the creation of new products for the market. 
This is the basis for the competition in the new economy.  The informants were aware   221 
about  the  role  of  innovation  in  the  knowledge-based  economy;  however,  Malaysia‟s 
technology parks were unable to encourage this.  
 
More importantly, the flow of knowledge allows knowledge to be codified and result in 
innovation (Mandeville, 1999, pp. 157-158). If the sponsors of technology parks have this 
understanding, they would not rush to establish technology parks in order to significantly 
effect the economy. The free flow of knowledge among market participants allows them 
to be innovative and productive. Such a situation allows technological change due to 
innovation  and  provides  more  economic  opportunities.  Eventually,  it  can  have  a 
significant effect on the economy.  
 
There are a number of critical questions to ask.  What are the reasons that motivated 
governments to use technology parks to address slow economic development? Cook and 
Joseph (2001, p. 385) asserted that governments rush to establish technology parks to fix 
the problems of the economy. Why do governments perceive that technology parks could 
address  economic  problems?  Macdonald  (1998,  pp.  168-170)  claimed  that  many 
governments tried to use technology parks to address economic problems because they 
believed that technology parks can supply the knowledge required by the economy to 
create outstanding economic growth. How can this happen? Macdonald (1998, p. 171) 
pointed out that the governments believed that when technology parks are located close to 
knowledge-oriented institutions such as universities, research centres, and so forth, firms 
based in technology parks can gain easy access to knowledge from these institutions. 
With that perception, Macdonald (1998, pp. 178-179) maintained that these governments   222 
are merely implementing the “linear innovation” approach to generate knowledge that 
can potentially give a positive impact on economic growth. If the governments continued 
to believe in the ability of technology parks to fix the economic problems, Macdonald 
(1996, p. 307) argued then the governments are just wasting time and resources, which he 
called the “labour of Sisyphus.” Macdonald (1998, pp. 47-48) suggested the governments 
play a significant role in using technology parks to facilitate knowledge transfer between 
ICT firms to encourage the development of the ICT industry.  
 
The  feedback  from  the  policy  makers,  government  officers  and  ICT  firms‟ 
representatives confirmed that the government contributed to “macro” level stickiness 
through its economic policies that did not adequately motivate ICT firms to participate in 
knowledge transfer. The “macro” level stickiness occurs when policy makers formulated 
the policy for technology parks and established technology parks across the nation to 
attract foreign direct investment in the ICT industry.  
 
Based on the findings, the study recommends that the policy makers and government 
officers should implement three practical actions that give the right roles to technology 
parks to promote knowledge transfer between ICT firms.  
 
Firstly, they should include in future economic policies a section on the ICT industry and 
a  progressive  evaluation  on  the  development  of  Malaysian  technology  parks. 
Administratively, a specific office or unit should be institutionalised at the Ministry of 
Science, Technology and Innovation, and integrated into the management of technology   223 
parks. By doing this, it will give technology parks more effective roles in promoting 
knowledge transfer through formal and informal methods. Such a suggestion is in line 
with Macdonald‟s (1992, pp. 49-50) argument that firms always recognise the knowledge 
that is obtained from the formal knowledge flow. In the meantime, firms can use informal 
information flow through employees, which minimizes some cost of operations. 
 
Secondly, the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, through its unit-in-charge 
of technology parks should work together with the management of technology parks and 
ICT firms to formulate a dynamic method of operations at technology parks to allow both 
“linear”  and  “non  linear”  innovations  (Macdonald,  1998,  pp.  47-48).  The  existing 
technology  park  model  resembles  the  “linear”  approach  where  ICT  firms  located  in 
technology parks can easily gain access knowledge (in terms of research output) from the 
knowledge-based institutions such as universities and research institutions.  The problem 
with the “linear” approach is that it is not practical because some institutions may have 
specific  policies  that  restricted  them  from  transferring  knowledge  to  external 
organisations.  
 
Finally,  the  Ministry  of  Science,  Technology  and  Innovation  should  establish  a  joint 
collaboration  with  the  Ministry  of  Human  Resources  and  the  ICT  industry  players 
(companies) to formulate training, development, and remuneration packages to encourage 
ICT firms to utilise their employees‟ network for knowledge transfer. This approach can 
be  implemented  within  the  current  operations  without  restructuring  the  whole 
administrative procedures. Although this effort is voluntary, the government needs to   224 
convince the ICT firms to give incentives to employees who can offer better ideas. In 
fact, Macdonald (1998, pp. 47-48) argued that the government can allow free flow of 
knowledge in technology parks. Eventually, such free flow of knowledge can motivate 
ICT firms to get involved in knowledge transfer with other firms. Since the government 
has established the technology parks with  public funds, Mandeville (1999, pp. 157-158) 
stressed that the government should work with the management of technology parks and 
ICT firms to promote good knowledge flow between ICT firms in technology parks.  
 
Since the it was found that the existing economic policies and policy for technology parks 
did not adequately support knowledge transfer between ICT firms, the study suggests the 
government, through Technology Development Unit, Ministry of Science, Technology 
and Innovation to work closely with the managers of technology parks and ICT firms at 
technology parks to search for practical actions that are executable  by both of them. 
Nevertheless,  this  study  believes  that  the  government  does  not  have  to  build  more 
facilities for the ICT industry, but to provide adequate support in connecting technology 
parks with ICT firms locally and globally.  
 
7.2 “Micro” level stickiness 
The  study  obtained  feedback  from  ICT  firms  to  obtain  insights  into  “micro”  level 
stickiness  caused  by  the  ICT  firms  themselves.  The  study  argues  that  ICT  firms 
contributed  toward  “micro”  level  stickiness  because  they  believed  that  knowledge 
transfer  between  firms  is  costly,  yet  they  were  uncertain  about  the  profitability.  The 
scholars said that knowledge transfer is costly in the four aspects, namely the (a) transfer   225 
mechanism,  (b)  types  of  transfer,  (c)  knowledge  barriers,  and  (d)  transfer  contexts 
(Szulanski & Jensen, 2004, pp. 347-349, 2006, pp. 937-938; Winter & Szulanski, 2001, 
pp. 730-731). Accordingly, informants of ICT firms were asked how they would respond 
to the high cost of operation in the four aspects of knowledge transfer. Each of the items 
is discussed below: 
 
a. Transfer mechanism 
Transfer  mechanism  is  one  important  element  in  knowledge  transfer.  Basically,  the 
scholars  argued  that  there  are  three  transfer  mechanisms,  namely  “replication,” 
(Szulanski & Jensen, 2004, p. 347) “adaptation,” (Szulanski & Jensen, 2006, pp. 937-
938) and “best practices” (Szulanski, 1995, p. 438). When ICT firms perform the three 
transfer  mechanisms,  they  used  organisational  resources  to  perform  the  three 
organisational actions: “learning,” “doing,” (Arrow, 1962, p. 155) and “remembering” 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982, pp. 99-101). Thus, ICT firms that are involved in knowledge 
transfer have to bear additional costs. Consequently, ICT firms will be reluctant to be 
involved in such an expensive undertaking. The informants claimed that ICT firms in 
Malaysian technology parks preferred knowledge transfer to be executed through formal 
arrangements  in  which  firms  that  are  involved  need  to  bear  additional  expenses. 
Nevertheless, ICT firms could not ascertain the amount of profit that they can make after 
engaging in knowledge transfer. Inkpen and Pien (2006, pp. 779-780) argued that firms 
preferred the formal arrangement to avoid future disputes that can be very costly. In fact, 
prior to a formal relationship, firms normally establish informal relationships with other 
firms. Such decisions are very straight forward for profit making institutions which are   226 
only  concerned  with  profit  maximisation  objectives.  Dyer  and  Hatch  (2006,  pp.  4-5) 
argued that a good relationship between firms can lead to the transfer of  “capability” that 
is essential in knowledge transfer between firms. However, firms have to bear some cost 
if they desire to get knowledge from other firms.  
 
Informants  argued  that  knowledge  transfer  between  ICT  firms  in  the  Malaysian 
technology  parks  involved  “replication,”  (Szulanski  &  Jensen,  2004,  p.  347) 
“adaptation,” (Szulanski & Jensen, 2006, pp. 937-938) and “best practice” (Szulanski, 
1995, p. 438).  Hence, when the firms acquired knowledge from other firms through 
“replication,”  (Szulanski  &  Jensen,  2004,  p.  347),  they  are  already  involved  in  a 
“learning” process. Indeed, Winter and Szulanski (2001, p. 735) argued that “replication” 
can be related to “diffusing”  knowledge within an organisation or between organisations. 
Winter and Szulanski (2001, p. 735) said: 
The learning process may begin from an idea of how something works; this idea 
is then used to create a template. Conversely, the process may begin with an 
attempt to replicate an existing template. The capability to replicate develops 
over time as repetition and experience reveal the effects of the attribute mix on 
the success, cost, and robustness of the replication process. 
 
 
The “learning” process that Winter and Szulanski (2001, p. 735) described is in line with 
Szulanski and Jensen‟s (2004, p. 348) argument that the “replication” of firms‟ daily 
tasks  or  “routines”,  within  an  organisation,  is  more  cost  effective  because  the 
organisation  has  the  full  access  to  its  own  “templates”  or  “working  examples.”  The 
“replication” of “daily tasks” is not only difficult to perform, but costly to firms. This 
suggests  ICT  firms  can  take  a  few  practical  actions  to  address  the  “replication”   227 
difficulties. Firstly, they should make use of firms‟ formal and informal information flow 
in the knowledge transfer process. Indeed, the findings demonstrated that ICT firms were 
involved  in  knowledge  transfer  to  “replicate”  the  good  performance  of  other  people. 
Secondly,  this  study  also  suggests  ICT  firms  to  help  the  government  to  facilitate 
knowledge transfer between firms. Finally, ICT firms should provide incentives to the 
employees  to  motivate  them  to  use  the  informal  information  network  to  acquire 
knowledge from other firms. 
 
b. Types of transfer 
As  for  types  of  transfer,  the  scholars  asserted  that  the  types  of  knowledge  transfer 
comprised “technology,” “technical advice,”(Teece, 2005, pp. 17-19) and “best practice” 
(Szulanski, 1996, p. 27). Each type of transfer requires the firms to be capable to get the 
knowledge transferred (Dyer & Hatch, 2006, pp. 4-5). Informants emphasised that ICT 
firms have to bear the cost of knowledge transfer. Additionally, they pointed out that ICT 
firms transferred the “best practices” (Szulanski, 1996, p. 27) and “technology” (Teece, 
2005, pp. 17-19) through the government projects that they collaborated on. Lee and Win 
(2004, pp. 433-434) claimed that regardless of the types of transfer, firms have to bear the 
costs. Nevertheless, firms often tried to minimise the cost as much as possible. Lin (2003, 
pp. 327-328) argued that firms can try to minimise the cost, but they will not easily allow 
other firms to acquire their knowledge that can be a source of their competitiveness.  
 
The types of transfer that occurred in knowledge transfer between ICT firms in Malaysian 
technology parks were “best practices” (Szulanski, 1996, p. 27) and “technology” (Teece,   228 
2005, pp. 17-19). This situation can be related to Teece‟s (1977, pp. 244-247) argument 
that  firms  preferred  the  “technology”  type  of  transfer  to  improve  or  introduce  new 
technology in order to appropriate long term profits. Szulanski (1996, pp. 27-28) argued 
that firms that are interested in acquiring “best practices” from other firms believed that 
when they used the “best practices” of other firms, they can improve the organisational 
activities that are more profitable.  
 
c. Knowledge transfer barriers 
In terms of knowledge barriers, the scholars argued that knowledge is not easy to be 
transferred due to the “knowledge” itself and the “situation” in which that knowledge is 
created (Szulanski, 1995, p. 437). Accordingly, when knowledge is to be transferred to 
other firms, the recipients have to ensure that both aspects are transferred. Thus, such 
action will result in additional costs to ICT firms. Informants of the study said that ICT 
firms were not convinced that they can obtain the same quality of knowledge transferred 
from other ICT firms. Additionally, it appeared that ICT firms were not willing to share 
knowledge with other firms. They rather concentrated on profit making activities.  
 
Informants also argued that the “campus-like” (Macdonald, 1998, p. 49)  environment in 
Malaysian technology parks is insufficient to promote knowledge transfer between ICT 
firms. Moreover, they claimed that local firms were inexperienced in the ICT industry. 
Additionally, informants claimed that firms are not willing to share knowledge with other 
firms. Instead, they rather concentrate on profit making activities. As such, the “campus-
like”  environment  in  Malaysian  technology  parks  is  unable  to  promote  knowledge   229 
transfer  among  tenant  firms  since  most  ICT  firms  were  inexperienced  in  ICT.    The 
findings also argued that the arrangement to get knowledge transferred from other ICT 
firms was expensive and yet ICT firms were not financially sound to bear the expensive 
organisational activities.  
 
Based on Szulanski‟s argument about knowledge barriers, the unwillingness of ICT firms 
to  transfer  knowledge  can  be  explained  by  two  aspects  of  knowledge:  “knowledge 
characteristics” and “situation characteristics” (Szulanski, 1995, p. 437). The first barrier 
is about how to get the benefit from the knowledge that was acquired from other firms 
which has not proven profitable (Szulanski, 1995, p. 438). ICT firms are very concerned 
about profitability. They do not want to waste time and resources on something that 
cannot generate profit. For that reason, informants argued that ICT firms are located in 
technology  parks  to  get  the  benefit  of  cheaper  rental  for  good  facilities  and  also 
investment incentives associated with the MSC status and Malaysian technology parks. 
Essentially,  the  mindset  of  ICT  firms  was  just  to  reap  economic  advantages  by 
establishing their businesses in Malaysian technology parks. Such a mindset indicated 
that ICT firms were not interested to be involved in knowledge transfer with other ICT 
firms, especially when they viewed other ICT firms as their competitors.  
 
 
The  second  type  of  knowledge  barrier  is  about  the  context  where  the  knowledge  is 
created. This means that knowledge creation involved a few participants in the economy. 
The  scholars  explained  the  “situation  characteristics”  (Szulanski,  1995,  p.  437)  that 
impede knowledge transfer because of a few factors such as (a) the motivation of the   230 
origin of the knowledge, (b) perception from the party to receive knowledge, (c) the lack 
of interest from the “recipient” of knowledge, (d) the lack of “absorptive capacity” on the 
recipient side, (e) the lack of ability to hold knowledge on the “recipient” side, (f) lack of 
support  from  the  management  of  the  organisations  involved,  and  (g)  communication 
breakdowns between the “source” and “recipient” of knowledge (Szulanski, 1995, pp. 
437-439). All these factors are important to facilitate knowledge transfer between ICT 
firms. However, the findings pointed out that ICT firms were not concerned about these 
factors because their primary concern is profit making.  
 
Informants were aware that it is costly to acquire knowledge from other firms. However, 
if there were reasonable costs for knowledge transfer activities then the ICT firms would 
search for information. 
 
d. Transfer contexts 
The scholars further argued that knowledge transfer is costly in both single (Szulanski, 
1996, pp. 27-28) and multiple contexts (Kostova & Roth, 2002, pp. 215-216). As a result, 
ICT firms will decide the appropriate contexts that are reasonable to allow knowledge 
transfer (Persson, 2006, p. 547; Santoro & Bierly, 2006, p. 495). The findings confirmed 
that  the  decision  to  be  involved  in  single  and  multiple  contexts  is  based  on  the 
profitability of the knowledge to be transferred. 
 
The  informants  argued  that  multinational  corporations  tend  to  practice  knowledge 
transfer within their own firms rather than with other firms. Informants argued that they 
participated  in  single  and  multiple  contexts  as  long  as  they  can  make  profit.  They   231 
acknowledged that when their firms are located in Malaysian technology parks, they have 
an advantage to establish their businesses next to other ICT firms, especially the giant 
multinational ICT firms with which they can easily establish face-to-face interactions.  
 
In addition, informants also argued that the facilities provided at Malaysian technology 
parks were modern and sophisticated to allow potential networking between ICT firms. 
Such quality facilities were essential to attract many ICT firms to operate in the MSC. 
 
However, informants were not convinced that all the facilities and privileges provided by 
technology parks can make them instantly innovative in the ICT industry. Indeed, they 
argued that they can enjoy the sophisticated and modern facilities at an affordable rate, 
but  that  alone  will  not  motivate  them  to  be  innovative  through  knowledge  transfer 
between ICT firms. In fact, they argued that ICT firms were interested in making profit 
with any partnership.  
 
Based on the feedback of ICT firms, they were very concerned about profitability. Hence, 
they suggested that the government play an active role to enhance the technology parks 
and  to  take  an  active  role  in  promoting  knowledge  transfer  between  ICT  firms. 
Additionally,  ICT  firms  can  use  informal  information  methods  to  acquire  knowledge 
from other firms.   
 
In short, “macro” stickiness is caused by the government through the existing economic 
policies  that  are  concerned  with  investment  attraction,  employment  and  business 
opportunities, wealth creation and national stability. These policies are commendable; 
however, if the government and the ICT firms could work together to produce a practical   232 
formula to support knowledge transfer among ICT firms, that would be very meaningful 
for knowledge transfer. Eventually, the “micro” stickiness caused by the “increasing” 
cost of transfer (“very costly” and “quite costly”) issue could be addressed through this 
effort when the ICT firms could estimate long term profitability in both wealth creation 
and superiority of technology capability. 
7.3 Linkage between the results of the “macro” and “micro” levels stickiness 
This section discusses the linkage of the results of the “macro” and “micro” levels of 
stickiness.  
 
 
The results of the “macro” level stickiness investigation confirm that the government 
contributed  to  the  phenomenon.    Its  formulated  economic  policies  did  not  support 
meaningful knowledge transfer between ICT firms. As an immediate action to overcome 
this problem, the government should work closely with the managers of technology parks 
and ICT firms located there to search for practical short- and medium term solutions. 
 
The results of the “micro” level stickiness investigation confirm that ICT firms are not 
keen to participate in knowledge transfer between them because their primary concern is 
making profit. Hence, they suggest that the government play an active role to enhance the 
technology parks and to take an active role in promoting knowledge transfer between 
them.  Additionally,  ICT  firms  might  want  to  use  informal  information  channels  to 
acquire knowledge from other firms. 
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The  two  results  above  share  a  common  thread.  The  “macro”  issue  (for  instance, 
“economic and business advantages”) may be labelled as the „cause‟ factor, whereas the 
“micro” aspect (for example “very costly” to “emulate, learn, research and development”) 
as the „effect‟ factor. The main concern of firms is to maximise profits and to minimise 
cost. Any undertaking that is perceived to be costly will invite reluctance among ICT 
firms. This implies that the “macro” issue must be solved first before confronting the 
“micro”  issue.  In  other  words,  the  problem  with  “stickiness”  in  knowledge  transfer 
between ICT firms could be managed if the government provides meaningful support and 
motivation  to  ICT  firms.  With  renewed  government  support  and  greater  confidence 
among ICT firms to make potential profits, the latter may be more active in engaging in 
knowledge transfer initiatives. Table 7.4 provides a summary of the research findings. 
Table 7.4 
The Summary of the Research Findings 
Research 
Question 
Propositions  Answers to Interview Questions  Proposed Solutions 
 
 
Why is 
knowledge 
difficult to 
transfer between 
ICT firms? 
 
The government 
contributed to 
“macro” level 
stickiness through 
economic policies 
that constrained 
firms by requiring 
that their decisions 
reflect the national 
agenda put forward 
by those in 
government. 
 
 
“MACRO” STICKINESS 
 
A. Factors included in Malaysian economic 
policies:  
a. economic and business advantages  
b. employment opportunities 
c. national unity  
d. wealth creation 
 
B. Reasons for the national agenda in 
economic policies: 
a. protect the economy 
b.  to  maintain  unity  and  harmony  in 
multiracial context, and 
c. to safeguard the national interest 
 
C. Roles of Malaysian technology parks: 
a. stimulus 
b. networking 
c. knowledge 
d. incubation 
e. incentives 
f. image 
 
 
a. The federal government 
to establish Technology 
Development Unit (TDU) 
at the Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Innovation 
(MOSTI) to monitor a 
progressive evaluation on 
the development of 
Malaysian technology 
parks 
 
b. To form coordination 
council between TDU-
MOSTI, Technology Parks, 
and ICT firms for dynamic 
method of operations 
 
c. To set a steering 
Committee (joint the 
Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Innovation 
with the Ministry of 
Human Resources and the 
ICT industry players 
(companies) to formulate 
training, development, and 
remuneration packages to   234 
encourage ICT firms to 
utilise their employees‟ 
network for knowledge 
transfer 
ICT firms 
contributed to 
“micro” level 
stickiness when they 
did not want to be 
involved in 
knowledge transfer 
because it was costly 
in terms of (a) 
transfer mechanism, 
(b) types of transfer, 
(c) knowledge 
barriers, and (d) 
transfer context 
“MICRO” STICKINESS 
 
(a)  TM:  cost  of  transfer  mechanisms  is 
“very  costly”  in  the  combination  of 
“emulate,  learn,  research  and 
development.” 
(b) TT: the cost of types of transfer is also 
“very  costly”  when  both  “people”  and 
“technology” combined. 
(c)  KB:  “quite  costly”  when  two  out  of 
three  elements  –  “cost,”  “people,”  and 
“management”, combined. 
(d)  TC:  quite  costly”  when  “single”  and 
“multiple” combined; plus “business” role 
of technology parks. 
Solutions for “very costly” 
transfer mechanism: 
a. ICT firms use the formal 
and informal information 
flow in knowledge transfer 
process. 
b. ICT firms to work with 
the government to facilitate 
knowledge transfer 
between firms 
c. ICT firms should provide 
incentives to the employees 
to motivate them to use the 
informal information 
network to acquire 
knowledge from other 
firms 
 
Solutions for “very costly” 
types of transfer: 
a.  ICT  firms  to  acquire 
essential  “technology”  and 
“best  practices”  
(Szulanski,  1996,  pp.  27-
28)  to  improve  the 
organisational activities  to 
be cost efficient and more 
profitable. 
b.  ICT  firms  to  share 
transfer  cost  through 
specific  arrangement  with 
the  government  and  other 
ICT firms.  
 
Solutions for “quite costly” 
knowledge barriers: 
a. motivate ICT firms to 
share knowledge  
b. change the perception of 
the beneficiary of 
knowledge receivers 
c. Instill the interest from 
the knowledge receivers  
d. Prepare the “absorptive 
capacity” on the recipient 
side 
e. Increase the ability to 
hold knowledge on the 
“recipient” side 
f. Encourage support from 
the management of the 
organisations involved 
g. Resolve any 
communication 
breakdowns between the 
“source” and “recipient” of 
knowledge (Szulanski, 
1995, pp. 437-439).   235 
 
Solutions for “quite costly” 
transfer context: 
a. Proactive role from the 
government to enhance the 
role of technology parks 
b. Active role in promoting 
knowledge transfer 
between ICT firms 
c. Encourage ICT firms to 
use informal information 
methods to acquire 
knowledge from other 
firms   236 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
This  study  examined  stickiness  in  knowledge  transfer  between  ICT  firms  in  selected 
Malaysian technology parks. The research question was “why is knowledge difficult to 
transfer  between  ICT  firms?”  The  answer  is  stickiness  impedes  effective  knowledge 
transfer between ICT firms. There are two levels of stickiness in knowledge transfer, 
namely “macro” and “micro.”  
 
In  terms  of  “macro”  level  stickiness,  the  research  found  out  that  the  government 
contributed to “macro” level stickiness through its economic policies, particularly the 
fiscal incentives. The fiscal incentives such as the MSC bill of guarantee became “sticky” 
when they were perceived insufficient to motivate knowledge transfer between ICT firms 
although the government has established technology parks. Besides the fiscal incentives, 
the  government  is  expected  to  enhance  the  existing  collaboration  between  key 
government  agencies  and  ICT  industry  key  players  to  facilitate  knowledge  transfer 
between ICT firms within as well as outside the technology parks. 
 
The results of the “micro” level stickiness argued that that ICT firms are not keen to 
participate in “costly” knowledge transfer between them because their primary concern is 
making profit. Fiscal incentives were viewed as instruments to gain business advantages 
in terms of the cost minimization effort. Hence, they suggest that the government play an 
active  role  to  enhance  the  technology  parks  and  to  take  an  active  role  in  promoting   237 
knowledge transfer between them. Additionally, ICT firms might want to use informal 
information channels to acquire knowledge from other firms. 
 
In short, the entire study converges to emphasise that the government contributed to the 
“macro”  level  stickiness  in  knowledge  transfer  because  the  economic  policies  that  it 
formulated did not support meaningful knowledge transfer between ICT firms.  Likewise, 
the ICT firms also contributed to the stickiness of knowledge because the ICT firms were 
reluctant to participate in knowledge transfer due to “increasing” cost of transfer. 
 
8.1 Limitations of the study 
The study examines stickiness in knowledge transfer between ICT firms in Malaysian 
technology parks and confirms that the government and ICT firms contributed to “macro” 
and “micro” level stickiness, respectively. Nevertheless, the findings of the study should 
be  read  with  a  few  limitations,  namely  (a)  the  scope  of  the  study,  (b)  the  types  of 
informants, (c) the data collection method, and (d) the duration of the fieldwork. Each of 
the limitations is discussed below: 
 
a. The scope of the study 
The study examines stickiness in knowledge transfer between ICT firms, but the scope is 
restricted to the study of ICT firms in the selected Malaysian technology parks only. 
Future  study  should  include  also  ICT  firms  that  are  operated  outside  the  Malaysian 
technology parks. The feedback from ICT firms in Malaysian technology parks is valid, 
but it is not conclusive. If the study could include the feedback from ICT firms outside   238 
the technology parks, then the results could further explain the problems of knowledge 
transfer between ICT firms outside the specially „protected‟ environment. 
 
b. Types of informants 
The researcher interviewed policy makers, government officers, and executives of ICT 
firms to obtain the feedback on “macro” and “micro” levels of stickiness. To obtain the 
responses  for  the  “macro”  level  stickiness,  the  researcher  interviewed  policy  makers, 
government officers and firms‟ executives. However, there was no significant difference 
in  the  opinions  expressed  by  both  policy  makers  and  government  officers.  This  is 
understandable since both informants work closely to formulate economic policies.   
 
The feedback from the ICT firms came from the managers and senior executives only. If 
the researcher could interview key employees of the ICT firms, more information about 
knowledge transfer between ICT firms could have been obtained and cross referenced 
with the managers and senior executives. 
 
c. Data collection method 
The  study  used  the  personal  interview  technique  to  obtain  the  feedback  from  policy 
makers, government officers and executives of ICT firms. Such a technique was useful to 
give rich information, but it was unable to get feedback from more informants. Moreover, 
the  study  used  note  taking  technique  to  transcribe  the  interviews  which  were  later 
analysed  manually.  Nevertheless,  the  study  was  aware  of  the  disadvantages  of  such   239 
technique, but owing to the nature of the study, it was considered adequate to obtain some 
insights for the study although they may be inconclusive.  
 
d. Duration of the fieldwork 
Fieldwork was conducted on two occasions. The first time was within three months from 
May through July 2005. The second time was within a month in August 2007. There is a 
gap of two years between the first and the second time of data collection. The main 
reason  for  the  second  fieldwork  was  to  update  the  feedback  in  2005  with  the  latest 
development in the ICT industry. Since the fieldwork was conducted at two different 
times, the same informants were not able to be interviewed. 
 
8.2 Future directions of the study 
The study has identified a few limitations that hindered it from obtaining more conclusive 
answers  from  the  informants,  namely  (a)  the  scope  of  the  study,  (b)  the  types  of 
informants, (c) the data collection method, and (d) the duration of the fieldwork. The 
study suggests that the discussion for the future directions of the study is based on the 
factors that limit the study from obtaining more conclusive results. Each aspect of the 
future direction is discussed below: 
 
a. The scope of the study 
The study suggests the future studies to include all important participants and industry 
players  of  the  ICT  industry.  When  the  study  includes  the  feedback  from  all  the   240 
participants in the ICT industry, it can expect more conclusive results. With regard to 
time and cost constraints, the study should anticipate them right from the beginning. 
 
For future research, this study recommends such plan allocate more time to ensure more 
conclusive  results.  In  fact,  future  studies  could  obtain  medium  to  long-term  research 
grants, and report their findings periodically for the benefit of the sponsors. Alternatively, 
future studies could collaborate with the government and the ICT industry. The reason for 
using such approach is that both the government and the ICT firms can work together to 
identify their weaknesses and strengths. This is important for them to come out with more 
sustainable solutions to address both social and economic problems. 
 
b. Types of informants 
In this study, only selected policy makers, government officers, and executives of ICT 
firms that are directly involved in the ICT industry were interviewed. Since the study was 
confined to selected informants, it was not able to obtain conclusive feedback. In view of 
that, the study recommends future studies to include a cross section of informants that are 
directly involved in the ICT industry. Additionally, future studies could also interview 
informants  who  were  already  interviewed  so  that  the  study  could  verify  whether  the 
informants uphold consistent views. 
 
c. The data collection method 
The study used personal interview technique to obtain the feedback from the informants. 
When the study used only one technique, it has no means of verifying consistency of   241 
opinions from the same informants. Future studies may consider the use of more than one 
technique such as personal interview and observations at the informants‟ institutions. In 
fact, the future studies could administer a mail questionnaire survey to obtain explicit 
feedback from more informants. 
 
d. The duration of the fieldwork 
The  fieldwork  was  conducted  twice  at  two  different  sets  of  times.  This  situation  is 
reasonable  to  get  the  latest  information.  If  the  future  studies  require  very  detailed 
feedback, then they should conduct the fieldwork several times. By doing so, the future 
studies could verify the feedback that is obtained from several stages which can give 
more robust and conclusive answers.   242 
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Appendix 1: Cover letter 
MURDOCH BUSINESS SCHOOL 
South Street, Murdoch 
Western Australia 6150 
Telephone: (61-8) 9360 2837 
Facsimile: (61-8) 9310 5004 
E-mail: s.sarif@murdoch.edu.au 
 
 
Date:                 Ref: 30298559 
 
The CEO______________ 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
Knowledge Transfer Survey 
I am a Ph.D. student at the Murdoch Business School, Murdoch University, Perth, Western Australia, 
investigating the difficulties, prospects and expectations of knowledge transfer between technology-based 
firms  in  Malaysia  science  and  technology  parks  under  the  supervision  of  Associate Professor  Richard 
Joseph. The purpose of this study is to investigate knowledge transfer between firms in these parks and the 
role of these parks in promoting knowledge transfer.  I hope to be able to show how the difficulties of 
knowledge transfer can be overcome and with this assist the formulation of public policy on innovation. 
The  research  outcome  is  very  significant  to  the  Government  of  Malaysia  to  boost  the  growth  of  the 
knowledge-based economy for the nation. 
I am a Malaysian and a lecturer at the International Islamic University Malaysia and currently conducting 
research that is fully sponsored by the Public Services Department of Malaysia.  
All information collected will be treated confidential and no names or other information that might identify 
you will be used in any publication arising from the research.  
I earnestly hope that you will be able to participate in this study by spending approximately 30-60 minutes 
to answer the interview questions. If you have any questions about this project, please feel free to contact 
either  myself,  Suhaimi  Mhd  Sarif,  on  +618  9360  2837,  E-mail:  s.sarif@murdoch.edu.au,  or  my 
supervisor, Associate Professor Richard Joseph, on +618 9360 6274, E-mail: R.joseph@murdoch.edu.au.  
My supervisor and I are happy to discuss with you any concerns you may have on how this study is 
conducted, or alternatively you can contact Murdoch University's Human Research Ethics Committee on 
+618 9360 6677, E-mail: ethics@murdoch.edu.au. 
Sincerely, 
 
Dr Richard Joseph 
Associate Professor 
Murdoch Business School 
Suhaimi Mhd Sarif 
Ph.D. Candidate 
Murdoch Business School 
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Associate Professor Richard Joseph/ Mr. Suhaimi Mhd Sarif 
Murdoch Business School 
Murdoch University 
South Street, Perth WA 6150 
Australia 
 
Dear Sirs: 
REPLY SLIP 
I/We  (the  participant)  _________________________________________  have 
read the information above. Any questions I have asked have been answered to 
my satisfaction. I agree to take part in this activity, however, I know that I may 
change my mind and stop at any time.   
I understand that all information provided is treated as confidential and will not be 
released by the investigator unless required to do so by law. I also understand 
that I can decide to withdraw my consent at any time. 
I agree that research data gathered for this study may be published provided my 
name or other information, which might identify me, is not used. 
Participant/Authorised Representative: 
Date:                                             
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Appendix 2: Interview questions 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
Policy makers 
1.  What are the factors has been considered by the government when formulating 
economic policies to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
2.  Why does the government include the national agenda in economic policies which 
are supposed to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
3.  How Malaysian technology parks assist knowledge transfer among ICT firms that 
operate in Malaysian technology parks? 
 
Government officers 
 
1.  What are the factors has been considered by the government when formulating 
economic policies to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
2.  Why does the government include the national agenda in economic policies which 
are supposed to encourage knowledge transfer among ICT firms? 
3.  How Malaysian technology parks assist knowledge transfer among ICT firms that 
operate in Malaysian technology parks? 
 
ICT firms 
 
1.  How does your firm respond to high cost transfer mechanisms when it is involved 
in knowledge transfer with other ICT firms? 
2.  How does your firm respond to high cost types of transfer when it is involved in 
knowledge transfer with other ICT firms? 
3.  How does your firm respond to high cost knowledge barriers when it is involved 
in knowledge transfer with other ICT firms? 
4.  How does your firm respond to high cost transfer contexts when it is involved in 
knowledge transfer with other ICT firms? 
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